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1 
 
Summary 
 
 
Increasing rates of divorce, cohabitation and single parenthood mean that the 
well-being of families throughout the European Union has generated 
considerable interest from policy makers.  This report presents an overview of 
the available knowledge that is published in the English language on the way 
that family change affects children. 
 
Across the EU, family structure, formation, dissolution and policy vary 
considerably.  The review considered selected outcomes for children in 12 
countries:  Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  These countries have been 
selected to represent different approaches to family policy. 
 
The outcomes considered are poverty and social exclusion, educational 
achievement, health and well-being, and housing.  The review shows that the 
increased risk of poverty among children in single parent families is reinforced 
by disadvantage at school and poorer health and housing outcomes.  Children 
from non-intact families are more likely than those living with both their parents 
to be exposed to risks which represent barriers to educational achievement.  
Educational outcomes are of particular concern as they are crucial to the future 
life-prospects of children and young people.  There is also a negative relationship 
between single parenthood and health outcomes for children.  Moreover, family 
breakdown can have substantial, long-lasting adverse repercussions for the 
housing situations and living arrangements of children of single parent families.  
A fall in household income, market pressures and the lack of affordable housing 
can push post-breakdown households into poor quality or inappropriate housing.   
 
While the general thrust of the literature is that family breakdown is associated 
with poorer outcomes for children, there is debate about the nature of this link.  
Some researchers have argued that the association has been overstated and 
that background features of family life, which often go unmeasured, may 
exercise a greater influence on children’s outcomes than family structure per se.  
Others believe that there are specific risk factors associated with growing up 
within a non-intact family which exercise a real effect upon outcomes.  A third 
type of explanatory framework considers the extent to which differing family 
policy environments across countries mediate the link between family structure 
and children’s outcomes.   
 
As a review of English language publications, many of the sources used come 
from the Nordic countries and the UK.  There are fewer studies reported here for 
CCE and Southern European countries.  While care must be taken not to ‘over-
generalise’ the findings, the review nonetheless highlights the importance of 
providing a policy framework that provides single parents with a ‘life-work’ 
balance, decent family income, and support services delivered by professionals 
and agencies sensitive to the risk of poorer outcomes for children due to family 
breakdown. The review finds that some EU countries perform better than others 
in delivering policies for children in general and children of single parents in 
particular which provides learning opportunities for countries facing the 
challenge of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all children.   
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1  Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
Across the European Union (EU25) there is, with significant country variations, 
nearly one divorce for every two marriages (Eurostat, 2006). Increasing rates of 
divorce, cohabitation and single parenthood means that around a third of all 
babies born in the EU25 are now born outside marriage (Eurostat, 2006).  Given 
this demographic change (Billari, 2005), the well-being of families throughout 
the European Union (EU) has generated strong interest from policy makers.  
 
The European Commission’s commitment to developing EU policy to support 
family life takes account of demographic ageing, growing diversity and the 
promotion of equal rights for women, men, parents, non-parents and children.  
The modernization of family support policies in the EU also promotes children’s 
rights and this is a critical element of support for families.  For example, the 
European Commission’s Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 
(2008b:20, 23) advances an ‘active inclusion’ strategy to tackling child poverty.  
This is an integrated approach which combines:  a) income support for families 
(such as family benefits) at a level sufficient for people to live in dignity; and b) 
policies enhancing the labour market integration of parents. 
 
This report presents an overview of the available knowledge that is published in 
the English language on the way that family change (involving separation of a 
parental couple in both married and cohabiting relationships) affects both the 
social situation and prospects of children, and identifies policy measures that 
have a positive effect in mitigating any negative impacts for children of family 
breakdown.  Family dissolution (that is, divorce and cohabitation breakdown) is 
only one route into single parenthood.  Other paths include single, never married 
mothers and widowhood.  Studies reviewed in this report rarely distinguish 
between the various pathways into single parenthood, and for this reason the 
review is (of necessity) based on single parents as a whole. 
 
 
1.2  Aims of review 
 
The aims of the research are:  
 
• To provide an overview of the current impact of family instability on the 
social situation of, and prospects for, children in Europe. 
• To examine policy measures that may mitigate against the negative impacts 
on children of family instability.  These measures include policies to support 
parents in paid work; support for care giving (including childcare provision), 
and support for parenting.  
 
The review identifies the extent and impact of family relationship breakdown on 
children in the EU focusing on 12 selected Member States (see below).  While it 
is recognised that there is a wealth of literature published in languages other 
than English, the scope of the study is confined to publications in English. 
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The report provides a thematic and comparative study of the research questions 
within European institutional, social, demographic and policy contexts.  The 
review identifies and evaluates policy measures in each of the selected EU 
Member States, and identifies key policy lessons.  Specifically, it examines: 
 
• The social situation of children (such as the risk of poverty and social 
exclusion and poor housing conditions). 
• Short and longer term impacts on children (especially for educational 
achievement and physical and psychological health). 
• The demographic context. 
 
1.3  Research design and methods 
  
 
The review is comparative and draws on a range of quantitative and descriptive 
data to both identify institutional, social, demographic and policy contexts and 
compare data on family breakdown in all 27 EU Member States - these data are 
reported in Chapter 2.  
 
The review uses ‘traditional’ or purposive review methodologies, and not 
systematic approaches (Gough, 2007).  As such ‘informed’, extensive sweeps 
rather than systematic searches were conducted.  This review includes single-
country and comparative studies which address the nature of the relationship 
between family structure and child outcomes in 12 case study countries (see 
below) and more broadly where appropriate.  In some cases there is an 
imbalance of available literature in English and caution must therefore be 
exercised in generalising findings to societies with very different policy 
environments.  The comparative cross-national studies included in the review 
introduce evidence from a broader sweep of countries but may be reliant on 
more limited outcome measures.  
 
 
1.4  Selection of the twelve countries for in-depth 
study 
 
Across the EU, family structure, formation, dissolution and policy vary 
considerably.  There are, however, clusters of counties that share similar 
characteristics regarding the relationship between family, state, market and civil 
society (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996; Hantrais, 2004; Pascall and 
Manning, 2000; Arts and Gellissen, 2002; Berthoud and Iacovou, 2007).  Twelve 
countries were carefully chosen to illustrate different approaches to family policy 
(Hantrais, 2004:199).  The case study countries are:  Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK.  The selection of the countries is based on Hantrais’ 
typology of family policy in the EU. 
 
Hantrais’ typology of family policy in the EU groups countries into categories 
based on the degree of ‘defamilialisation’ in family policy and family form.  
Defamilialised policies are those which offer generous state support for families 
as opposed to placing undue reliance on family support in order to secure a 
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socially acceptable standard of living (Hantrais, 2004:199).  A further aspect of 
defamilialisation entails the deinstitutionalisation of family forms.  The increasing 
diversity in family forms and the movement away from the ‘male breadwinner 
model’ are markers of family deinstitutionalisation.  This has been seen 
demographically in rising divorce rates, increasing levels of unmarried 
cohabitation in some EU countries, greater proportions of extramarital births, 
higher levels of single parenthood, and decreasing numbers of multigenerational 
households (Hantrais, 2004:63).  In short, defamilialisation refers to a 
movement away from traditional family forms and extended family support to 
state support to ensure family well-being.    
 
Hantrais’ typology of family policy groups EU Member States into four 
categories:  defamilialised, partially defamilialised, familialised, and 
refamilialised (see Table 1.1).  The countries within each grouping share a 
similar design and structure of family policy and a similar level of commitment to 
state support for family life (Hantrais, 2004:199-200).  However, it should be 
noted that variations within clusters exist, such as differences in funding 
mechanisms, methods of delivery, the target population and the impact of family 
policy overall. Furthermore, the groups, in some cases, have fuzzy boundaries 
and countries may shift from one group to another depending on the criteria 
applied (Hantrais, 2004:199-200).   
 
The defamilialised countries include the Nordic States – Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden - France, Luxembourg and Belgium, all of which are seen as having 
explicit, coherent family policies, which are legitimised, coordinated and 
supportive of working parents. With the exception of Belgium these policies are 
based on citizenship/residence. However, there is a distinction made in this 
group between the tax funded, individualised and service based policies of the 
Nordic countries and the mixed funded, family centred and institutional policies 
of Belgium, Luxembourg and France.  In both cases public administration is 
supportive of family life to the extent that ‘the responsibility for family matters 
can be said to be defamilialised, and the state can be described as family and 
women friendly’ (Hantrais, 2004:200-201).  Offering high standards of benefits 
and services, the strong ideological commitment to redistributive policies rests 
on notions of social solidarity and collective responsibility.  Designed to 
maximise personal choice and flexibility, the development of alternative family 
forms has not been seen as problematic (Hantrais, 2004:201).   
 
The second, ‘partially defamilialised’, typology relates to family policies found in 
the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK).  
Partial defamilialisation means that family policies are only partially coordinated 
and legitimised.  While government rhetoric is supportive of families, policy 
actors are reluctant to interfere in private life (Hantrais, 2004:202).  
Consequently, family policies are implicit and indirect, resulting in less coherent 
policies than those of the first typology.  The two sub-groups are distinguished 
by their funding mechanisms with Austria and Germany having some similarities 
with the second subgroup of the defamilialised countries in that they have formal 
structures for making and delivering policies (Hantrais, 2004:202). The 
Netherlands straddles the two subgroups. 
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Table 1.1: Hantrais’ (2004) typology of family policy in the EU (with the 
addition of Bulgaria and Romania) 
 
Typology Overarching characteristics of 
family-policy  
 
Countries 
 
1) Defamilialised
 
Explicit, coherent, legitimised, 
coordinated, supportive of working 
parents, universal/residence 
Denmark 
Finland 
Sweden Belgium 
France 
Luxembourg 
 
2) Partially 
Defamilialised
Residence, partially coordinated, 
partially legitimised, rhetorical, 
implicit/indirect 
Netherlands 
Austria,  
Germany 
Ireland 
UK 
 
 
3) Familialised Underfunded, un-coordinated, weakly 
legitimised, non institutionalised, 
fragmented 
Greece 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Cyprus 
Malta 
 
 
4) Refamilialised Implicit/indirect, rhetorical, pro-
natalist, semi-legitimised, un-
coordinated, institutionalised, 
transitional, underfunded 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia   
Lithuania  
Poland 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia  
 
Source:  Hantrais, 2004:200. 
 
The third, ‘familialised’, typology includes the Southern European countries of 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and Malta.  State support for families in 
these countries is comparatively underfunded, uncoordinated and less strongly 
legitimised.  The non-institutionalised nature of these policies means that they 
are more fragmented and may vary from region to region according to different 
local authority practices.  The responsibility for family well-being is placed on 
family members, with families receiving a relatively low level of provision of 
benefits and support services compared to Northern and Western European 
countries (Hantrais, 2004:203).  Distinctions can be made in this group by 
funding mechanism, degree of marketisation and influence of religion (Hantrais, 
2004:203). 
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The final, ‘refamilialised’, typology applies to the Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries in the EU.  During the Soviet era, these countries provided 
extensive benefits and services to their citizens, ensuring that the basic needs of 
families were met.  Transition from Soviet rule resulted in a shift towards a 
minimalist state and open markets, meaning that enterprise-based welfare 
support systems for workers and their families were abandoned (Hantrais, 
2004:204).  Family policy refamilialised in the sense that responsibility for family 
well-being shifted from the state back to the family.  Support systems for 
families in these countries are comparatively underfunded, unreliable, and often 
rhetorical rather than practical.  These countries’ policies tend to be pro-natalist, 
semi-legitimised and transitional (Hantrais, 2004:200). 
 
 
1.5  Structure of the report 
 
Chapter 2 presents quantitative data on demographic change in the EU.  It 
outlines the prevalence and type of family breakdown across the EU Member 
States.   
 
Chapter 3 looks at the effects of family breakdown with regard to the poverty 
and social exclusion of lone parent households and their children.  The chapter 
reviews definitional and measurement issues related to poverty and social 
exclusion, examines various indicators of poverty and social exclusion, 
(providing data for all twelve countries where possible and partial data where 
not) and identifies key policy responses from the case study countries.   
 
Chapter 4 looks at family breakdown and education achievement, while Chapter 
5 explores the associations between family breakdown and health and well-being 
outcomes for children.  Chapter 6 considers the relationship between family 
breakdown and housing and living arrangements.  Chapter 7 presents the 
conclusions and key lessons for policy makers. 
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2  Demographic Change in the EU 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter examines a range of indicators of family structure, formation and 
dissolution affecting children across the EU27 Member States, with particular 
attention paid to trends within the typology groupings identified in Chapter 1.  
The Chapter provides a context for the discussion of children’s’ outcomes in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
 
2.2  Demographic change in the European Union 
(EU27) 
 
2.2.1  Total Population 
Demographic change in the European Union (EU) is a pressing issue for policy 
makers.  In 2007 the total population of the EU27 was 495 million (Table A.1, 
Annex A).  The countries with the largest populations were Germany, France, 
United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Poland and Romania (Figure 2.1).  While Germany 
has the largest population, its percentage share of the total EU27 population has 
reduced from 17.1 per cent in 1997 to 16.6 per cent in 2007 (Table A.2, Annex 
A).  Meanwhile, the shares of population for France and Spain have each 
increased by 0.7 per cent over this ten year period.  The population shares for 
all of the refamilialised countries have decreased or remained constant since 
1985. 
 
A key issue is that the EU population is growing.  Between 1987 and 2007 the 
EU27 population grew by 6.2 per cent (Table A.1, Annex A).  Migration was the 
major force behind this growth, although increased life expectancy also played a 
role (Eurostat, 2007a:15, 17).  Between 1997 and 2007 all of the defamilialised, 
partially defamilialised, and familialised countries experienced an increase in 
their populations (Figure 2.2).  Only the refamilialised countries experienced a 
decrease in total population, with the exception of Slovenia and Slovakia.   
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Figure 2.1: Population, by country, on January 1, 2007 
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Figure 2.2: Percentage rate of change in population, by country, 1997 
and 2007 
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2.2.2  Live births 
In the 20 year period between 1987 and 2007 Europe saw a decrease in live 
births by 10.9 per cent (Table A.3, Annex A).  Figure 2.3 shows that all but eight 
EU27 countries experienced a decline during this period.  The increases in live 
births occurred in the defamilialised countries of Denmark (14 per cent), Sweden 
(2.6 per cent), Luxembourg (29.2 per cent), and Belgium (2.8 per cent), the 
partially defamilialised Ireland (20.9 per cent), and the familialised Italy (2.1 per 
cent), Spain (14.4 per cent), and Greece (3.4 per cent).   
 
Comparing the number of live births in 1997 and 2007, shows that almost half of 
the EU27 countries had positive rates of growth, indicating a turnaround for the 
UK and half of the refamilialised countries from relatively low levels of births in 
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the 1990s (Figure 2.4).  None of these countries, however, returned to their 
1987 levels. 
 
The highest growth rates in live births may be attributed to family policies that 
support working parents.  As some commentators have argued (see, for 
example, Gornick and Meyers, 2003), family policies that support working 
parents may be crucial in addressing the problem of declining fertility.  A feature 
of defamilialised family policies is that they are, for the most part, supportive of 
working parents, and so limit the employment penalties for women associated 
with child bearing in some other European countries (Hantrais, 2004; Fahey and 
Speder, 2004).  So, perhaps unsurprisingly, five of the eight countries which 
experienced positive rates of live births between 1987 and 2007 were among the 
defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries.   
 
Figure 2.3: Percentage rate of change in total live births, 1987 and 
2007 
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In addition, rates of teenage pregnancies and the consequent levels of young 
single parenthood also vary considerably between countries (Micklewright and 
Stewart, 1999) (single parenthood is discussed below).   
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Figure 2.4: Percentage rate of change in total live births, 1997 & 2007 
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2.2.3  Children in the European Member States 
There is no universally accepted definition of a child; and discussions around the 
definition of children and childhood are complex.  The different definitions are 
based on varying notions of economic dependency on families and parents, or in 
some contexts, on somewhat looser definitions based on concepts of emotional 
and psychological maturity.  Moreover, as Hantrais (2004:41) notes, the age of 
children in years is not necessarily a good indicator of family dependence, 
especially in the context of the later age at which many young people across the 
EU become financially independent and leave the parental home. 
 
Differences in the minimum school-leaving age across the EU add to the 
complexity.  Since the turn of the 21st century, the minimum school-leaving age 
has been 15, although most Member States maintain compulsory schooling to at 
least the age of 16.  Belgium, Germany, Hungary and Poland require young 
people to remain in school until age 18 (Hantrais, 2004:75).1  For this reason, 
Eurostat, in some of its publications, has tended to define dependent children 
as:  
 
‘all children up to the age of 14 plus all those persons aged 15-24 who are 
economically inactive (mainly in education) and who are living with at 
least one of their parents’ 
 
Eurostat (2007:8) 
 
While the definition of a dependent child may vary across Eurostat publications 
to include age ranges such as 0-16/17-24, 0-17/18-24 and 0-18/19-24, for the 
purpose of this report we will base our discussion on a definition which 
recognizes the 0-14/15-24 age category unless otherwise stated.   
 
In 2006, people aged 0-14 made up 15.9 per cent of the EU27 population (Table 
A.4, Annex A).  Germany, France and the UK had the largest numbers of 0-14 
                                            
1 The school leaving age will be raised to 18 in the UK in 2013. 
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year olds.  The refamilialised and the partially defamilialised countries had group 
averages for the proportion of 0-14 year olds close to the EU average with 15.4 
per cent and 16.0 per cent respectively.  The average proportion of 0-14 year 
olds for the familialised countries was below the EU average (14.4 per cent), 
while the defamilialised countries average was above the average (18.2 per 
cent).  Among Member States, Ireland had the highest proportion of 0-14 year 
olds (20.4 per cent), followed by Denmark (18.7 per cent) and France (18.6 per 
cent).  Bulgaria (13.5 per cent) and Germany (14 per cent) had the lowest 
percentage of 0-14 year olds.   
 
Both the proportion and overall number of children aged 0-14 has been 
declining.  The proportion of 0-14 year olds has declined from 18 per cent of the 
European population in 1996 to 15.9 per cent in 2006 (Table A.4, Annex A).  
Furthermore, all of the refamilialised countries experienced a significant drop in 
the absolute number of children age 0-14 (Figure 2.5 and Table A.4, Annex A).  
On average, the number of children age 0-14 within this group’s population fell 
by 26.1 per cent.  This compares to a decrease of 7.4 per cent among the 
partially defamilialised group and 1.7 per cent among the familialised countries.  
The absence of any overall change for the defamilialised grouping is misleading 
as there was substantial variation among these countries with the larger 
population of France, which only increased slightly over this period, accounting 
for much of the group’s average.  Across Europe, only Denmark, Luxembourg, 
France, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Spain increased their numbers of children 
age 0-14; and only in Denmark did this result in a slight increase (one per cent) 
in the proportion of this age group in the overall population.   
 
Figure 2.5: Percentage rate of change of persons aged 0-14, 1996 and 
2006 
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Figure 2.6: Percentage of persons living as children in parental home 
aged 0-24, 2001 
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Using the broader Eurostat definition of children, data on the number of persons 
living as children in their parental home is only available for 2001.  On average, 
a quarter (26.3 per cent) of Europeans living in households were persons aged 
0-24 living as children in their parental home (Table A.5, Annex A).  Figure 2.6 
shows that across the EU, the percentage of persons aged 0-24 living as children 
in their parental home ranged from 21.8 per cent in Latvia to 33.9 per cent in 
Cyprus with only Ireland, Cyprus, Slovakia, and Poland noticeably above the 
European average.  Among our typology, the partially defamilialised (25.1 per 
cent) and familialised (25.2 per cent) countries had group averages (weighted 
by population size) close to the EU27 average, although both Ireland and Cyprus 
were substantially above that average.  However, owing to the relatively small 
size of their populations, these outliers did not substantially affect the overall 
group average.  Similarly, the group average for defamilialised countries was 
27.3 per cent, although the significantly larger population of France accounted 
for much of this.  The group average for the refamilialised countries was slightly 
above the EU average at 28.7 per cent; however, the refamilialised countries 
showed greater variation than those of the defamilialised grouping.  In general, 
the Baltic States were closer to the lower end of the spectrum, while the Eastern 
European countries were closer to the middle or higher end of the range.  
Poland, with its large population, is responsible for ‘pushing’ the refamilialised 
group average higher than it would otherwise have been.   
 
 
2.3  Households in the EU 
 
2.3.1  Defining families and households 
While the terms ‘family’ and ‘household’ are related concepts, they are 
distinctive terms.  The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE), which is responsible for revising the definitions to be used in each 
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census round, base their definition of a household on the concept of a 
housekeeping unit (rather than a housing unit2).  This definition includes: 
 
• a one-person household, that is, a person who lives alone in a separate 
housing unit or who occupies, as a lodger, a separate room (or rooms) 
of a housing unit but does not join with any of the other occupants of 
the housing unit to form part of a multi-person household as defined 
below, or 
• a multi-person household, that is, a group of two or more persons who 
combine to occupy the whole or part of a housing unit and to provide 
themselves with food and possibly other essentials for living.  Members 
of the group may pool their incomes to a greater or lesser extent.  
(UNECE, 2005:2-3). 
 
Eurostat (2008) follows this definition. 
 
The definition of a family differs from that of a household in that the UNECE’s 
recommendation is based on the concept of a ‘family nucleus’, which is defined 
as: 
 
‘two or more persons within a private or institutional household who are 
related as husband and wife, as cohabiting partners, or as parent and 
child.’3 
(UNECE, 2005:3) 
 
The family nucleus constitutes a sub-category of a household.  In general, data 
collected in national censuses refer to private households rather than families as 
the unit of measurement, as this approach has the advantage of including one-
person households (Hantrais 2004:39).  Despite definitional recommendations 
by the UNECE, discrepancies remain between countries in the type and quality of 
the data collected.   
 
Measuring newly emerging family forms presents challenges for both 
statisticians and policy makers (Keilman, 2008). The UNECE Task Force on 
Families and Households is developing an analytical framework of policy 
concepts and definitions that includes new and emerging family and household 
forms with the aim of enabling consistent international measurement (Freguja, 
2008:4).  New family forms currently under consideration for the 2010 Censuses 
of Population and Housing include reconstituted families, the increasingly 
common living apart together (LAT), same-sex relationships, people with 
multiple residences, and persons living within a family or social network (UNECE 
Secretariat, 2006).  Many of the difficulties in the measurement of new family 
forms relate to problems of consistent measurement and definition across the 
                                            
2 Some countries use the different concept of house-dwelling which is simply the 
aggregated number of persons occupying a housing unit.  However, UNECE recommends 
that these countries should provide estimates of the number of households based on the 
housekeeping concept in their census report (UNECE 2005:3).   
3 The UNECE definition of child includes children ‘who have no partner and no child and 
have usual residence in the household of at least one parent.  Children also includes 
stepchildren and adopted children, but not foster children’ (UNECE 2005:3). 
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EU; difficulties which are being addressed in current field testing (due for 
completion in June 2008) (UNECE, 2005; UNECE Secretariat, 2006).   
 
2.3.2  Households in the EU 
This section explores three Eurostat datasets on households:  the percentage 
change in the number of private households; the average number of persons per 
household; and the distribution of households with dependent children among 
the population. 
 
On average, the number of private households within several Member States 
increased by 3.3 per cent between 1997 and 2001 (Table A.6, Annex A).  The 
typology’s group averages are similar to the EU average, and ranged from a four 
per cent increase for the familialised to a 2.8 per cent increase in the 
defamilialised countries.  However, these group averages conceal wide variation 
within each group.  Each group in our typology had one country which was 
significantly above the EU average (see Figure 2.7).  Luxembourg 
(defamilialised) had an 8.2 per cent increase in the number of households, 
Ireland (partially defamilialised) experienced an 8.3 per cent increase, while 
Spain (familialised) saw a 7.4 per cent increase.  Depending on the context, the 
steady growth in the number of households may be attributed to population 
growth as well as increasing diversity in family forms.    
 
Figure 2.7: Percentage rate of change in the number of private 
 households, EU15, 1997 and 2001 
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Alongside the increase in the number of households, there has been a trend 
across the EU towards fewer people in households.  Table A.7 (Annex A) shows 
the estimated average number of people per household4 across the EU25 in 
2003 was 2.4, down from 2.5 in 2000. 
                                            
4 Average household size is calculated by dividing the number of people living in private 
households by the number of households.  This, however, conceals important variations 
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Figure 2.8 shows that families in familialised and refamilialised countries tended 
to have, on average, larger sized households in 2003 than those in defamilialised 
and partially defamilialised countries.  The larger households in the familialised 
and refamilialised countries are not surprising in the context of Hantrais’ 
typology (2004), as they are more likely to include a broader range of family 
members, such as grandparents.  However, in the light of broader societal shifts, 
including lower fertility rates, the increasing financial cost of raising children and 
changes in family forms, both familialised and refamilialised countries, with the 
exception of Poland and Latvia, experienced a fall in family sizes between 1993 
and 2003.5  Average household size in Poland rose from 2.5 persons in 1997 to 
3.1 persons in 2003 and in Latvia from 2.4 persons in 2001 to 2.8 in 2003.  
Conversely, average household size in Hungary (refamilialised) fell from 3.4 
persons in 1996 to 2.6 persons in 2003.   
 
The largest changes in family size tended to be among the refamilialised 
countries and in familialised Spain.  The defamilialised and partially 
defamilialised countries show a small decrease in the average number of persons 
per household between 1993 and 2003. 
 
Figure 2.8: Average number of persons per private household, 2003 
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2.3.3  Households with children 
The average distribution of households with dependent children among the total 
population for 2006 was 52 per cent (Figure 2.9 and Table A.8, Annex A).  
Eurostat data show that the refamilialised countries and familialised countries 
had the largest distributions of households with dependent children.  Cyprus 
(familialised) had the highest distribution with 64 per cent followed by Lithuania 
and Poland (refamilialised) with 62 per cent.  With the exception of the two 
familialised countries Greece (49 per cent) and Italy (50 per cent), all 
familialised and refamilialised countries were either at or above the EU25 
average, while the defamilialised and partially defamilialised groups had the 
                                                                                                                                        
in household size.  People living in collective households (boarding houses, hospitals, and 
halls of residence) are excluded from average household size calculations.   
5 Data for some years in this time period are not available for certain countries, so 
generalisations are made based on the data that are available.   
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greatest number of countries with distributions below the EU25 average, the 
lowest of which was in Germany (46 per cent).  The main exception to this trend 
was Ireland which had one of the largest distributions of the EU25 with 63 per 
cent. 
 
While there has been growth in the number of households across the EU, 
between 2000 and 2006 there was a decrease in the distribution of households 
with dependent children across the total population in most EU25 countries 
(Figure 2.10 and Table A.8, Annex A).  EU15 estimates show a four per cent 
drop in the distribution between 1996 and 2006 and a two per cent decrease 
between 2000 and 2006.  The familialised and defamilialised countries had the 
greatest decreases in the distribution of households with dependent children 
across the population.  Only a small number of countries showed percentage 
increases.  Luxembourg (defamilialised) shows an 11 per cent increase from 46 
per cent in 2000 to 57 per cent in 2006; although the 2006 figure represented a 
return to its 1996 level.  The Netherlands (partially defamilialised) and Latvia 
(refamilialised) both show a small increase of one per cent, while the two 
partially defamilialised countries Germany and Ireland experienced no changes 
from their 2000 levels.   
 
Figure 2.9: Distribution among total population:  households with 
dependent children, 2006 
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Figure 2.10: Households with dependent children:  percentage 
difference, 2000 and 2006 
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2.4  Typology of families in the European Union 
 
Non-intact families take many forms and family structures are dynamic, 
dissolving and re-forming over time (Andersson 2002).  Pong et al. (2003) 
observe that there are also important cultural differences between countries, for 
example in the degree to which non-marital childbearing is socially acceptable 
and, consequently, the extent to which parenthood results from the dissolution 
of cohabiting unions rather than from divorce.  This section explores the 
different types of families in the EU:  single parent families, cohabitation, 
marriage, reconstituted families, and intergenerational households.  From this 
discussion a fuller picture emerges of the situation of children in different family 
nuclei and households across the EU, as well as the differences between 
defamilialised, partially defamilialised, familialised and refamilialised country 
groupings. 
 
2.4.1  Single parent families 
The allocation of single parent status is not straight forward.  UNECE (1998:43) 
guidelines differentiate between a single parent as a ‘household nucleus’ and as 
a partner in a cohabitating relationship; however, datasets among different 
countries do not consistently adhere to UNECE guidelines (Hantrais, 2004:58).  
A single parent living in a cohabiting relationship may fail to be identified as a 
cohabitee in some surveys, while national differences in the legal status of step-
parents may complicate the identification of reconstituted families (Hantrais, 
2004:59).  In addition, the growth in the number of couples who ‘live apart 
together’ (LAT) represents a further challenge to the data. 
 
Single parent status is not necessarily an indicator of family breakdown, as there 
are different routes into single parenthood. For example lone parenthood can be 
caused by the breakdown of a relationship, either married or unmarried, with 
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dependent children, the birth of a child or children outside a partnership, or 
death (Lehmann and Wirtz, 2004: 2) 
 
There are different types of single parent households:  single mother and single 
father households, as well as single parent households that include other family 
members.  Across the EU27 12.9 per cent of households with dependent children 
and no other person outside the family nucleus were single parent families in 
2001 (Table A.9, Annex A).  When households containing adults outside the 
family nucleus were included, the percentage of total households with dependent 
children rose to 13.6 per cent (Table A.10, Annex A).6  This relative increase 
may be explained by the support that other family members, such as a child’s 
grandparent, may provide to single parents by living in the same household.  A 
comparative study of single parent families in Europe by Chambaz (2001) shows 
that lone parenthood is not only least common in Southern European countries, 
but that a substantial proportion of lone parent families in these countries share 
their accommodation with other households and are thus `included’ rather than 
‘isolated’. 
 
Where children were living in a single parent family, it was much more likely that 
they lived with their mother (11 per cent) than their father (1.9 per cent) (Table 
A.9, Annex A).   
 
Figure 2.11: Percentage of family nuclei with single parent and children 
under age 25, 2001 
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Diversification of family forms has resulted in family breakdown replacing 
widowhood as the main cause of lone parenthood (EC, 2007:2).  The Brodolini 
(2007) study of poverty and social exclusion among single parent households 
found that in almost all the countries reviewed7 divorce and separation 
                                            
6 Of the EU averages of single parents with children on Table A.10, the average entitled 
‘EU (minus Austria, Ireland, and Latvia)’ is used for the sake of consistency of available 
data between Table A.9 and Table A.10.   
7 Thirteen countries were reviewed in the Brodolini (2007) report:  Bulgaria, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain and the UK.   
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accounted for between 40 per cent and 60 per cent of routes into single 
parenthood (EC, 2008:24).  Nevertheless, routes into lone parenthood were 
found to vary among countries:  single mothers (due to out-of-wedlock births) 
accounted for 45-50 per cent of lone parents in the UK, 30 per cent in Germany, 
France and the Netherlands, and roughly 20 per cent or less in Southern 
countries (EC, 2008:23-24).  This pattern is consistent with Hantrais’ (2004) 
theory of defamilialisation in which the more defamilialised countries are more 
individualised in their family forms compared to the more intact family 
institutions of the familialised Southern countries. 
 
In contrast to the Brodolini study, an EC (2006) report on single parents in 
thirteen countries8 downplayed the importance of ‘solo’ parenting, claiming that 
there was little evidence that women having children without either being 
married or cohabiting were major routes into lone motherhood (EC, 2006:86).  
The study found that even in the UK where teenage pregnancy rates were 
particularly high, this especially vulnerable group of young mothers constituted 
only a minority of all lone mothers (EC, 2006:86).  Furthermore, it was found 
that these mothers were disproportionately from economically deprived 
neighbourhoods or families, and that the incidence of sole parenting varied by 
ethnicity, with greatest numbers found among Afro-Caribbean mothers (EC, 
2006:86).   
 
The high rates of single mothers due to out-of-wedlock births cited in the 
Brodolini report are likely to be a result of rising rates of cohabitation.  In fact, 
within Finland, Sweden and the UK, cohabitation disruption as a route into lone 
parenthood is considered to be of similar significance as that of divorce (EC, 
2006:86).  Out-of-marriage births can easily be misunderstood, as single 
parenthood due to cohabitation breakdown is sometimes misinterpreted as a 
result of ‘solo’ parenting.  This may be indicative of difficulties involved in the 
measurement of cohabitation and cohabitation breakdown, which may be 
dependent on the criteria a government uses to define a cohabiting relationship, 
and the policies that are in place in response to dissolving cohabiting 
relationships.  Considering the rising rates of cohabitation across Europe, social 
policy in regards to the children of dissolving relationships of unmarried parents 
is of particular importance.    
 
Refamilialised countries had the largest percentage of single parent families 
(16.8 per cent), followed by the familialised (12.4 per cent), defamilialised (11.4 
per cent) and partially defamilialised (11.6 per cent) countries.  Among the 
refamilialised countries, Estonia had the largest percentage of single parent 
households (23 per cent), followed by the Czech Republic (19.5 per cent) and 
Poland (19.0 per cent) (Figure 1.11).  Figure 2.11 also shows that of the 
partially defamilialised countries the UK had the largest proportion of single 
parent families (13.4 per cent), although this percentage is still below the 
average for the refamilialised countries.  The UK also had the largest number of 
single mothers, while Germany had the largest number of single fathers.  Of the 
defamilialised countries, Denmark had the lowest percentage of single parent 
families.  These findings suggest that the incidence of single parenthood is 
                                            
8 The thirteen countries reviewed in the EC (2006) report included:  Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. 
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highest among the refamilialised countries and lowest among the defamilialised 
countries, although comparable data for the defamilialised and partially 
defamilialised countries of Sweden, Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria and Ireland 
were not available. 
 
Trends for total households across the typologies were similar to those of 
households with no other person outside the family nucleus (Figure 2.12 and 
Table A.10, Annex A).  The defamilialised countries still had the lowest 
proportion of single parents (12.1 per cent), the partially defamilialised countries 
were similar (12.4 per cent), the familialised countries had an average of 13.4 
per cent, and the refamilialised countries had the largest percentage of single 
parents (18 per cent).   
 
Figure 2.12: Percentage of private households with single parent 
 and children under age 25, 2001  
 
Percentage of private households with single parent and children under age 25, 
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While comparable data for the partially defamilialised countries of Austria and 
Ireland and the refamilialised country of Latvia were not available for Table A.9, 
statistics for these countries were available for total private households with 
dependent children (see Table A.10, Annex A).  Austria, with 15.9 per cent 
single-parent households, and Ireland, with 16.6 per cent single-parent 
households, had similar proportions to the UK with 16.4 per cent.  While these 
two additions were relatively consistent with the other countries in the partially 
defamilialised grouping, Latvia’s addition to the refamilialised grouping was 
significantly above the group’s average.  Latvia had the largest proportion of 
single parent families with 32.4 per cent (Figure 2.12).  Latvia also had the 
highest proportion of single father and single mother households, 3.3 per cent 
and 29.1 per cent respectively.  The next highest proportions of single parent 
households were among the other two Baltic States, Estonia (24.9 per cent) and 
Lithuania (20.9 per cent).   
 
In comparing the EU averages from Table A.9 to Table A.10, the difference 
between the proportions of single fathers to single mother is larger in Table 
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A.10, suggesting that more single mothers than single fathers share a household 
with at least one other adult.   
 
The distribution of single parent families with dependent children among the 
EU25 population was five per cent in 2006 (Table A.11, Annex A).  The 
defamilialised and the partially defamilialised countries had the largest 
distributions of single parent families with most of the countries at or above the 
EU25 average (Figure 2.13).  Indeed, the three countries with the highest 
distributions of single parent families were defamilialised Sweden and partially 
defamilialised Ireland and the UK.  Luxembourg (defamilialised) and Austria and 
the Netherlands (partially defamilialised) were exceptions with four per cent.  
The refamilialised Baltic States and Hungary were at or above the EU25 average.  
With distributions in the range of two to three per cent, the familialised countries 
were the least likely to have single parents with dependent children.   
 
Figure 2.13: Distribution among total population:  single parent with 
children, 2006  
Distribution among total population: single parent with children, 2006
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Figure 2.14 shows that the distribution of single parents with dependent children 
among the total population in the EU15 rose by an average of two percentage 
points between 1996 and 2006, while estimates for 2001 and 2006 suggest a 
similar trend for the EU25.  Distributions increased most in the partially 
defamilialised countries of Germany and Ireland.  Only the refamilialised 
countries Latvia, Lithuania and Poland showed decreases (of one per cent). 
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Figure 2.14: Single parent with children:  Percentage difference, 2000 
and 2006 
 
Single parent with children: percentage difference, 2000 & 2006
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Bradshaw et al. (2007) find a strong correlation between the distribution of 
single parents and step parent families across countries.  They combined these 
two family types to produce a ranking for family structure across the EU25, so 
that countries with the highest proportion of intact families achieved positive 
index scores.  The index scores9 for family structure ranged from +2.0 to -2.0.  
Malta – where divorce is illegal - was the only country to achieve a positive score 
of more than 1.5.  Other case study countries with positive scores were - in 
descending order:  Greece (between 1 and 1.5); Spain and Poland (between 0.5 
and 1); and the Netherlands  (between 0 and 0.5).  Countries with negative 
scores – again in descending order - were France and Germany (between 0 and 
-0.5), Czech Republic and Finland (between -0.5 and -1), Sweden, and Denmark 
(between -1 and -1.5); and the UK (between -1.5 and 2).  In terms of the 
Hantrais typology, familialised countries (Malta, Greece and Spain) are clustered 
at the ‘top end’ of the index and defamilialised countries (Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark) at the bottom.  This is not, however, a simple match with the 
typology since the UK, a partially defamilialised country, appears at the very 
bottom of the index.  France, a familialised, country hovers around the middle, 
along with Germany and the Netherlands (partially defamilialised) and Poland 
and Czech Republic (refamilialised). 
 
                                            
9 The chosen method was to calculate z scores for each variable and average the z 
scores to obtain an average score for a domain.   
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2.4.2  Two adult families 
The most common configuration of households with children in all countries is 
two adults and a dependent child or children (Tables A.9 and A.10, Annex A).  
However, there are variations across households.  Couples may be married or 
they may be cohabiting; both adults may be biological parents or only one may 
be biologically related to the child or children; and these couples may also be 
living with adults, such as other family members, from outside the family 
nucleus.  
 
Of households with dependent children and no other person outside the family 
nucleus, 87.1 per cent were comprised of married or cohabiting couples across 
the EU (Table A.9, Annex A).  Similarly, married or cohabiting couples accounted 
for 86.3 per cent of total households with dependent children in 2001 (Table 
A.10, Annex A). 
 
The refamilialised countries had the lowest proportion of two adult families (83.2 
per cent), while the other typology averages were between 87.6 per cent and 
88.6 per cent, with the highest proportion falling among the defamilialised 
countries (Table A.9, Annex A).  Similar trends were evident from the data for 
total private households with dependent children (Table A.10).  The Baltic States 
had the lowest percentage of two adult households, with only 67.6 per cent for 
Latvia, 75.1 per cent for Estonia, and 79.1 per cent for Lithuania. 
 
There is variation in family form within these two adult families:  hence 
cohabitation, marriage, and reconstituted families will be looked at in turn.  
 
2.4.3  Cohabitation 
Cohabitation is difficult to define, although it is usually taken to mean ‘a sexual, 
emotional and relatively stable relationship, euphemistically described as living 
together as a couple, and the absence of formal marriage’ (Hantrais, 2004:44).  
UNECE recommendations suggest that the term ‘couple’ should include married 
couples and couples who report living in consensual unions, and where feasible, 
a separate count of consensual unions and of legally married couples should be 
given.  Two persons are understood as partners in a consensual union when they 
have usual residence in the same household, are not married to each other, and 
report having a marriage-like relationship to each other (UNECE, 1998:43).  
However, inconsistencies between survey and census data among European 
countries, combined with the sometimes relatively unstable nature of some 
cohabiting unions, create difficulties in measuring the extent and nature of 
cohabitation (Hantrais, 2004:44).  
 
One thirteenth (7.6 per cent) of total households with resident children under 
age 25 across Europe were cohabiting in 2001 (Table A.10, Annex A).  Thus 
there are fewer cohabiting couples with children than there are single mother 
households.  The defamilialised countries, Denmark and Finland, had the largest 
proportion of cohabiting couples with dependent children, with 20.2 per cent and 
18.7 per cent respectively (Figure 2.15).  While data on cohabiting couples with 
children were not available for the remaining defamilialised countries, according 
to Hantrais (2004:57) Sweden and France are among the countries with the 
highest cohabitation rates among younger people (along with Denmark, Finland, 
and the UK).  The partially defamilialised countries had the second largest 
percentage of cohabiting couples with dependent children, with a group average 
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of 11.1 per cent.  The familialised and refamilialised countries had the lowest 
average proportions of cohabiting couples with children (four per cent and 4.6 
per cent respectively).  However, the refamilialised countries had the greatest 
range from 1.9 per cent in Poland to 16.1 per cent in Estonia.  
 
Figure 2.15: Cohabiting couples with dependent children as a share 
of total private households with resident children 
under age 25, 2001 
 
Cohabiting couples with dependent children as a share of total private households 
with resident children under age 25, 2001
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The proportion of births outside marriage across Europe has been rising steeply 
since 1980 (Hantrais, 2004:56).  Hantrais (2004:57) found that the countries 
with the highest cohabitation rates for younger people had the highest 
percentages of extramarital births, in particular Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
France and the UK.10  Eurostat data for 2006 (Figure 2.16 and Table A.12, Annex 
A) also reveal this pattern, with these defamilialised countries and the UK 
(partially defamilialised) reporting proportions of extramarital births above 30 
per cent.  While the refamilialised countries Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Slovenia had percentages over 40 per cent; in the context of their relatively high 
percentages of single parenthood in 2001 (see Table A.10, Annex A), the high 
percentage of extramarital births may be associated with single parenthood 
rather than cohabitation.   
 
 
                                            
10 Extramarital births refer to births where the mother’s marital status at the time of 
birth was other than married. 
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Figure 2.16: Live births outside marriage:  Share of all live births, 2006 
 
Live births outside marriage: share of all live births, 2006
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More children are being born out-of-wedlock than previously.  All European 
countries experienced an increase in the proportion of extramarital births 
between 1996 and 2006, and all countries except Denmark increased their 
absolute numbers of extramarital births.  The familialised group had the largest 
increases in the number of extramarital births with Malta, Cyprus, and Spain 
experiencing increases at a rate of over 200 per cent and Portugal and Greece 
recording increases of over 60 per cent (Figure 2.17 and Table A.12, Annex A).  
Half of the refamilialised countries reported a rate of change of over 60 per cent, 
marking a shift from relatively low numbers of extramarital births to higher 
ones.  The defamilialised countries did not experience such high rates of change 
given the already relatively high proportions of extramarital births in 1996.  The 
exception was Luxembourg which increased from 15 per cent to 28.8 per cent.  
Of the partially defamilialised countries, the Netherlands (113 per cent) and 
Ireland (66.4 per cent) had the highest rates of change.  
 
Unmarried cohabitation has received formal recognition in the form of contracts 
or registration in several countries among the EU Members States, including 
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Germany and Hungary (Hantrais 
2004:113).  However, legislative arrangements for the protection of the 
interests of children have been subject to a less coherent response (Hantrais, 
2004:113) which has implications for the longer term care and well-being of 
children living in new, and sometimes complex, family arrangements.  
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Figure 2.17: Percentage rate of change in live births outside of 
marriage as a share of all live births, 1996 
 
Percentage rate of change in live births outside of marriage as a share of all live 
births, 1996-2006
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2.4.4  Marriage  
There has been a well documented decline in marriage in most European 
countries, with the EU15 Member States experiencing a fall in the average 
number of marriages per 1,000 population of nearly 34 per cent between 1960 
and 2000 (Hantrais, 2004:51).   
 
Across Europe (in 2001), 78.3 per cent of total private households with resident 
children under the age of 25 consisted of a married couple with children (Table 
A.10, Annex A).11  The familialised countries had the highest group average with 
82.6 per cent, while the refamilialised countries had a group average of 77.3 per 
cent.  The defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries had the lowest 
proportion of married couples with children (69.6 per cent and 76.4 per cent, 
respectively).  The two lowest percentages of married couples with children were 
among the refamilialised Baltic States of Estonia (59.0 per cent) and Latvia 
(62.2 per cent), which also had the highest rates of single parenthood (Table 
A.10, Annex A).  Of the defamilialised countries, Finland also had a low 
percentage of married couples with children; however, it was the country with 
the highest percentage of cohabiting couples with dependent children. 
 
Moreover, between 1996 and 2006 the proportion of live births within marriage 
across Europe has been falling (Table A.13, Annex A).  All countries show a 
decrease of between 4.1 per cent and 38.4 per cent except Sweden 
(defamilialised), Ireland (partially defamilialised), and Spain and Greece 
(familialised).  Instead, these countries reported increases in the number of 
births within marriage despite experiencing proportional decreases as a share of 
                                            
11 This average does not include France as the authors of the study believe the numbers 
for married couples with children were skewed due to the absence of data for cohabiting 
couples with children for this country.  Also, data were not available for Sweden, 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Bulgaria and Malta. 
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total live births.  All of the refamilialised countries recorded both proportional 
and absolute decreases in live births within marriage.   
 
Figure 2.18 shows that the proportions of children born within marriage in 2006 
were lowest among the defamilialised countries, ranging between 44.5 per cent 
and 59.5 per cent, with the exception of Luxembourg which had 71.2 per cent.  
The partially defamilialised countries had a range of 56.3 per cent to 70.0 per 
cent, while the familialised countries had the largest proportion of births within 
marriage with a range of 68.4 per cent to 94.7 per cent.  The refamilialised 
countries showed the greatest variation, ranging from 49.2 per cent of live births 
within marriage in Bulgaria to 81.1 per cent in Poland.   
 
Figure 2.18: Live births within marriage:  Share of all live births, 2006 
 
Live births within marriage: share of all live births, 2006
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2.4.5  Reconstituted families (Stepfamilies) 
UNECE recommendations for the collection of statistical data define a 
reconstituted family as: 
 
‘a family consisting of a married or cohabiting couple with one or more 
children, where at least one child is a non-common child i.e. either the 
natural or adopted child of only one member of the couple.’  
 
UNECE (1998:46) 
 
There is evidence that stepfamilies are becoming more widespread (Hantrais, 
2004:61), although a comparative picture on stepfamily formation is lacking 
(Hantrais, 2004:71).  One study (Prskawetz et al., 2003) examined stepfamily 
formation using individual-level data for the 1990s round of the Fertility and 
Family Surveys (FFS) from 19 European countries for which internationally 
comparable data were available for the birth cohort of women born between 
1952 and 1959.  Prskawetz et al. (2003) grouped the countries into four 
categories:  Northern European countries (Finland and Sweden); Western 
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European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, and West Germany); Southern 
European countries (Italy and Spain); and former socialist countries (Czech 
Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania).  The study found that in the former socialist countries – refamilialised 
in our typology – more than 70 per cent of women entering a second union 
already had a child, although there was significant inter-country variation in 
union dissolution and repartnering (Figure 2.19 and Table A.14, Annex A) 
(Prskawetz et al., 2003:130).  Forming a stepfamily before the age of 35 was 
highest in Estonia and Latvia.  Poland and Lithuania had relatively few second 
unions and stepfamilies, while the Czech Republic, Hungary and East Germany 
fell in-between (Prskawetz et al., 2003:131). 
 
Figure 2.19: Percentage of women from the entire birth cohort (1952-
1959) who had experienced a second union formation by 
age 35 when the woman already had her own pre-union 
children  
 
Percentage of women from the entire birth cohort (1952-1959) who 
had experienced a second union formation by age 35 when the 
woman already had her own pre-union children
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Prskawetz et al. (2003) found a clear distinction between countries in Western 
and Northern Europe and the CEE countries:  in the Western European countries 
(defamilialised Belgium and France and partially defamilialised Austria and West 
Germany), women were less likely to have children in the (eventually dissolved) 
first unions than in the former socialist countries.  However, the case of 
defamilialised Sweden was unique as most dissolved unions in Sweden had no 
children, although both union dissolution and repartnering were comparatively 
frequent (Prskawetz et al., 2003:131).12  With the exception of Belgium, 
Western European countries as well as defamilialised Finland had relatively low 
percentages of women entering a second union with children.  Familialised 
                                            
12 Even though the dissolved first unions of Swedish women were among the least likely 
to have children, because dissolution is relatively common, Sweden was among the 
countries with high stepfamily experience (Graph 2.19 and Table A.14, Annex A) 
(Prskawetz et al., 2003:139).   
29 
 
Southern Europe and defamilialised Belgium had relatively few second unions 
and had the lowest prevalence of stepfamilies among all the studied countries 
(Prskawetz et al., 2003:131).  
 
Prskawetz et al. (2003) conclude that in North European countries and, to a 
lesser extent, in Western European countries, repartnering had become more 
frequent (Prskawetz et al., 2003:137).  However, it was less common for these 
women to already have a child at the point of forming a second union.  
Conversely, in most Southern European countries, as well as the CEE countries, 
childbearing remained closely connected with first unions (Prskawetz et al., 
2003:137).  In all the former socialist countries (that is, the refamilialised 
countries) most of the women who formed a second union had children 
(Prskawetz et al., 2003:138).  
 
2.4.6  Intergenerational households and extended families 
Intergenerational households and extended families represent another 
definitional challenge.  UNECE recommendations for the 2010 round of censuses 
define a three-generation (multi generational) household as consisting of:  
 
‘two or more separate family nuclei or one family nucleus and (an) other 
family member(s).  A woman who is living in a household with her own 
child (ren) should be regarded as being in the same family nucleus as the 
child (ren) even if she is never-married and even if she is living in the 
same household as her parents; the same applies in the case of a man 
who is living in a household with his own child (ren).  Thus, the youngest 
two generations constitute one family nucleus.’  
 
UNECE (1998:46)13 
 
                                            
13 UNECE (1998:para. 198) also suggests that countries derive information on ‘extended 
families’, defined for census purposes as ‘a group of two or more persons who live 
together in the same household and who do not constitute a family nucleus but are 
related to each other (to a specified degree) through blood, marriage (including 
consensual union) or adoption’.  Suggested classifications for ‘extended family status’ 
and ‘type of extended family’ define household members with reference to their 
relationship to the household reference person (UNECE, 1998:198). 
30 
 
Figure 2.20: Distribution among total population:  three or more adults 
with dependent children, 2006 
Distribution among total population: three or more adults with 
dependent children, 2006
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According to Eurostat data for the EU25 countries, in 2006 10 per cent of the 
European population lived in households of three or more adults with dependent 
children (Table A.15, Annex A).  This is a decrease from 15 per cent in 2001.  
There are, however, wide variations between countries (Figure 2.20).  The 
refamilialised countries had the largest proportions of their populations living in 
households of three or more adults with dependent children, with the greatest 
proportions in Poland (25 per cent), Slovakia (24 per cent) and Latvia (21 per 
cent).  Data available for 2001 show that Romania also had a high proportion of 
the population living in households with three or more adults and dependent 
children.  The next largest proportions were among the familialised countries, 
while lower percentages were found among the partially defamilialised and 
defamilialised countries.  Of the familialised countries, Malta and Portugal had 
the highest proportions (18 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively).  Ireland, at 
17 per cent, had the highest percentage among the partially defamilialised 
countries.  The lowest percentages were among the defamilialised countries, 
with Denmark recording the smallest proportion (two per cent).   
 
Over time the proportion of households with three or more adults and dependent 
children has declined.  Among the EU15 countries the percentage of people living 
in households with three or more adults and dependent children has fallen 
between 1996 and 2006 (Figure 2.21 and Table A.15, Annex A).  Proportional 
decreases seemed to be largest in the familialised and then the partially 
defamilialised countries.  However, comparative data for the EU25 between 2001 
and 2006 reveal that in some of the refamilialised countries the proportion of the 
population living in these types of household arrangements was increasing, as 
was the case in Estonia, Lithuania and Poland (Figure 2.22).  This was also the 
case in defamilialised Finland.   
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Figure 2.21: Three of more adults with dependent children:  percentage 
difference, 1996 and 2006 
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Figure 2.22: Three of more adults with dependent children:  Percentage 
difference, 2001 and 2006 
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Eurostat data show that the proportion of people living in households with three 
or more adults and dependent children conforms to the defamilialised and 
familialised typology.  This type of living arrangement is comparatively unusual 
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in defamilialised countries, and while it has been declining in many familialised 
and refamilialised countries, it nevertheless remains an important feature of 
households in these countries.   
 
 
2.5  Family breakdown and reformation 
 
This section examines divorce, remarriage, cohabitation breakdown and children 
living in institutional care.  Eurostat data are presented on total divorce rates, 
crude divorce rates, mean duration of marriage at divorce, and marriages by 
previous marital status.  Studies looking at data on cohabitation dissolution and 
children in institutional care are also examined.   
 
2.5.1  Divorce  
In addition to the increase in cohabitation and single parenthood, the changing 
nature of family relationships is characterised by increasing total divorce rates 
(Figure 2.23 and Table A.16, Annex A).14  Evidence from the EU27 shows nearly 
one divorce for every two marriages across the European Union in 2005 and 
2006, with variation between countries (Figure 2.24 and Table A.16, Annex A).  
Rates were highest among the defamilialised countries and relatively high in the 
partially defamilialised countries and, in general, lowest among the familialised 
countries.  Among the refamilialised countries there was wide variation in the 
total divorce rates.  In 2005 and 2006, the defamilialised countries had the 
highest divorce rate at 0.5 divorces per marriage for all countries in this group 
(with the exception of France for which there were no data).  Similar rates were 
found among the refamilialised Czech Republic and the Baltic States which all 
had a rate of 0.5 in 2006.  Partially familialised Austria also had a rate of 0.5.  
The rest of the partially defamilialised countries had rates of 0.4 in 2005 and 
2006, with the exception of Ireland which only legalized divorce in 1996 
(Hantrais, 2004:52).  The familialised countries had the lowest rates with a 
range of 0.1 to 0.3 divorces per marriage; however, some of these countries 
showed the largest rates of change between 1995 and 2005 (Figure 2.23).  Total 
divorce rates either increased or remained the same across Europe in this 10 
year period, and the refamilialised and familialised countries saw the largest 
rates of change, with Poland, Slovakia and Spain reporting increases of 200 per 
cent and Cyprus experiencing a 100 per cent increase (Figure 2.23).  This 
indicates that while divorce rates were still small in these countries, the 
prevalence of divorce was rising rapidly. 
 
                                            
14 Eurostat definition of ‘total divorce rate’ is:  ‘The mean number of divorces per 
marriage in a given year. This number is not influenced by different sizes of the 
'marriage cohorts' (i.e. marriages concluded in a specific year).  Therefore, the total 
divorce rate is not the divorce rate of any specific 'marriage cohort'; rather, it is the 
divorce rate of a hypothetical generation subjected at each age to the current marriage 
and divorce conditions.  This way, it reflects the current marriage and divorce conditions 
unbiased by the age structure of the population, leading to better comparability between 
countries and over time’ (Eurostat, 2008).  
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Figure 2.23: Rate of change in total divorce rate, 1995 and 2005 
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Figure 2.24: Total divorce rate, 2005 
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The crude divorce rate, or the ratio of the number of divorces to the average 
population, averaged two divorces per 1,000 inhabitants across the EU27 in 
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2005 (Figure 2.25 and Table A.17, Annex A).15  This represented an overall 
increase of 11 per cent from 1995 and 18 per cent from 1985.  The distribution 
of the crude divorce rates across the EU27 in 2005 was similar to that of total 
divorce rates, with the rates highest among the defamilialised countries and 
some of the refamilialised counties and lowest among the familialised countries.  
The countries with rates of over 2.5 divorces per 1,000 inhabitants were the 
defamilialised countries Denmark (2.8), Finland (2.6), France (2.5), Belgium 
(2.9), the partially defamilialised UK (2.6), and refamilialised Czech Republic 
(3.1), Estonia (3.0), Latvia (2.8), Lithuania (3.3), and Hungary (2.5) (Figure 
2.25).  Most of the remaining refamilialised countries were below the EU27 
average.  Of the partially defamilialised countries, Ireland had the lowest crude 
divorce rate (0.8), while the other countries in this group were all at or above 
the EU27.  Most of the familialised countries were below the EU average.    
Portugal was the only country in this group above the EU27 average with a rate 
of 2.2 divorces per 1,000 inhabitants.  Divorce remains illegal in Malta, hence its 
divorce rate of zero. 
 
Between 1995 and 2005 the crude divorce rate increased in all but eight EU 
countries.  These countries include the defamilialised and partially defamilialised 
Finland, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK, and refamilialised 
Estonia, Latvia, and Romania.  The reasons for this fall in the crude divorce rate 
are unclear.  As was seen with the total divorce rates, the familialised countries 
experienced the largest rate of change in the crude divorce rates throughout the 
20 year period between 1985 and 2005.   
 
Figure 2.25: Crude divorce rate, 2005 
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The mean duration of marriage at divorce in 2005 ranged from around 10 to 14 
years for all EU countries, except for Italy which had a mean duration of 16.8 
years (Figure 2.26 and Table A.18, Annex A).16  Figure 2.27 shows that, despite 
                                            
15 Eurostat definition of ‘crude divorce rate’ is:  ‘The ratio of the number of divorces 
during the year to the average population in that year. The value is expressed per 1000 
inhabitants.’ (Eurostat, 2008).  
16 Eurostat definition of ‘mean duration of marriage at divorce’ is:  ‘The mean marriage 
duration at divorce by calendar year is obtained by adding the series of divorce rates by 
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generally rising divorce rates, the mean duration of marriage at divorce between 
1995 and 2005 rose or stayed the same in most European countries.  The 
familialised countries Portugal and Spain were the only countries not to 
experience an increase in the amount of time spent in a marriage before divorce.  
The greatest increase occurred in the refamilialised countries, especially in 
Bulgaria and Romania which saw increases in duration of marriage of more than 
three years and two years respectively.   
 
Figure 2.26: Mean duration of marriage at divorce (in years), 2005 
Mean duration of marriage at divorce (in years), 2005
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Kiernan and Cherlin (1999), using data from the UK’s National Child 
Development Study, consider whether young adults who had experienced 
parental divorce were more likely than those from intact relationships to have 
dissolved their own first partnerships before the age of 33.  They found that 
individuals who had experienced parental divorce before the age of 20 were 
more likely to have dissolved their first partnerships, and that this relationship 
persisted when age at first partnership, type of first partnership, indicators of 
class background, child and adolescent school achievement and behaviour 
problems were taken into account.  Their best estimate was that parental 
divorce before age 20 increased the risk of partnership dissolution for adult 
children by 16 per cent for women and 41 per cent for men.  Strong links were 
found between certain demographic variables, notably type of first partnership, 
and age at first partnership and partnership dissolution, suggesting that these 
might be important pathways mediating the association between parental 
divorce and second-generation partnership dissolution, particularly for men. 
                                                                                                                                        
duration of marriage for the calendar year under consideration, and by calculating the 
mean of this sum.’ (Eurostat, 2008).   
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Figure 2.27: Rate of change in mean duration of marriage at divorce, 
1995 and 2005 
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Figure 2.28: Percentage of marriages by divorced persons.  Male and 
female, 2006 
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2.5.2  Remarriage  
As divorce becomes more prevalent across Europe, it is not surprising to find 
that more marriages in some countries involve divorced persons.  While in 2006 
most people getting married in the EU27 were single (rather than divorced or 
widowed), a substantial minority were divorced (Table A.19, Annex A).  The 
proportion of remarriages varies by country (Figure 2.28).  In general, 
familialised countries had the lowest proportion of marriages that included 
people who were divorced.  Similarly, the refamilialised countries of Poland and 
Slovenia had less than a tenth of marriages by divorced persons.  In contrast, 
Luxembourg (defamilialised), Austria and Germany (partially defamilialised), and 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Hungary (refamilialised), around one-
quarter of all marriages were of persons previously married (Figure 2.28).   
 
As Prskawetz et al. (2003) highlight, the proportion of these remarriages that 
involve children varies from country to country.   
 
2.5.3  Cohabitation breakdown 
Cohabitation has eclipsed marriage as the marker of first partnership in the 
defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries, while in the familialised 
countries and in Ireland it has remained marriage (Kiernan, 1999).  In this 
context, cohabitation breakdown becomes an issue of importance to policy 
makers.  Drawing on the 1990s round of the Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) as 
well as the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), Kiernan (1999) was able to 
analyze the duration of cohabiting unions and the dissolution of unions in 
Western Europe.  One of the key findings was that in most countries cohabiting 
unions tended to be short-lived, either dissolving or converting into marriage 
(Kiernan, 1999:32).  The median duration of cohabitation was found to be less 
than two years in all countries, with the exception of Sweden where the median 
duration was four years (Kiernan, 1999:96).  Unions that dissolved without 
resulting in marriage tended to last longer on average.  These unions generally 
lasted two years or more in most countries (Kiernan, 1999:96).    
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Figure 2.29: Percentage of first partnerships surviving 10 years (life 
table estimates) according to type of first partnership.  
Woman aged 20-39 years   
 
Source:  Kiernan (1999:30)   
 
Figure 2.29 gives the percentage of first partnerships surviving 10 years 
according to type of first partnership.  Cohabiting unions that did not convert 
into marriages were the most likely type of partnership to dissolve.  However, 
marriages that began as a cohabiting relationship were no more likely to 
breakdown than marriages in which there was no prior experience of 
cohabitation (Kiernan, 1999:32).  The highest percentages of cohabiting couples 
to reach their ten year anniversary were among couples in Finland, France, 
Austria, West Germany and Italy.  Within these countries 40-50 per cent of 
these couples survived.  Within Sweden and Spain 30-40 per cent survived, 
while in Great Britain the figure was only 18 per cent. 
 
It is important to note that these findings are based on data from the early and 
mid 1990s and that these data may not be representative of the current 
situation, particularly in countries where cohabitation has continued to increase.  
Newer data on cohabitation breakdown is required to properly assess the 
longevity of these types of relationships.  Furthermore, information on the 
number of cohabitation breakdowns which involve resident children would be of 
interest to family policy makers.   
 
2.5.4  Children in institutional care 
The proportion of children living in institutions is comparatively high in some 
countries.  Although estimates seem to vary. Chou and Browne (2008:43), for 
example, show relatively high proportions of children aged three and under 
living in institutions in the CEE countries (not including Slovenia), as well as in 
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Belgium, Finland, Malta, and Spain.  These countries had over 20 per 10,000 
children aged less than three years in institutional care in 2003 (Table A.20, 
Annex A).  Furthermore, France, Romania, Spain and Belgium were estimated to 
have more than 2,000 children aged under three in institutional care in 2002-
2003 (Chou and Browne, 2008:44).   
 
2.5.5  Other family breakdown indicators 
Other family breakdown indicators include the number of children who had 
experienced the death of a parent and custody patterns of single parent families 
(contact and no contact with non-resident parent).  However, searches among 
quantitative data sources such as Eurostat, UNICEF and UN country statistics 
yielded no results for comparative data across the EU.   
 
 
2.6  Conclusions 
 
As this chapter has shown, the European Union has undergone substantial 
changes in regards to family structure, formation and dissolution.  Many of these 
shifts have been highlighted using demographic indicators, bringing to light 
trends among country clusters and differences between the typology groupings.  
Table 2.1 summarises general trends among selected indicators. 
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Table 2.1: Summary table of selected indicators 
Population growth, 1997 & 2007 Positive Positive Positive Negative (except SI,SK)
Rate of change in total live births, 
1987 & 2007 Positive (except FI) Negative (except IE) Negative (except ES,GR) Negative
Percentage of persons aged 0-14, 
2006
Highest; above EU avg. (group 
avg.) Close to EU avg. (group avg.)
Lowest; below EU avg. 
(group avg.) Close to EU avg. (group avg.)
Rate of change in persons age 0-14, 
1996 & 2006 Half negative, half positive Negative (except NL,IE) Negative (except IT,ES,) Negative
Percentage of persons living as 
children in parental home, 2001 2nd Largest (group avg.) Close to EU avg. (group avg.)
Close to EU avg. (group. 
Avg) Largest (group avg.)
Avgerage number of persons per 
private household, 2003 Smaller households Smaller households Larger houeholds Larger houeholds
Distribution of households (3 adults 
or more) with dependent children 
among total population, 2006 Low Low (except AT, IE) 2nd highest Highest
Proportional growth in distribution of 
households (3 adults or more) with 
dependent children among total 
population, 1996 & 2006 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Distribution of households with 
dependent children among total 
population, 2006 More below EU avg. More below EU avg. More above EU avg. More above EU avg.
Households with dependent children, 
percentage difference, 2000 & 2006 Negative (except LU) Not much change Negative Negative (except LV)
Distribution of single parents with 
children among total population, 2006 Largest Largest Smallest Mixed
Percentage of cohabiting couples 
with dependent children, 2001 Highest (group avg.) 2nd highest (group avg.) Lowest (group avg.) 2nd lowest (group avg.)
Growth in births outside of 
marriage,1996 & 2006 Positive Positive Positive Positive
Percentage of married couples with 
children, 2001 Lowest (group avg.) 2nd lowest (group avg.) Highest (group avg.) 2nd highest (group avg.)
Total divorce rates, 2005 Highest 2nd highest Lowest Mixed
Growth in total divorce rates, 1995 & 
2005 Positive or constant Positive or constant Positive or constant Positive or constant
RefamilialisedSelected Indicators Defamilialised Partially Defamilialised Familialised
 
Note:  Please refer to List of Abbreviations or Annex A for country abbreviations.
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Population growth was positive across the EU between 1997 and 2007 
with the exception of most of the refamilialised counties.  Within the 20 
year period between 1987 and 2007, the EU experienced a decline in 
fertility, with only the majority of the defamilialised countries experiencing 
a positive growth in live births.  The percentage of children aged 0-14 was 
greatest within the defamilialised countries and lowest among the 
familialised countries.  Between 1996 and 2006, the proportion of children 
aged 0-14 declined in most countries, although the most notable 
exceptions were among the defamilialised and partially defamilialised 
countries.  The greatest percentages of children aged 0-24 living at home 
were among the refamilialised countries, followed by the defamilialised 
countries.  Households with most members in 2003 were among the 
familialised and refamilialised countries, which (in 2006) also had the 
greatest distributions of households with three or more adults with 
dependent children.  Overall, however, the distribution of households with 
three or more adults and dependent children decreased between 1996 and 
2006 across the EU, marking a general decrease in household size.  The 
familialised and refamilialised countries had slightly higher proportions of 
households with dependent children.  Nevertheless, between 2000 and 
2006 the distribution of households with dependent children fell among 
these countries, as well as among the defamilialised countries.  Only 
within the partially defamilialised countries did the distribution of 
households with children remain relatively constant.  These trends 
indicate that along with general decreases in children among the 
population, the distributions of households with children have also been 
decreasing.   
 
The distribution of single parents with children was highest among the 
defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries.  Single parents were 
least common among the familialised countries.  The prevalence of single 
parents varied substantially among the refamilialised countries.   
 
The defamilialised countries had the highest proportions of cohabiting 
couples with dependent children in 2001, followed by the partially 
defamilialised countries.  The smallest proportions were among the 
familialised countries, known for their more traditional family forms.  
Mixed results were once again observed among the refamilialised 
countries, although on the whole the proportions within these countries 
were quite low.  Births outside marriage, often a sign of relatively high 
levels of unmarried cohabitation, were largest among a number of 
defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries.  High rates of births 
outside of marriage among some of the refamilialised countries may be 
indicative of relatively high levels of single parenthood.  Unsurprisingly, 
the largest proportion of married couples with children in 2001 was among 
the familialised countries, and the smallest proportions were among the 
defamilialised countries followed by the partially defamilialised countries.  
 
Since 1995, divorce has risen or remained constant across the EU Member 
States.  Total divorce rates in 2005 show that divorce was most prevalent 
in the defamilialised countries, followed by the partially defamilialised 
countries.  Rates among the refamilialised countries varied, while the 
lowest rates were among the familialised countries.    
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The demographic indicators identified in this chapter demonstrate the 
diversity in patterns of family structure, formation and dissolution in 
different areas of the European Union.  These variations highlight the 
importance of the need for a flexible policy response to protect the 
interests of children in new family forms, and the need for consistent, 
good quality data. 
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3  Poverty and Social Exclusion 
among Children and Lone 
Parents 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Socio-economic changes in Europe over the second half of the 20th 
century have brought about new at-risk groups within society.  Whereas 
in the past widows and orphans were considered the most in need of 
social protection from the state (Brodolini, 2007; EC, 2007:6), single-
parent households and their children are now increasingly being 
recognized by governments as at-risk of poverty and social exclusion.  
The rise in single parent households is one of the most visible outcomes of 
changing patterns of family formation and dissolution across the European 
Union (EU) (Millar, 2004:79).  The increased individualism widely 
associated with modernity (Giddens, 1994, cited in EC, 2006:86) is 
considered to be a contributing factor.  This is evidenced by marriage and 
cohabiting relationships becoming less stable, births outside marriage 
becoming more common and less stigmatised, and the increased 
economic autonomy of women (EC, 2006:86) (see Chapter 2).   
 
The rise in single parent households must be understood in the context of 
broader socio-economic developments.  Changes in the labour market and 
the increasing independence of women precipitated the decline of the 
male breadwinner model of the post-war era.  Based on the assumption of 
male economic activity outside the home and female responsibility for 
children and housework within the home, the male breadwinner ideal 
depended on full male employment and stable families (Lewis, 2006:5).  
These two tenets were jeopardised as women gained increasing autonomy 
and as ‘the stable, typical, blue-collar, low-skilled and male jobs of the 
Fordist societies were replaced by more insecure, flexible, high-skilled and 
differentiated jobs, accessed by a growing proportion of married mothers’ 
(European Commission, 2007:1).17  Labour market changes meant that 
fewer families were able to depend on a sole income, giving rise to the 
dual earner model or the one-and-a-half earner model (Bradshaw and 
Hatland, 2006:3-4).  The timing of these changes varied between 
countries, with the Nordic and the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries experiencing a shift to the dual earner model first, followed by 
the UK and the rest of Western Europe (Brodolini, 2007:7).  The evolution 
of the Southern European countries has followed a different path, as their 
economies were never fully Fordist and, arguably, their social policies 
never fully subscribed to the male breadwinner model (Brodolini, 2007:7).   
 
                                            
17 Fordism refers to the system of mass production and consumption based on 
the development of assembly line production, characteristic of highly developed 
economies during the 1940s-1960s. 
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Dual earning gave rise to an ‘adult worker model’, now promoted by most 
governments (Lewis, 2006).  Lewis (2006:9) notes the considerable 
convergence across Europe in terms of governments’ current 
encouragement of the adult worker model, promoted with the aim to 
stimulate non-inflationary economic growth, reduce poverty, further 
gender equality in the labour market and tackle the problem of 
deteriorating dependency ratios.  However, as Skevik (2006:233) points 
out:  
 
‘The dual breadwinner/dual carer model carries its own dangers 
though:  like the male breadwinner model, this is premised on the 
assumption that families will have two parents who cooperate and 
share the day-to-day responsibilities.  Women (and men) who 
struggle to form and maintain autonomous households do not have 
this support.’ 
 
Faced with both earning and caring responsibilities, single parents face 
higher risks of poverty and unemployment, even in countries where lone 
parents are doing best in terms of poverty and employment rates (Skevik, 
2006:233).  There are variations in the adult worker model, with the 
Nordic countries following closer to a ‘caregiver social wage model’ which 
supports mothers through social transfers and a ‘parent-worker model’ 
which involves high rates of labour market participation with a high ‘social 
wage’ (Lewis and Hobson, 1997:15-18, cited in EC, 2006:85). 
 
This chapter examines the effects of family breakdown with regard to the 
poverty and social exclusion of single parent households and their 
children.  These effects will be investigated among twelve EU Member 
States.  The first part of this chapter reviews some definitional and 
measurement issues related to poverty and social exclusion.  The second 
part examines various indicators of poverty and social exclusion, providing 
data for all twelve countries where possible and partial data where not.  In 
the final section, examples are drawn from different policy responses in 
the case study countries.  One final note should be made:  As noted in 
chapter 2, family dissolution (that is, divorce and cohabitation breakdown) 
is only one route into single parenthood.  Other paths include single, 
never married mothers and widowhood.  Data used in this chapter do not 
distinguish between the various pathways into single parenthood, and for 
this reason the discussion is based on single parents as a whole.   
 
 
3.2  Poverty and social exclusion:  Some 
definitional and measurement issues 
 
Poverty, a highly contested notion (Barnes, 2004:3; Lister, 2004:3), is 
difficult to define.  Traditionally, poverty is understood as a distributional 
issue:  ‘the lack of resources at the disposal of an individual or household 
– primarily the lack of income’ (Barnes, 2004:3).  In comparing levels 
across the EU, poverty is defined in relation to the socio-economic context 
of each country.  According to Townsend (1979) this relative approach to 
defining poverty means: 
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‘Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be 
in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, 
participate in the activities and have the living conditions and 
amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or 
approved, in the societies to which they belong.  Their resources 
are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual 
or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living 
patterns and activities’ 
 
Townsend (1979:31) 
 
Townsend’s emphasis on the exclusionary effect of poverty highlights the 
non-material as well as the material manifestations of poverty.  This has 
led to a view that ‘poverty has to be understood not just as a 
disadvantaged and insecure economic condition but also a shameful and 
corrosive social relation’ (Lister, 2004:7).  Therefore, poverty is not just a 
distributional issue but a relational one as well.   
 
Social exclusion – a concept which has been influential in recent political 
discourse (Barnes, 2004:5) – recognizes the multi-dimentional and 
relational issues associated with poverty.  Room identifies these as:  
‘inadequate social participation, lack of social integration and lack of 
power’ (Room, 1999:169).  This approach introduces the social relations 
of power and control and the processes of marginalisation and exclusion 
which can cause multiple forms of disadvantage which may interact to 
create a cumulative impact (Williams and Pillinger,1996:9). The concept 
highlights social inequalities (along the lines of gender, race, ethnicity, 
sexuality, age and disability) and issues of autonomy and dependency 
(Barnes, 2004:5-6).  This has led to the EU Observatory on Social 
Exclusion, for example, linking social inclusion and participation to 
political, civil and broader human rights (Lister, 2004:89).   
 
Social inclusion policies have, however, tended to focus on social 
integration, primarily through access to paid work (Lister, 2004:79).  The 
association of social inclusion with paid work is challenged on two main 
premises:  first, because ‘inclusion in the labour market through marginal, 
low paid, insecure jobs under poor working conditions does not constitute 
genuine poverty-free social exclusion’; and second, because the focus on 
paid work tends to ignore the (gendered) unpaid work of reproduction and 
care, effectively devaluing and marginalizing these activities (Lister, 
2004:79 
 
A rounded measure of poverty should take account of both income and 
living standards (Lister, 2004:5).  Income poverty is usually measured 
against a poverty standard, often referred to as the poverty line, which 
represents a threshold below which individuals are considered ‘poor’ 
(Lister, 2004:41).  The EU agreed poverty threshold is set at 60 per cent 
of the national median equivalised household income, meaning that a 
household living on an income below this level is considered ‘at-risk-of-
poverty’ (European Commission, 2008:12).  Poverty standards such as 
this are criticized as being arbitrary (Bradshaw, 2005:4), however they 
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are used for official poverty estimates due to their suitability for 
international comparisons (Lister, 2004:41).  Poverty threshold measures 
provide an estimated head count of those living below the poverty line but 
do not give any indication of the severity of the poverty experienced.  
‘Poverty gap’ measures, on the other hand, take account of the severity of 
poverty by measuring a person or household’s distance from the poverty 
line, expressed as a percentage of the threshold.  Poverty gap measures 
are important as ‘policies that are successful in bringing those just below 
the poverty line up to it (thereby reducing the headcount) may not be the 
best way of helping those furthest below it (thereby closing the poverty 
gap)’ (Lister, 2004:42).  Another important indicator is that of persistent 
poverty.  Poverty is thought to be more damaging, particularly for 
children, if it persists (Ritakallio and Bradshaw, 2006:247).  The longer a 
child remains in poverty the greater the impact on a child’s life-chances.  
Eurostat (2008) defines at-persistent-risk-of-poverty as, ‘The share of 
persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty 
threshold in the current year and in at least two of the preceding three 
years’. 
 
One of the shortcomings of income based measures is that they do not 
reflect differences in living conditions.  Evaluating living conditions can 
give a picture of the resources actually available to households living in 
poverty.  Material deprivation measures are one way of evaluating the 
living conditions of households, and are based on the proportion of the 
population that are deprived from a range of goods and services that can 
be considered necessary to enjoy a decent standard of living in the 
national context (European Commission, 2008:51).  Examples of such 
indicators include economic strain, enforced lack of durables and poor 
housing conditions (European Commission, 2008:51).  
 
Despite a number of problems with available datasets on child poverty 
and deprivation (see Bradshaw, 2005:4), quantitative data are much 
more prevalent than qualitative.  However, Lister (2004:38) stresses the 
importance of qualitative research, arguing that it ‘can uncover meanings 
and provide insights into the experience of poverty that have implications 
for the development of policy’.  Qualitative studies shed light on what 
deprivation actually means for those experiencing it.  The picture painted 
by qualitative studies generally consists of:  ‘constant restrictions; doing 
without; running out of money at the end of the week; limited choice; no 
room for spontaneity; [and] damaged relationships’ (Lister, 2004:54).  
Furthermore, qualitative studies lend themselves to participatory 
approaches based on ‘the belief that people in poverty are themselves 
experts in poverty and that therefore, ideally, their views should be taken 
on board at all stages of the research process – as subjects and not just 
objects from whom information is extracted’ (Lister, 2004:47).  
Participatory approaches recognize the value of ‘voice’ and 
participation/consultation in the development of social policy.   
 
Poverty estimates usually refer to individuals but are actually based on 
measures of household income rather than that of each individual within 
the family unit.  The reason for this is based on the rationale that 
members of a household pool their resources and share living standards, 
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at least to an extent (Lister, 2004:48).  In order to compare households of 
different compositions and sizes, equivalence scales are used to take 
account of economies of scale and the differing needs of adults and 
children (European Commission, 2008:12; Lister, 2004:48).  However, 
using measures based on household income ignores the distribution of 
resources among household members and can underestimate the poverty 
of women and children who are more likely to suffer from an unequal 
share of income within the family (Lister, 2004:48).  This concern has led 
to a gendered and child-centred perspective which emphasises the 
experience of poverty by individuals rather than households (Lister, 
2004:60).  Brannen and O’Brien (1996), for example, argue for a research 
focus on ‘children in families’ rather than on ‘families with children’. 
 
 
3.3  Child poverty 
 
On average, the poverty rate of children (aged less than 18 years) 
exceeds that of the total EU population.  In 2006, it was estimated that 
across the EU25 the poverty rate of children was 19 per cent, whereas the 
poverty risk for the population as a whole was 16 per cent (Figure 3.1 and 
Table 3.1).  Only four of our case study countries had child poverty rates 
lower than those of the total population:  defamilialised Denmark, Finland 
and France, and partially defamilialised Germany.  All of the defamilialised 
and partially defamilialised countries had low child poverty risks, with 15 
per cent or less of their child population living below the poverty line.  The 
only exception was the UK which had one of the highest at-risk-of-poverty 
rates for children, with 24 per cent of children living below the poverty 
threshold.  The highest rates were among the familialised and 
refamilialised countries, with roughly a quarter of all children at-risk-of-
poverty in Poland and Spain. 
 
Table 3.1: At-risk-of-poverty rate (60 per cent of median 
equivalised income after social transfers), children vs. 
total population, 2006 
 
Typology
eu25 dk fi fr se de nl uk gr es mt cz pl
Total population 16 12 13 13 12 13 10 19 21 20 14 10 19
Less than 18 years 19 10 10 14 15 12 14 24 23 24 19 16 26
D. P. F. R.
 
Source:  Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'At risk of poverty rates by 
age and gender', ilc_li02.   
Note:  2006 data for EU25 is a Eurostat estimate; 2006 Malta data is provisional. 
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Figure 3.1: At-risk-of-poverty rate, persons less than 18 years of 
age, 2006 
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While the at-risk-of-poverty rate indicates the proportion of people living 
below the poverty line, it does not show how far they fall below the 
threshold.  Poverty gap measures, on the other hand, give an indication of 
the depth of poverty of those living below the poverty line.  In 2006, the 
relative at-risk-of-poverty gap for children in the EU25 was on average 23 
per cent, compared to 22 per cent for the EU25 population in total (Figure 
3.2 and Table 3.2).  This suggests that in the EU poverty is slightly more 
severe for children than it is for the rest of the population.  The countries 
which had poverty gap measures for children greater than those for the 
total population were Spain (familialised) and the refamilialised countries.  
The smallest at-risk-of-poverty gaps were among the defamilialised 
countries.  The partially defamilialised countries also had poverty gaps 
below the EU25 average.  The extent of poverty tended to be most severe 
for children living in familialised Spain and Greece, and refamilialised 
Poland, with measures ranging from 25-28 per cent.   
 
Across the EU25, children (less than 16 years) are more at-persistent-
risk-of-poverty than the total population.  In 2000, it was estimated that 
12 per cent of children in the EU25 were living below the poverty line and 
had been for at least two of the three preceding years, compared to nine 
per cent of the greater EU25 population (Table 3.3).  For our case study 
countries in 2000 and 2001, only three had at-persistent-risk-of-poverty 
rates below those of the total population:  Denmark, Finland, and Greece.  
Denmark and Finland (defamilialised) also had the lowest rates of 
persistent poverty for children (three per cent and four per cent 
respectively).  The UK (partially defamilialised) had the highest rate of 
persistent poverty for children at 19 per cent, followed by Spain 
(familialised) at 16 per cent. 
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Table 3.2: Relative poverty gap (60 per cent of median 
equivalised income), children vs. total population, 
2006 
 
Typology
eu25 dk fi fr se de nl uk es gr mt cz pl
Total population 22 17 14 19 22 20 17 23 26 26 21 17 25
Less than 18 years 23 15 10 15 21 18 17 21 28 25 19 18 27
D. P. F. R.
 
 
Source:  Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'Relative at-risk-of-poverty 
gaps', ilc_li11.   
Note:  2006 data for EU25 is a Eurostat estimate; 2006 data for Malta are 
provisional. 
 
Figure 3.2: Relative poverty gap, persons less than 18 years of 
age, 2006 
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Table 3.3: At-persistent-risk-of-poverty rate (60 per cent of 
median equivalised income), children vs. total 
population, 2000/2001 
 
Typology
eu25 dk fi fr de nl uk es gr
Total population 9 6 6 9 6 6 11 10 14
Less than 16 years 12 3 4 10 7 11 19 16 10
D. P. F.
 
Source:  Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'At-persistent-risk-of-
poverty rates by gender and age', ilc_li21.   
Note:  All data is for 2001 except for eu25, FR, and UK for which that data is 
2000.  Data for eu25 is a Eurostat estimate, data for NL is provisional, and data 
for FI and UK have a break in series. 
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3.4  Poverty among children and single parent 
households in twelve case study countries 
 
3.4.1  Definitional issues 
A single parent can be defined as a person living without a partner, who 
has the daily care responsibility for a dependent child (EC, 2006:85).  
However, a number of ambiguities within this definition make cross 
national comparison difficult.  For example, the age at which a child 
ceases to be considered dependent varies across the EU, although 18 
years of age is the most common threshold (EC, 2006:85) (see Chapter 
2).  Further ambiguities include:  whether or not a non-resident parent is 
involved in supporting or caring for the child(ren); at what point a new 
partnership constitutes a transition from single parenthood to a couple; 
and the distinction between single parents who live in separate 
households and those who live with other family members (such as their 
own parents) in a complex household (EC, 2006:85).  Moreover, datasets 
on single parents frequently treat single parenthood as a static category, 
as research undertaken is often cross-sectional rather than longitudinal.  
This obscures recognition that spending time as alone is part of a wider 
life course which changes as single parents repartner and as children grow 
up (Millar, 2004:79-80).   
 
3.4.2  Children of lone parents in lone parent households 
and complex households 
Based on data from the 2000/01 census round, on average 19 per cent of 
children in the EU were living with only one of their parents (Table 3.4 and 
Figure 3.3).  Of our case study countries, only the refamilialised countries 
(Poland and the Czech Republic) and the UK (partially defamilialised) were 
above this average.  Three countries had less than 15 per cent of children 
living with just one parent (Denmark, the Netherlands, and Greece), with 
the rest either at the EU average (Finland) or within a few percentage 
points below (France, Germany, Spain).  Since the 1990/91 census round, 
the familialised countries (Greece and Spain) saw their share of children 
living with just one parent increase the most (by six percentage points), 
followed by the UK (by five percentage points).   
 
Children who live with just one of their parents do not necessarily live in a 
single parent household.  While some single parents do live on their own, 
others seek economic relief by living with other family members in 
complex (or multi-generational) households (EC, 2008:23).  This can lead 
to an underestimation of the numbers of single parent families in data 
based on household structures as this kind of measurement does not take 
account of lone parent families nested in complex families (Brodolini, 
2007:14).  In 2005, households of this sort were most prevalent in the 
familialised and refamilialised countries where the distribution of children 
in complex households exceeded that of those in single parent households 
(Table 3.5).  In these countries the distribution of children in single parent 
households was much less than the share of children living with only one 
parent.  For example, in Poland 21 per cent of children were living with 
one parent (Table 3.4), but only five per cent were living in single parent 
households (Table 3.5).  This trend was reversed in the defamilialised and 
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partially defamilialised countries where the distribution of children in lone 
parent households matched the share of children living with only one of 
their parents more closely.   
 
Table 3.4: Share of children living with only one of their parents 
(percentage, 1990/91 and 2000/01) 
 
Typology
Census eu dk fi fr de nl uk gr es cz pl
1990/91 : 15 15 13 15 13 19 9 12 : :
2000/01 19 15 19 17 16 13 24 15 18 24 21
D. P. F. R.
 
Source:  Table modified from EC, 2008:23; Eurostat census – family nuclei 
database. 
 
Figure 3.3: Share of children living with only one of their 
parents (percentage, 2000/01) 
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Table 3.5: Distribution of children in lone parent households 
and complex households (percentage), EU25, 2005 
 
Typology
eu25 dk fi fr se de nl uk gr es mt cz pl
LP HH 13 17 13 12 19 21 9 25 5 4 6 11 5
Cmplx HH 11 3 4 5 4 5 5 7 8 17 18 12 28
D. P. F. R.
 
Source:  Table modified from EC, 2008:155; EU-SILC (2005) PDB 
Note:  EU25 data is a Eurostat estimate; UK data are provisional 
 
Considering the disproportionately high poverty rates of children living in 
single parent households within the familialised and refamilialised 
countries, it is not surprising that many single parents in familialised and 
refamilialised countries seek economic relief by living in complex 
households (Table 3.6 and Figure 3.4).  The at-risk-of-poverty rates of 
these children range from 42-54 per cent, whereas in the defamilialised 
and partially defamilialised countries the range is from 20 per cent-38 per 
cent.  What may explain this divide is greater state support for single 
parent households in the latter and lower levels of provision in the former.  
In the absence of state support that would enable single parents to live 
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independently, many must depend on their extended families for relief 
instead. 
 
Table 3.6: At-risk-of-poverty rates of children (percentage) in 
single parent households and complex households, EU25, 2005 
 
Typology
eu25 dk fi fr se de nl uk gr es mt cz pl
All children 19 10 10 14 9 14 15 21 20 24 22 18 29
LP HH 34 23 21 28 20 33 31 38 46 42 54 47 46
Cmplx HH 20 10 13 18 23 7 9 15 32 23 13 16 26
D. P. F. R.
 
Source:  Table modified from EC, 2008: 145; EU-SILC (2005) PDB 
Note:  EU25 data is a Eurostat estimate; UK data is provisional 
 
Figure 3.4: At-risk-of-poverty rates of children (per cent) in lone 
parent households, EU25, 2005 
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3.4.3  Poverty among single parent households  
The distribution of single parent households among the EU25 population 
was estimated to be 5 per cent in 2006 (Figure 3.5 and Table B.1, Annex 
B).  However, among the at-risk-of-poverty population single parent 
households were more prevalent, representing nine per cent of this 
population.  The distribution of single parent households was largest 
among the defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries, with these 
households representing 5-8 per cent of the population (with the 
exception of the Netherlands which had a distribution of four per cent).  
This distribution was smallest within the familialised countries (two per 
cent), followed by the refamilialised countries (3-4 per cent).  In all of the 
countries the distribution of single parent households among the at-risk-
of-poverty population was greater than their distribution among the total 
population, suggesting that single parent households are overrepresented 
among the poor.  The sole exception was Greece, for which the 
distribution was the same among both populations.  There was a similar 
pattern for all households with dependent children:  the distribution of 
these households was greater among the at-risk-of-poverty population 
than among the total population, which indicates the general vulnerability 
of households with children to poverty.  The exceptions in this case were 
predominantly among the defamilialised countries.  Within these countries 
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(as well as in Germany), households with dependent children had a 
distribution smaller or equal to the distribution among the total 
population.  This result can be expected considering the policy imperatives 
of the Scandinavian countries to support families with children.  
Nevertheless, supportive policies in these countries have not kept single 
parent households from being overrepresented among the poor.      
  
Figure 3.5: Distribution of single parents with dependent 
children   among total population and at-risk-of-
poverty population, 2006 
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Figure 3.6: At-risk-of-poverty rate (60 per cent of median 
equivalised income after social transfers), lone 
parent households and households with dependent 
children, 2006 
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The vulnerability to poverty of single parent households is further 
demonstrated by at-risk-of-poverty rates for 2006.  Thirty-two per cent of 
single parent households in the EU25 were living below the poverty 
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threshold compared to 17 per cent of all households with dependent 
children (Figure 3.6 and Table A.2, Annex B).  The lowest poverty risks 
were among the defamilialised countries which all had poverty rates at or 
below the EU25 average.  The partially defamilialised countries were also 
at or below the average, with the exception of the UK which had 41 per 
cent of single parent households living below the poverty line.  The only 
other country to have such a high poverty risk was the Czech Republic, 
which also had a rate of 41 per cent.  The familialised and refamilialised 
countries generally had rates above the average with the exception of 
Poland, which was at the average, and Greece, which was just below the 
average (30 per cent).    
 
Between 1996 and 2006, the at-risk-of-poverty rates generally decreased 
for both single parent households as well as all households with children.  
The EU15 poverty risk for single parent households dropped by 14 per 
cent, while those for all households with children decreased by six per 
cent (Figure 3.7 and Table B.2, Annex B).  The main exception to this was 
Finland, whose poverty rates increased by 125 per cent for single parent 
families and 80 per cent for all households with children.  However, this 
was an increase from a low base and in 2006 Finland still had the lowest 
poverty rate for single parent households and the second lowest (after 
Denmark) for all households with children.  The familialised countries also 
experienced increases of between 11-19 per cent for single parent 
families, and of between 5-15 per cent for all households with children.  
The most significant decreases in the percentage of single parents below 
the poverty line was among the defamilialised Germany and UK, which 
experienced decreases of 53 per cent and 21 per cent respectively.   
 
Figure 3.7: Percentage rate of change in at-risk-of-poverty 
rates:  single parent households and households 
with dependent children, 1996 and 2006 
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Despite the general decreases in the ten year period between 1996 and 
2006, in more recent years at-risk-of-poverty rates for single parent 
households have been going up in a number of countries.  Between 2001 
and 2006, the EU25 average for single parent families increased by seven 
per cent, while the average for all households with dependent children 
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decreased by six per cent (Figure 3.8 and Table B.2, Annex B).  The 
Nordic  countries, which in 2001 had poverty rates for single parents well 
below the EU25 average, all experienced increases in 2006.  Denmark 
experienced a 58 per cent change (from 12 per cent to 19 per cent), 
Finland a 33 per cent change (from 17 per cent to 18 per cent) and 
Sweden a 71 per cent change (from 13 per cent to 32 per cent).  
Increases in the at-risk-of-poverty rates for single parent households were 
also experienced by the refamilialised Czech Republic and Poland, which 
recorded changes of 58 per cent and 45 per cent respectively.  Both the 
partially defamilialised and the familialised countries experienced 
decreases in their poverty rates for single parent households.   
 
Figure 3.8: Percentage rate of change in at-risk-of-poverty rates:  
single parent households and households with 
dependent children, 2001 and 2006 
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3.4.4  Labour market situation of lone parents 
The labour market situation of lone parents has a major impact on a 
single parent household’s risk of poverty.  Joblessness represents the 
main poverty risk for households with children, although in-work-poverty 
remains a significant cause of low income among families (EC, 2008:27), 
as single parents face particular difficulties in reconciling work and family 
life (EC, 2008:29).  On average, 47.5 per cent of children living in a 
jobless household in 2006 were also living in a single parent household 
(EC, 2008:29).  In the refamilialised Czech Republic and the partially 
defamilialised Germany, Netherlands and the UK half or more than half of 
children in a jobless household were living with a single parent.  This rate 
was highest in the UK at 67 per cent. 
 
The prevalence of joblessness among single parent families is a highly 
gendered phenomenon.  Single parents are predominantly female, with 
single mothers representing nine out of 10 single parents in the EU (Table 
3.7).  Not only do mothers struggle to balance work and care 
responsibilities, but the wages they can command in the labour market 
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are on average lower than those of men (EC, 2006:11).  Therefore, single 
mothers are most likely to face difficulties in finding jobs that are 
sufficiently well paid and flexible to enable them give up welfare benefits, 
in countries where such benefits are available (Brodolini, 2007:31).  In 
considering paid employment, single mothers must take into account the 
financial gains and losses that employment will pose to a family and the 
cost and availability of suitable childcare (Millar, 2004:86).  A further 
consideration includes the extent to which employers will accommodate 
workers with children.  Single fathers also face some of these issues.  
Although single fathers have higher employment rates than single 
mothers, they tend to have lower employment rates than other men (EC, 
2006:11).  
  
Table 3.7: Percentage of single parents by sex, 2001 
 
Typology
eu15 dk fi fr se de nl uk es gr
Males 9 12 14 12 26 4 12 7 12 9
Females 91 88 86 88 74 96 88 93 88 91
D. P. F.
 
Source:  Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'Percentage of lone parents 
by age and sex', ilc_hlc_hh07.   
Notes:  eu15 data is a Eurostat estimate. 
 
Table 3.8: Percentage of single parents aged 25-49 who are 'not 
working' by sex, 2001  
 
dk fi fr de nl uk
Males 5 s : : : 19 u : : : : :
Females 29 s 19 20 28 27 34 40 40 18 u 19 u
D. P. F.Typology
eu15 gresse
 
Source:  Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'Percentage of lone parents 
aged 25-49 who are 'working' or 'not working' by sex', ilc_hlc_wa01. 
 
In 2001, it was estimated that 29 per cent of single mothers in the EU15 
were ‘not working’ compared to five per cent of single fathers (Table 3.8).  
In Sweden this gap was much smaller, with 27 per cent of women and 19 
per cent of men ‘not working’.  The partially defamilialised countries had 
the highest rates of women out of work, ranging from 34 per cent in 
Germany to 40 per cent in the Netherland and UK.  The familialised 
countries had the lowest rates of single mothers out of work (18-19 per 
cent), which supports findings from the EC (2008a:28) report that 
earnings (as opposed to social transfers) played the biggest role in the 
incomes of poor families in Southern European countries, representing 
more that 70 per cent of these families’ gross income.  The defamilialised 
countries also had relatively low levels of single mothers ‘not working’ 
(19-28 per cent).  Millar (2004:90) distinguishes between two groups of 
countries with relatively high levels of employment for single mothers with 
dependent children:  
 
‘On the one hand, there are those countries that actively support 
employment for parents, and so high levels of employment 
represent responses to a more positive environment for working 
parents.  On the other hand, there are those counties where the 
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type and level of support offered to non-employed lone parents is 
very low and so there is more of a negative ‘push’ into work (rather 
than a positive pull).’ 
 
The lower rates of the defamilialised countries (particularly Denmark and 
Finland) are examples of the former category, while the familialised 
countries are examples of the latter.  
 
Children living in single parent households are at a much lower risk of 
poverty if their parent works full-time, but the same is not the case for 
single parents who work part-time (EC, 2008:36).  The risk of poverty for 
children of single parents where the parent is employed full-time is 15 per 
cent compared to 19 per cent for all children (EC, 2008:36).  Among the 
defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries this risk is between 4-
14 per cent, but it is only among the defamilialised countries that the 
majority of single parents with dependent children work full-time (EC, 
2008:36).  Conversely, children whose single parent works part-time have 
a much higher risk of poverty - 30 per cent on average in the EU. 
 
In-work-poverty is a considerable risk for single parent families and can 
be a consequence of low wages and/or part-time work, which is often 
poorly paid.  Single parents must balance work and care responsibilities 
on only one income, and part-time work for some single parents is the 
only way of reconciling the two.  Within the EU25, 17 per cent of working 
single parent households were at risk of poverty in 2006, compared to 
only 10 per cent of all households with dependent children (Table 3.9).  
These rates were lowest among the defamilialised countries (with the 
exception of Sweden), as well as within Malta and Poland.  The partially 
defamilialised countries were either at or just above the EU25 average, 
while Sweden, Spain and the Czech Republic had the highest rates of in-
work-poverty with 26 per cent, 23 per cent and 20 per cent respectively.  
 
Table 3.9: In-work at-risk-of-poverty rates, 2006 
 
Typology
eu25 dk fi fr se de nl uk es gr mt cz pl
LPHH 17 9 8 14 26 18 17 19 23 16 11 20 13
HHDP 10 4 4 7 7 5 6 10 14 17 7 5 16
D. P. F. R.
 
Source:  Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'In-work at-risk-of-poverty 
rates by household type', ilc_iw02.   
Note:  eu25 data is a Eurostat estimate; MT data is provisional and single parent 
data is unreliable or uncertain; FI data is provisional.  
 
3.4.5  Living conditions and material deprivation 
Material deprivation measures provide insight into the living conditions of 
those in poverty.  They can cover economic strain, housing conditions and 
costs, and the enforced lack of important amenities and durables.  
 
In 2001, single parent households living below the poverty line were more 
likely to experience a heavy financial burden due to housing costs than all 
households living in poverty.  (Housing outcomes are discussed in Chapter 
6)   
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Not only are households living below the poverty threshold at risk of 
having housing problems, they are also at risk of missing at least one of 
three basic amenities.  These three basic amenities include:  hot running 
water on the premises; bath or shower within the dwelling; and flush 
toilet within the home.  However, in 2001 single parent households living 
in poverty were less likely to be missing at least one basic amenity than 
all poor households, 21.1 per cent and 28.9 per cent respectively (Table 
B.6, Annex B).  Nevertheless, the rate for single parents, as well as for all 
poor households, increased significantly between 1995 and 2001:  from 
nine per cent to 21.1 per cent, and from 10.5 per cent to 28.9 per cent, 
respectively.  Only Denmark and Germany experienced a downward trend 
during this period for single parent households.  All of the defamilialised 
and partially defamilialised countries were below the EU15 average in 
2001, although much of these data is marked as uncertain or unreliable.  
On a more positive note, the number of single parent households without 
central heating in their home has decreased over ten percentage points 
since 1995.  Only the Netherlands has experienced an increase, but this 
was from a low base and its overall levels in 2001 were still significantly 
below the EU15 average.   
 
Households living below the poverty line are more likely than the rest of 
the population to be unable to afford certain commonplace durables.  In 
1998, single parents in the EU15 were 1-3 per cent more likely than other 
poor households to be unable to afford durables such as a video recorder, 
dishwasher, microwave, and they were over twice as likely not to be able 
to afford a car.  However, while cross-country comparisons are difficult to 
make due to missing and unreliable data, the percentage of single parent 
households without the funds to buy a car compared to all poor 
households is nevertheless striking (67.3 per cent vs. 26.6 per cent).  The 
lack of car  ownership among single parents can contribute to the social 
exclusion of children, making it difficult for children to develop strong 
friendships with classmates living outside their neighbourhood and impede 
children’s participation in out-of-school activities in cases where transport 
is necessary (Ridge, 2002).   
 
3.4.6  Social protection expenditure 
The EC (2008a:38) report found that in terms of social expenditure and 
at-risk-of-poverty rates of children, those who spend most have the 
lowest poverty rates.  Figure 3.9, shows that, in general, the 
defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries have high rates of 
social expenditure and low rates of child poverty while the reverse is true 
for the familialised and refamilialised countries.  The exceptions to this 
include the UK (which had slightly above average social expenditure but 
above average child poverty rates) and the Czech Republic (which had 
below average social expenditure but below average child poverty rates). 
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Figure 3.9: Social benefits as a percentage of GDP vs. child poverty 
rates, 2005 
 
 
Source:  EC, 2008:38; EU-SILC (2005) 
 
 
3.5  Policy responses to poverty among 
children and single parents 
 
3.5.1  Political priority 
In order to ensure the economic well-being and social inclusion of 
children, child poverty strategies need to address the particular 
vulnerability of children living in single parent families.  The issue of child 
poverty and social exclusion has been a growing political concern across 
the majority of Member States (Frazer and Marlier, 2007:45).  However, 
growing awareness of the issue in many countries has yet to be translated 
into coherent, mainstreamed and multi-dimensional strategies to alleviate 
the poverty and social exclusion of children and their parents (Frazer and 
Marlier, 2007:45).  For some countries the well-being of children and 
families has been a long established priority, while for others it has been a 
more recent development.  The Nordic countries are typical examples of 
the former group, as they have had long-standing inclusive policies 
directed at supporting all children and families, which have, in effect, 
resulted in generally low child poverty levels (Frazer and Marlier, 
2007:45).  In line with the defamilialisation typology, the Nordic countries 
have employed a combination of universal benefits, activated employment 
policies, and good childcare and service provision (EC, 2004:6).  France, a 
defamilialised country, has also maintained below average child poverty 
rates for the EU with its generous and supportive state provision – both in 
transfers and in-kind provision – for families with children in general, and 
single parent families in particular.  
 
While support for families with children has been a characteristic of the 
partially defamilialised Netherlands and Germany, a comprehensive policy 
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framework for the explicit prioritisation of child poverty and social 
exclusion has been missing (Frazer and Marlier, 2007:45).  Nevertheless, 
the partially defamilialised UK has given a high priority to tackling child 
poverty and social exclusion since its 1999 pledge to end child poverty by 
2020 (Ridge, 2002:1).  As a result, the UK has managed to reduce child 
poverty by nearly a quarter, just narrowly failing to meet its own target 
for 2004/5 (Bradshaw and Bennett, 2007:1).  
 
The familialised and refamilialised countries – all of which have high levels 
of child poverty (Greece, Malta, Spain and Poland) or child poverty rates 
just below the EU average (Czech Republic) – have, in comparative terms, 
not given tackling child poverty as high a political priority (Frazer and 
Marlier, 2007:46).  In Spain policies remain ‘piecemeal and limited’, while 
in Malta a plethora of initiatives and structures for the provision of 
different services exist although without a coherently delineated policy 
targeted at children (Frazer and Marlier, 2007:46).  Neither Poland, the 
Czech Republic nor Greece has initiated a strategic approach to the issue.   
 
The relative lack of political prioritisation in these five countries is 
consistent with the typology of family policies.  As Brodolini (2007:59) 
notes, the Southern European countries lack both family policy measures 
and national social assistance networks of last resort.  Thus, ‘they lack 
any frame in which to locate measures for lone parents’ (Brodolini, 
2007:59), let alone measures for children.  As typified by familialised 
family policy, ‘the family, in particular the extended family, has a central 
role in all areas of welfare self-production’ (Brodolini, 2007:59), including 
the protection of single parents.  In the words of one Spanish national 
respondent, ‘the family has been a second Ministry of Social Affairs:  
personal problems, work life or social issues, everything was resolved 
inside the family and by the family’ (Brodolini, 2007:62).  Similarly, in the 
transition countries the decline of social services in the post-soviet era 
meant a revival of familial support networks (Brodolini, 2007:59).  
  
3.5.2  ‘Work’ and ‘benefit’ strategies 
OECD recommendations call for an appropriate balance between ‘benefit 
strategies’, which increase the adequacy of benefits for low-income 
families with children, and ‘work strategies’, which promote policies to 
increase employment among poor families (OECD, 2007:4).  As an OECD 
(2007:4) working paper states:  
 
‘The fact that all countries with very low child poverty rates … 
combine low levels of family joblessness and effective redistribution 
policies supports the view that successful anti-poverty strategies 
should seek a balanced approach combining improved benefits 
where necessary and improved incentives to work.’   
 
Thus, policy responses need to include both work and benefit strategies, 
carefully tailored to the situation of each country.   
 
3.5.3  Increasing income through employment 
In keeping with the ‘adult worker’ model, the general direction of single 
parent policies in EU member countries in recent years has been aimed at 
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promoting employment (EC, 2006:92).  Increasing the income of single 
parents through employment requires action on two main fronts.  The first 
entails increasing single parent access to employment, and the second 
involves making work pay, in other words, ensuring that income from 
work is sufficient (Frazer and Marlier, 2007:60).  Hence reforms, most 
commonly among the defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries, 
have placed stricter job search requirements on single parents, usually 
accompanied by benefit modifications to ‘make work pay’ (EC, 2006:92).  
For instance, in Germany and the Netherlands single parents on social 
assistance now face greater pressure to take jobs (EC, 2006:92).   
 
Brodolini (2007:75) notes, however, that the ‘welfare-to-work’ strategy 
has evolved in countries with low employment rates for single mothers, 
and thus does not fit the experience of the Mediterranean countries and 
the transition countries in which single mothers already work in a higher 
proportion compared to the activity rates of women in general.  The report 
advises that ‘in none of these cases do the measures need to be framed in 
terms of a renewed “ethics of work” nor has the problem of welfare 
dependency ever arisen’ (Brodolini, 2007:75).  Therefore, the main issue 
for the familialised and refamilialised countries is improved access for 
single mothers to higher quality jobs as well as measures for reconciling 
work and family life.    
 
In order to provide single parents with better access to employment, 
measures to reconcile work and family life must be developed.  In this 
area, not only is childcare seen as critical to raising the participation of 
lone parents (particularly single mothers) in employment, but good quality 
childcare is recognised as important in itself for its constructive role in the 
early development of children (Frazer and Marlier, 2007:68).  In order to 
draw more single parents into the labour market, both the availability and 
cost-effectiveness of childcare need to be taken into consideration.  In 
many countries the net childcare costs are high, and ‘in several countries, 
tax burdens and the withdrawal of social benefits reduce gains from work 
to such an extent that even very limited childcare expenses can leave 
families with less money to spend than if they were to stay at home’ 
(OECD, 2007:35).  This means that along with the expansion of the 
availability of childcare, increased childcare support is required to improve 
affordability (OECD, 2007:31, 35).   
 
While childcare services have expanded in some countries stimulated by 
the Barcelona target, only the defamilialised countries have reached the 
target of providing a childcare place for at least 33 per cent of children 
under the age of three (EC, 2006:94).  In addition, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Spain joined the defamilialised countries in meeting (or 
scoring close to) the second Barcelona target:  that at least 90 per cent of 
children aged between three years and the mandatory school age should 
have a childcare place (EC, 2006:94).  Provision was lowest in Greece and 
Poland, and also in Spain and Malta where there were no public subsidies 
for childcare.  In 2002, coverage of infants was low in Spain, with only 
12.1 per cent of children aged three and under covered (EC, 2006:94).   
 
62 
 
Frazer and Marlier (2007:25-26) noted that the absence of sufficient 
affordable childcare was an important factor in the level of child poverty 
and social exclusion in Poland and Greece in particular.  The limited 
availability of childcare in Poland had a strong negative influence on the 
employment possibilities for single mothers.  In Greece, only employed 
women tended to have access to childcare, thereby increasing the 
difficulties for unemployed women to seek a job (Frazer and Marlier, 
2007:26).  It was highlighted that in Germany children from the lower 
social strata, especially those with a migration background, were few 
among day care attendees (Frazer and Marlier, 2007:26).  Affordability 
was also cited as an issue in the UK, where childcare remained expensive 
despite recent increases to the childcare subsidy element of the Working 
Tax Credit (EC, 2006:94).   
 
The defamilialised countries stand out as having a high level of coverage 
and affordability.  Municipalities in Sweden have an obligation to provide a 
childcare place within three to four months of demand, regardless of the 
parent’s employment status (EC, 2006:94).  Finland has a similar policy, 
in addition to which if there is an urgent need for day care, for example if 
a job is offered at short notice, childcare must be provided within two 
weeks (SOCCARE, 2002:21).  In Finland and Denmark, every child below 
school age has an individual right to day care (EC, 2008b:22).  In France, 
100 per cent of three to five year olds and as many as 35 per cent of two 
year olds were enrolled in a pre-school in 1998 (SOCCARE, 2002:31).  
The high employment rate of single parents in France appears to be 
related to the special provisions made for single mothers, who are given 
access to subsidised pre-elementary schooling, for children aged two 
years and above.  In recent years, both Denmark and Sweden have 
reduced day care charges, which has improved the access of poorer 
families to childcare (Frazer and Marlier, 2007:68).  Sweden, which 
provides a subsidised childcare system, introduced a maximum childcare 
fee in 2002, which reduced costs for almost all families (EC, 2006:94).   
 
Developments among some of the partially defamilialised and 
refamilialised countries have been observed in recent years regarding the 
reconciliation of work and family life.  In the UK, there has been a large 
expansion in childcare, nursery care and a special early childhood 
intervention programme, Sure Start.  Germany, following a ‘day-care 
summit’, declared that by 2013 all children under three years of age will 
have a legal guarantee to a place in day care (Frazer and Marlier, 
2007:68).  Proposals in the Czech Republic and Poland have been less 
specific, although both have expressed a commitment to introduce 
measures to help families balance work and family life (Frazer and Marlier, 
2007:60).   
 
Flexible working hours have the potential to enable parents to balance 
employment and family responsibilities.  ‘Time flexibility’ refers to working 
arrangements other than the standard working week of Monday to Friday, 
9 to 5.  With the development of the 24/7 economy, working hours have 
become more flexible to the advantage of some and to the detriment of 
others (Letablier, 2006:202; Klammer, 2006:237).  In terms of a work-life 
balance, flexibility can be ‘good’ or ‘bad’: 
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‘Good flexibility’ is when people have control over their working 
time schedules and is usually associated with a high level of job 
satisfaction.  It is more often found among middle-class workers, 
many of whom have regular and secure jobs in the public sector.  
‘Bad flexibility’ is associated with lack of control over hours, place of 
work and working conditions, low job satisfaction, as experienced 
by low-skilled workers in services, retail, hotels and catering.’ 
Letablier (2006:208) 
 
In Germany, France and the UK women tend to be concentrated in these 
sectors and are therefore more exposed to bad flexibility than men 
(Letablier, 2006:208). Irregular working schedules and non-standard 
working hours create problems for parents, especially single parents, in 
combining their hours of work with their children’s hours of care and 
school, homework and play (Letablier, 2006:206).   Thus, for women 
working in low-qualified jobs, flexibility does not bring greater autonomy, 
but more constraints and pressures for mothers trying to organise 
childcare (Letablier, 2006:214).  The increasing issue of atypical working 
hours has led countries such as France and Finland to develop flexible, on-
demand childcare (for example, 24/7 childcare) (EC, 2008b:22).  While 
certain initiatives – such as financial support for parents to employ a 
childminder in the home (France) or a commitment to provide ‘wrap-
around cover’ childcare between 8am and 6pm for children of working 
parents (UK) – are welcome developments, the extent to which childcare 
should be adapted to the 24/7 economy is questionable (Perrons, 
2006:259).  Nights and weekends are important for child-parent 
relationships, and the 24/7 economy can pose a threat to family life and 
child well-being (Klammer 2006:237; Letablier, 2006:202).  The need for 
stability and regular rhythms in family life is ‘staunchly in opposition to 
the labour market ideal of the flexible worker’, and the labour market 
norm can no longer be the ‘(male) full-time worker without any 
obligations beyond work’ (Klammer, 2006:238).  Klammer (2006:238-
239) contends, what is needed is a paradigm shift in companies, creating 
a situation in which each employee is automatically regarded as a 
potential caregiver with responsibilities outside work.   
 
In addition to work-life reconciliation policies, specific measures aimed at 
increasing the access of parents to paid work are important.  The UK’s 
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP), introduced in 1998 to maximize 
employment among single parents, has resulted in some single parents 
entering employment that otherwise might not have done (Frazer and 
Marlier, 2007:61).  However, Bradshaw and Bennett (2007:14) suggest 
that the NDLP ‘may have creamed off lone parents most ready and willing 
to work, and getting others into work may prove much harder’.  
Furthermore, the difficulty some single parents have in retaining their jobs 
has called into question problems related to childcare and the quality of 
work (EC, 2006:92).  Nevertheless, single parent employment in the UK in 
2007 was 57 per cent, up from 45 per cent in 1997 (Bradshaw and 
Bennett, 2007:14).   
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Activation measures, such as training initiatives or programmes to 
reintegrate mothers into the labour market, are important means of 
providing single parents increased access to paid work.  The NDLP 
introduced a ‘care to learn’ scheme for teenage lone mothers, which 
resulted in an increase from 23.1 per cent in 1997 to 29.7 per cent of 
teenage mothers in education, employment, or training (EC, 2006:90).  In 
Malta, single mothers and pregnant women between the ages of 13 and 
18 have been included in small-scale projects encouraging employment 
and/or a return to education (EC, 2006:92).   
 
Policies to increase the employment of single parents must be 
accompanied by measures to ‘make work pay’, as ‘raising employment 
levels, without raising income does not reduce child poverty’ (EC, 
2004:6).  This can be done though income support for working families 
and minimum wage policies.  Plans to increase the minimum wage have 
been expressed by Germany as well as the Czech Republic (Frazer and 
Marlier, 2007:61).  The UK government has sought to improve in-work 
incomes by increasing the minimum wage faster than average earnings 
and by substantially increasing Child Benefit for the eldest eligible child 
(Frazer and Marlier, 2007:61).  Nevertheless, despite the minimum wage 
and tax and benefit system, a single earner family must work 45 hours 
per week on the minimum wage in the UK if the household’s net income is 
to reach the poverty threshold (Bradshaw and Bennett, 2007:16).  For 
this reason, single parents remain particularly vulnerable to in-work 
poverty.   
 
3.5.4  Increasing income through benefits and social transfers 
As noted above, income from employment is not always sufficient to raise 
single parent households out of poverty.  Redistribution, therefore, 
through benefits and tax credits, is a key feature of social policy.  Both 
horizontal redistribution (from families without children to those with 
children) and vertical redistribution (from wealthier to poorer families) are 
important for alleviating the poverty of single parent families and children.  
There are a number of ways to redistribute income toward single parent 
families and children:  through family benefits, out-of-work benefits, in-
work income supplements, and non-cash benefits and services.  
Furthermore, the degree to which benefits are universal or targeted also 
impact on the effectiveness of social transfers in reducing poverty among 
single parent households.   
 
Family benefits play an important role in supporting the income of families 
with children, and represent on average approximately half of cash social 
transfers to EU households (EC, 2008b:20).  Two components of family 
benefit regimes that particularly impact on single parent families are child 
allowances, which vary depending on the age and number of children, and 
single parent supplements, which take account of the specific vulnerability 
of single parent families.  Child benefits tend to be universal, with the 
exception of Spain, which does not provide specific benefits for children 
(EC, 2008:177; Frazer and Marlier, 2007:27).  Spain has, however, 
recently reformed its system of tax concessions in order to give further 
support to families (EC, 2008:179).  Family benefits tend not to be 
targeted at poor children, although among the countries that do so, are 
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those countries that significantly reduce poverty through family transfers 
(France, Germany and the Czech Republic), as well as countries where 
family benefits only have a limited impact on alleviating child poverty 
(Greece, Malta, and Poland) (EC, 2008:42).  Poland, however, has 
recently committed itself to increasing the allowance for families in 
‘unfavourable circumstances’ by 50 per cent (Frazer and Marlier, 
2007:63). 
 
In most European countries single parent households receive specific 
financial transfers through either the tax or benefit system (EC, 2006:92).  
In Finland, Germany, and Denmark single parents receive extra support 
regardless of income.   In Finland, family allowance is paid universally for 
all children under 17 years of age, and single parents get a monthly 
supplement for each child (SOCCARE, 2002:22).  In other countries, 
single parents receive means-tested additional financial support.  For 
example, le Allocation de Soutien Familial (ASF) in France is a means-
tested support payment intended for those raising an orphaned child; 
however, it also extends to children of single parent families in cases 
where the absent parent does not pay alimony, or pays less than the 
amount of the ASF.  Moreover, le Allocation de Parent Isolé (API) is a 
means-tested Lone Parent Allowance paid to those with a child below the 
age of three (SOCCARE, 2002:29).    
 
Sweden differs from other countries in that special rights exist for the 
children, rather than the adult, in single parent households (EC, 2006:93).  
This entitlement for children who do not live with both parents has been in 
existence since the early 1930s.  This approach has a particular 
advantage:  ‘Given that in some European countries lone parents are 
sometimes attacked as undeserving in public debate (for example in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland), a benefit entitlement instituted as a right of 
a child may prove more enduring’ (EC, 2006:93).   
 
In addition to family benefits, income can be redistributed towards single 
parent families by:  a) providing a minimum level of income for those 
without paid employment, such as through social assistance, 
unemployment benefits, and disability payments; and b) by 
supplementing the income of employed parents as a means to ‘make work 
pay’.  Both Greece and the UK supplement the incomes of single parents 
based on the employment status of the parent (EC, 2006:179).  This type 
of approach reflects a welfare-to-work strategy.  This contrasts with 
France’s Lone Parent Allowance which is available for single parents 
regardless of their employment status.18  Policy development in this area 
must pay sufficient attention to the balance between work incentives and 
adequate provision, and must ensure enabling services such as childcare 
are in place in order that workfare approaches are successful in reducing 
poverty.   
 
                                            
18  This should not be taken to mean that, for instance, the UK does not pay child-related 
benefits regardless of employment status.  The UK has a Child Tax Credit paid to the main 
carers of children with a low to modest income regardless of their employment status. 
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A further area of concern is the high effective marginal tax rates that face 
low-paid workers as they make the transition from receipt of benefits into 
paid work (OECD, 2007:34).  In most countries average effective tax 
rates on the low paid can be higher than on average earners or even the 
high paid, largely through the interaction of direct taxes with the 
withdrawal of benefits (OECD, 2007:34).  Therefore, low effective tax 
burdens for low-wage earners could be of benefit to single parents seeking 
to move into paid work.   
 
The well-being and social inclusion of single parents and children depends 
not only on income support but also on in-kind benefits.  In this way, 
policies relating to childcare, housing, education, health, and the 
participation of children in social, cultural and recreational life are of great 
importance. 
 
As noted by Frazer and Marlier (2007:73), ‘a key element of the social 
inclusion and well-being of children is that they are given opportunities to 
participate in the normal social, recreational, sporting and cultural 
activities that their peers do’.  These strategies have been observed in a 
number of countries.  French policy has prioritised the promotion of 
access to culture and sport in impoverished neighbourhoods, while the UK 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport has announced increased 
funding to improve the participation of disadvantaged children in sport, 
drama, and music after school as part of its plan for ‘extended schools’ 
(EC, 2008b:30; Frazer and Marlier, 2007:73-74).  The Czech Republic 
provides grants for free time activities, and the Netherlands’s Ministry of 
Public Health, Welfare and Sports encourages equal opportunities for 
children from disadvantaged families to participate in meaningful activities 
(Frazer and Marlier, 2007:73-74).   
 
While health and education outcomes are discussed in subsequent 
chapters, policy issues related to the social exclusion of children at school 
warrant a brief discussion in this chapter.  Countries such as Poland and 
the UK have assisted schoolchildren from low income families by providing 
free school meals (Frazer and Marlier, 2007:64).  Nutritionally, free school 
meals play an important role in the health and development of these 
children; although, some research has indicated that ‘free school meals 
are often viewed as problematic and heavily stigmatised’ (Ridge, 
2002:82).  Ridge’s (2002:82) qualitative research with children living in 
poverty in the UK suggests that ‘the issue may not be the free school 
meal itself, as much as the process of qualification for it and delivery’.  
She proposes that ‘a universal system of tokens or swipe cards would 
ensure that all children collected their meals using the same currency, and 
that children receiving free school meals would be treated no differently to 
others’ (Ridge, 2002:148).  Two other issues highlighted in Ridge’s UK 
study were:  first, children’s social exclusion from school trips due to 
costs; and second, children’s exclusion from their peers based on 
inadequate school clothing or uniforms (Ridge, 2002:147).  In response to 
this latter, Ridge recommends the restoration of the uniform grant in the 
UK.  
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Child maintenance from non-resident parents can also influence the 
financial situation of single parents.  Arrangements for determining formal 
child maintenance obligations in cases where parents were unable to come 
to a private agreement vary between countries:  courts have the main 
responsibility for determining child maintenance in France, Sweden, 
Germany and Spain; agencies were used in Denmark and the UK; and a 
combination of the two operate in Finland and the Netherlands (Brodolini, 
2007:50; Skinner et al., 2007:2).  Brodolini (2007:51) observes that the 
defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries view the issue of 
unpaid alimony as ‘a non-private, socially relevant one’, while there is a 
less sensitive, and more legalistic attitude in the Southern countries.  The 
report recommended the use of agencies as a ‘friendlier alternative to 
courts’ in the hopes of reducing litigation between former couples 
(Brodolini, 2007:77).  This could pave the way for convergence towards 
shared custody between parents, the prevalence of which within some 
countries19 is estimated to be between 7-15 per cent (Skinner et al., 
2007:3).    
 
A report on international child support policy (Skinner et al., 2007:4) 
found that most of the countries20 in the study had some agency 
involvement in the collection and forwarding of maintenance, and that 
some provided guaranteed maintenance schemes (Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, and Sweden).  The main advantage of this latter 
provision was that it guaranteed a minimum amount of child maintenance 
regardless of the economic status of the liable parent.  The main 
drawback, however, was that such schemes were costly to administer and 
only Finland and Denmark had recovery rates greater than 50 per cent 
(65 per cent and 88 per cent respectively).  In terms of the effectiveness 
of child maintenance regimes, Denmark, Finland, and France were noted 
for their regularity of provision, while Denmark, Finland, Sweden, 
Germany and the Netherlands for ensuring the child’s entitlement.   
 
3.5.5  The impact of social transfers 
The impact of social transfers can depend on the degree of universality or 
targeting of benefits.  Countries with more generous systems (such as 
those among the defamilialised typology) provide most of their support 
through universal non-income related benefits, an approach that appears 
to be successful in supporting children and fighting child poverty (EC, 
2008:184).  The advantage of universal benefits is that they are non-
discriminatory and therefore less affected by low take-up.  Nevertheless, 
in the context of strained public budgets means-tested benefits are an 
efficient way of targeting support to the most needy, but can be more 
expensive to administer than universal support.  The success of means-
tested benefits, however, depends on three things:  coverage, adequacy, 
and take-up (Behrendt, 2000:37).  Means-testing must target the 
appropriate population, be generous enough to alleviate poverty and must 
                                            
19 Data on the prevalence of shared custody was inconsistent and partial, and was 
based on what data could be found for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, the UK, and the USA.   
20 Refer to above list of countries. 
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provide for optimal take up.  Addressing the last factor requires efforts to 
increase knowledge and access to benefits, as well as resourceful methods 
of reducing any stigma that may be attached to seeking benefits.  
Targeting must also be crafted carefully to avoid introducing adverse work 
incentives. 
 
The UK has achieved relative success in its means-testing, with ‘an 
astonishingly high degree of effectiveness, especially among the lower 
poverty brackets’ (Behrendt, 2000:36).  Sweden’s record is less clear, and 
Germany’s is far less impressive (Behrendt, 2001:36).  The transition 
from universal coverage to income testing in the Czech Republic and 
Poland between 1990 and 1993 was accompanied by a relative worsening 
of the income position of children (Forster and Toth, 2001:338).  Poverty 
rates during this period doubled in the Czech Republic and nearly tripled 
in Poland (Forster and Toth, 2001:337).  In more recent years, however, 
there have been attempts to relax means-testing and restore at least 
some of the universal qualities of family policies in these two countries 
(Forster and Toth, 2001:338).   
 
Given the different policy norms and models of family forms and 
obligations, policy responses need to be dynamic and carefully tailored to 
the situation of each country.  Nevertheless, the Brodolini study 
(2007:76) concludes: 
 
‘Although a lone-parent-family policy begins with targeted and 
specific measures, it will then mature only if included in a broader, 
multifaceted framework of family support policies.  The introduction 
of specific measures (or more favourable conditions) for lone-parent 
families should always be supported by a consistent framework of 
measures for all parents altogether.’   
 
Not only does the system of transfers (that is, if they are universal or 
targeted) bear weight on the impact of social transfers, but so does the 
type of support.  Whether income is redistributed through benefit regimes 
or the tax system can affect the outcome of poverty reduction measures.  
Tax concessions tend to assist better off families, and so shifting support 
from taxes to benefits would have the effect of redistributing income to 
the poorest children, especially if the benefits are means-tested (EC, 
2008:45).  However, ‘tax concessions tend to involve less distortion in 
terms of work incentives and have fewer problems of non take-up’ (EC, 
2008:45).  (Although the take-up of Working Tax Credit in the UK, 
illustrates that low take-up remains a serious issue for tax administered 
schemes.)  Furthermore, strong evidence that mothers are more likely to 
spend income on children’s needs than fathers, suggests that, ‘to the 
extent that child-contingent cash benefits are granted to mothers, they 
are, therefore, more likely to be spent for the well-being of children than 
tax concessions which simply reduce the tax of the income earner’ (EC, 
2008:184).   
 
There are, however, very wide discrepancies between countries in the 
overall impact of income transfers and tax policies (Frazer and Marlier, 
2007:63).  For example, while the UK has increased both its in-work and 
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out-of-work benefits, the Government has not met its own interim child 
poverty reduction targets: 
 
‘It can be seen that the UK starts with a pre-transfer poverty rate 
only 19 per cent higher than Sweden; but after transfers, the child 
poverty rate in the UK is 50 per cent higher than in Sweden.  
Sweden makes more effort.  It spends more in making that effort … 
and its level of inequality is lower’  
Bradshaw and Bennett (2007:15) 
 
So while the UK has experienced some success over the past ten years in 
reducing poverty, inequality has increased (TUC, 2008:1).  Inequality, it 
can be argued, is as bad as poverty for children as it can have detrimental 
effects on their health, their education and their well-being (TUC, 
2008:1).  Therefore, while targeting support towards children and families 
(particularly single parent families) is a necessary feature of a poverty 
reduction scheme, it is not sufficient.  What is required, therefore, is an 
overall system of redistribution which addresses underlying inequalities 
(Frazer and Marlier, 2007:63).   
 
 
3.6  Conclusions 
 
In the context of family change in the EU, the particular vulnerability of 
single parents and their children must be mainstreamed into poverty 
reduction strategies and given sufficient political priority by Member State 
governments.  Child-centred and gender sensitive approaches should be 
adopted that confront the overlapping and cross-cutting causes of 
poverty, emphasising the negative effects that poverty and social 
exclusion have on the current and future well-being of children and their 
families.   
 
Without a child-centred approach to policymaking, children’s interests and 
needs are easily subsumed by those of the family or the state.  Despite 
the increasing attention of many governments to children’s particular 
vulnerability to poverty, countries such as the UK have been criticized for 
taking a ‘social investment’ approach to the issue (Lewis, 2006:17; Lister, 
2006; Ridge, 2002:4).  From this perspective, ‘children are protected, 
educated and valued for what they will become:  future citizens’ (Lewis, 
2006:17).  This future-oriented approach regards children as ‘becomings’ 
rather than ‘beings’, and as ‘children as adults in waiting’ to the detriment 
of the child qua child (Lister, 2006:321).  As such, childhood is not valued 
in itself but is valued for its instrumental role in the development of 
children into productive adults.  In this way, the emphasis is on 
‘achievement but not enjoyment; education and not play’ (Lister, 
2006:321).  Proponents of a child-centred perspective are interested in 
children’s own accounts of their experiences of poverty and consider the 
policy implications for children’s concern over stigma, ‘fitting in’, and 
bullying (see, for example, Ridge’s (2002) child-centred study of poverty).  
Lewis (2006:16) proposes a rights-based, citizenship model that focuses 
on the individual child and his or her need for protection.   
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The ‘social investment state’, as opposed to the traditional welfare state, 
focuses on ‘investment in human capital wherever possible, rather than on 
direct provision of economic maintenance’ (Giddens, 1998:117).  
Therefore, in the process of governments’ elevation of paid work as the 
primary obligation of citizenship, without adequate support single mothers 
and their children become particularly vulnerable to poverty as single 
mothers attempt to balance paid work with their care responsibilities 
(Lister, 2006:322-323).  Lister (2006:315) criticizes Britain’s New Labour 
child welfare policy for its lack of a gender analysis.  She argues that ‘one 
consequence is that children are de-coupled from their mothers so that it 
is no longer a case of “women and children first” but “children (not 
women) first”’ (Lister, 2006:315).  She maintains that the well-being of 
children cannot be divorced from that of their mothers’ and that the 
interrelationship between women’s weak labour market position and child 
poverty must be recognized and prioritised in social policy (Lister, 
2006:327).  As children’s material welfare depends disproportionately on 
the welfare of their mothers, tackling the well-documented feminisation of 
poverty (Lewis, 2006:7) is crucial for the success of child poverty 
strategies as well as being important in its own right (Lister, 2006:327).  
The challenge, therefore, is to develop child centred and gender-sensitive 
policies in order for children and their families – particularly single parent 
families – to thrive.   
 
When discussing social exclusion it is important not to over-concentrate 
on poverty as the sole cause of individual marginalisation or the sole 
manifestation of deprivation.  Sen (2000) has highlighted the need to 
focus on ‘the multidimensionality of deprivation and its emphasis on the 
relational processes rather than the individual’ (cited in Munck, 2004:21).  
Although poverty is a key element of social exclusion discourse, it is 
important to recognise that the concept of ‘deprivation’ is much more 
complex than material or financial poverty.  Indeed, this is one of main 
reasons why the language of ‘social exclusion’ became so popular within 
the European Union (Munck, 2004:22). Currently, the concept of social 
exclusion within the EU ‘refers to the dynamic process of being shut out, 
fully or partially, from any social, economic, political or cultural systems 
which determine the social integration of a person in society’ (Walker and 
Walker, 1997:8).  It is important to remember that social exclusion may 
be caused by other things other than poverty and the two terms are not 
synonymous. 
 
Each country must also find the right balance between ‘work-strategies’ 
and ‘benefit-strategies’ so that not only joblessness among single parents 
decreases, but that in-work poverty falls also.  Of course, in order to 
increase the access of single parents to employment attention must be 
paid to the reconciliation of work and family life.  Furthermore, social 
policy should ensure that all children are protected from poverty, 
deprivation and disadvantage despite the employment status of their 
parent.  This can be done, perhaps, through special rights and 
entitlements of a child.  As Stein Ringen (1987:41) states:  ‘If poverty 
prevails, the welfare state is a failure’.  If such a statement is to be taken 
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seriously, the particular challenges facing single parent families must be 
given due priority in the social policies of European governments.   
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4  Children’s Educational 
Outcomes  
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
There is a considerable body of international evidence that children 
growing up in non-intact families have lower levels of educational 
achievement than those who live with both natural parents.  The 
evidence however, is not entirely consistent and some findings have 
run counter to the prevailing view. 
 
While some report an association between family disruption and lower 
educational achievement, the explanatory frameworks offered by 
researchers are varied.  Some have questioned whether a causal link 
exists and have highlighted the problems of measuring unobserved 
variables that may have a stronger impact upon children’s achievement 
than family structure itself.  Others have concluded that family structure 
does exercise a real effect upon children’s achievement and have looked 
for reasons within the family itself or, at a societal and international level, 
within the family policy environment.  There is some evidence that socio-
economic status is important.  
 
4.1.1  The nature of the evidence 
The educational outcomes for children from non-intact families have been 
examined in studies which focus upon specific countries and in broader 
comparative studies.  There is large body of US research evidence which 
lies outside the scope of the present review.  It is important, however, to 
mention the influential meta-analysis of parental divorce and the well-
being of children conducted by Amato and Keith (1991) which reviewed 98 
studies, including some European research.  An update of the analysis was 
undertaken a decade later, based upon 67 studies undertaken during the 
1990’s (Amato 2001).  Both the original meta-analysis and the update 
find a significant negative effect of divorce upon a range of outcomes for 
children, including their educational achievement.  Although it was 
hypothesised that the effects would be weaker in the update – for 
example, because of improved therapeutic interventions for children and 
more sophisticated research designs developed over the intervening 
period – this did not prove to be the case and indeed the effects appeared 
to be stronger in the later study. 
 
The relevant body of European literature in the English language is much 
smaller than the US literature.  Many studies of specific countries can be 
identified but these – insofar as they are presented in English – appear to 
be to be unevenly dispersed across the EU Member States and other 
European countries.  For example, while the Netherlands, Nordic countries 
and the UK are quite well represented, the detailed situation in many 
countries is not covered.  This highlights the importance of cross-national 
studies which take a broader sweep across European countries and help to 
define important policy questions for the EU. 
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4.2  Child outcomes:  Specific country studies 
 
This section discusses the available evidence on child outcomes for the 
defamilialised and partially defamilialised typologies.  Evidence about the 
educational achievement of children from non-intact families in these 
countries must be viewed against the complex and shifting reality of 
family life in modern Europe, as outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
4.2.1  Defamilialised countries:  Sweden, Finland and 
France 
Swedish researchers have been able to use comprehensive national 
registers linked by unique personal identification numbers to conduct 
studies of entire populations.  A study by Ringback et al. (2004) of almost 
150,000 young people compared educational attainment at ages 24-25 of 
children of single parents and children from intact families.  The study 
sought to identify those factors which might increase the risk of lowered 
educational achievement and to examine the influence of the life 
circumstances of non-custodial parents.  The children of single parents 
were divided into three categories:  children of widows/widowers; children 
of a single parent with a living non-custodial parent; and children of a 
single parent where the non-custodial parent had died. 
 
Without controlling for background variables, it was found to be more 
common for children of single parents than those in two-parent families to 
have acquired only the nine years of compulsory Swedish education.  In 
fact, the proportion was twice as high, except for the children of 
widows/widowers.  The most disadvantaged group was children of a single 
parent where the custodial parent had died.  This pattern of disadvantage 
persisted in post-school education.  Once again, children of a single parent 
where the custodial parent had died fared worst. 
 
When variables treated as `confounders’ (parental age, socio-economic 
group and other parental characteristics) and `mediators’ (social benefits, 
housing situation, number of children),21 were introduced into the model, 
the likelihood of finishing education after just nine years of schooling 
decreased for all groups of children of single parents, but remained 
statistically significant for children with a living non-custodial parent and 
those whose non-custodial parent had died.  The chances of not achieving 
a post-school education also declined and remained significantly increased 
only for children whose non-custodial parent had died.  Children in other 
types of single parent households also show increased odds, but only 
when the circumstances of both parents were taken into account.  
 
                                            
21  A mediator is a process or mediating variable that explains the link between an 
initial variable and an outcome; a confounder is an extraneous variable in a 
statistical model that correlates (positively or negatively) with both the initial 
variable and the independent variable.  The analyses therefore need to control for 
these factors to avoid what is known as a type 1 error. 
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The authors conclude that children who lived with a single parent for at 
least five years of their adolescence show lower educational achievement 
at ages 24-25 than children from two-parent families and that the main 
explanation appeared to lie in a lack of household resources, as indicated 
by receipt of social assistance and their housing situation.  They also 
observe, however, that achievement varied according to the cause of 
single parenthood, with children of widowed parents having the best 
prospects.  In general, the negative education outcomes associated with 
single parenting were greater for girls than for boys, and for children of 
highly educated parents compared to those with low levels of education. 
 
These findings are in line with a previous study by Jonsson and Gahler 
(1997), which also used a large dataset, of around 120,000 cases.  This 
was based upon a national random sample of ninth grade (mainly 16 year 
old) Swedish junior high school students, linked through a unique 
personal identifier to census information about the households in which 
they lived. The researchers were able to undertake both cross-sectional 
and longitudinal analyses, introducing a wide range of control variables 
including family structure, parents’ education, housing situation, 
immigrant status and social class.  Results from both types of analysis 
show that children who had experienced family dissolution or 
reconstitution experienced lower levels of educational attainment at age 
16 than those from stable two-parent families.  Even after controlling for 
socio-economic characteristics, the effects for children of single parents 
were substantially smaller, but still present. 
 
The authors considered three possible explanations for the negative effect 
of single parenthood upon children’s attainment:  parental time 
constraints, downward social mobility and economic deprivation.  They 
find little support for the time constraint hypothesis, as, for example, the 
children of widowed parents demonstrated higher levels of attainment 
than children of divorced parents, even though time constraints would 
appear to operate in both situations.  Neither was economic deprivation 
particularly successful in explaining the results, mainly because income 
differences between different family types were relatively small, reflecting 
the generous levels of social welfare provision in Sweden.  When, 
however, downward social mobility, measured by changes in household 
educational and occupational status, was introduced into the model, a 
strong effect was observed.  In particular, the negative impact upon 
children was found to be greatest when the occupational and educational 
status of the custodial mother was lower than that of the absent father.  
While recognising the importance of hidden economic effects in changes of 
status, the authors nonetheless argued for the merits of distinguishing 
downward social mobility from other explanations, suggesting that loss of 
educational resources and sources of aspiration should be taken seriously 
in studies of family dissolution and educational attainment. 
 
The evidence from Sweden does not, however, always point in the same 
direction.  For example, a small study of 74 children of a one-year sample 
of parents divorcing through a district court (Wadsby and Svedin, 1996) 
discounted the effect of divorce upon their subsequent educational 
attainment.  All the children were between 11 years and 17 years old at 
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the time of divorce and completed their nine-year compulsory education 
within one year before, to five years after, the divorce.  Each child was 
matched with two classmates of the same sex, born closest in time and 
living with both biological parents. 
 
Wadsby and Svedin (1996) show that the grade point averages of the 
children at 16 years from the study group and the control group were 
similar irrespective of the time elapsed since the divorce.  In addition, the 
grades of children of professionals and higher manual workers were 
significantly higher than those of the children of manual workers in both 
groups, irrespective of family status. 
 
Acknowledging that their findings on the effects of divorce differed from 
those produced by many studies outside Sweden, the authors suggest 
that the relatively generous level of financial support available to divorced 
parents in Sweden may mitigate the economic impact of separation, and 
also that a more accepting attitude towards single parenthood than in 
more traditional societies may exercise a protective effect.  However, the 
Wadsby and Svedin (1996) findings may also be affected by the relatively 
small size of the sample used. 
 
In their comparison of the link between childhood family structure, 
schooling and earnings in Sweden and the USA, Björklund et al. (2006) 
drew the Swedish data from a large national dataset comprising a random 
sample of 20 per cent of the individuals born in Sweden in 1964/65 
(almost 36,000 cases).  These individuals were matched to their full and 
half-siblings, and observed in bi-decennial censuses in 1965, 1970, 1975 
and 1980.  Educational and earnings outcomes were gathered for 1996.  
While many studies use one year `window’ measurements as a proxy for 
family structure throughout childhood, this study sought to capture the 
dynamic nature of family formation and dissolution by constructing age-
specific changes in family structure over an individual’s entire childhood, 
up to age 16.  When only family structure - with controls for age, sex, 
race and oversampled groups - was included in the model, nearly all non-
intact family structure variables were negatively associated with years of 
schooling and annual earnings.  However, when the sibling composition of 
the family and parents’ education were included in the model, the effect of 
family structure became statistically insignificant, leading the authors to 
doubt a causal relationship between non-intact family structures and 
children’s educational outcomes measured in years of schooling.  At the 
same time, the number of full and half siblings and the time lived with 
them tended to be negatively related to educational achievement and 
earnings in adulthood.  This effect was observed in both countries and was 
attributed by the authors to the reduction in resources – both time and 
money – available to be devoted to children in larger families. 
 
Mixed conclusions were also drawn from an investigation of the 
educational achievement of more than 11,000 Finnish children (Riala et 
al., 2003), with special reference to single parent families.  This study 
formed part of the 1966 Northern Finland Birth Cohort Study, covering 96 
per cent children born in during that year.  Data on the cohort members’ 
families and personal characteristics were gathered at various ages:  
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during pregnancy, at birth in 1966 and at age one year, and then at 
follow-ups during the years 1980 and 1981.  Family background was 
linked with school performance at 16 years and education attainment at 
31 years.  Single parent families were divided into four types:  where the 
mother was single at the child’s birth and was still single by the time the 
child was 14 years old; where the mother was single at birth but married 
before the child was14; where a parent (or both parents) had died before 
the child was 14; and where the parents were divorced or separated by 
the time the child was 14. 
 
It was found that offspring from single parent families had lower mean 
scores for all school subjects at 16 years, and were subsequently less 
likely to enter and complete tertiary education.  Parental death appeared 
to affect children less adversely than living in other types of single parent 
family.  Also, girls from single parent families seemed more resilient than 
boys in terms of their educational performance, especially if their mother 
was well-educated.  
 
The effect of living within a single parent family upon educational 
performance was, however, considerably reduced when other family 
background variables and child characteristics were introduced into the 
analysis, with a significant effect remaining only for children of divorced 
parents.  Thus other family background factors, such as low maternal 
education and large family size, were generally more powerful predictors 
of educational achievement than family type.  Because the study was 
epidemiologically oriented and based on registers, there was no 
contextual information about family function or parent-child relationships 
which could have shed light on the poorer outcomes for children of 
divorced parents.  Given the generous social welfare payments and high-
quality universal education provided by the state in Finland, the authors 
considered it unlikely that diminished social or educational resources for 
any type of single parent family would have an effect on the outcomes for 
children.  From the findings of other studies in this field, they suggest that 
children of divorced parents may be particularly likely to suffer a range of 
stressors before and after the divorce, including emotional upheaval, 
disturbed social relations and lack of parental control, which may 
adversely affect their academic self-concept and educational achievement. 
 
Several studies have sought to measure the presence and impact of 
conflict.  Piketty (2003), in his examination of the impact of divorce on 
school performance in France between 1968 and 2002, finds that children 
living with both parents in the years immediately prior to separation did 
as poorly in terms of school performance as those already living with just 
one parent.  He concludes that parental conflict rather than separation per 
se produced negative outcomes. 
 
4.2.2  Partially defamilialised countries: Britain, 
Germany and the Netherlands 
Wadsworth et al. (1990) investigate a range of outcomes for a sample of 
5,362 children from the National Survey of Health and Development, the 
first in a series of British post-war birth cohort studies that was stratified 
by social class.  The analysis of data collected on 12 occasions during 
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childhood from mothers and teachers and from medical examinations and 
on 10 occasions in adulthood (up to age 36 in 1982) suggest that the 
experience of parental separation in childhood was associated with a 
number of negative outcomes in adolescence and adulthood for both 
males and females.  These included lower levels of educational 
achievement up to university level, followed by lower earnings in their 
thirties.  These effects were consistent in adulthood for both women and 
men.  Educational attainment was recorded at three stages:  up to and 
including `O’ level (then the key public examination at 16 years); `A’ 
level and equivalents; and University.  The children were grouped into two 
social classes, manual and non-manual.  At each point and for both social 
classes, the attainment of children who had experienced parental divorce 
fell below that of children who had not experienced divorce, and these 
differences were found to be statistically significant.  In contrast, the 
attainment of children who had experienced the death of a parent was 
similar to those from intact families at all stages, except  for university 
attainment, where the proportion of children of non-manual parents who 
had experienced the death of a parent fell below that of children who had 
experienced the divorce of a parent.  The authors did not suggest a simple 
causal link between parental separation and negative outcomes for 
children in later life but argued that there was sufficient evidence of 
increased risk to merit improvements in the emotional care of children 
post-separation and policies to mitigate the economic and social hardships 
that separated families suffered. 
 
Cherlin et al. (1991) in their analysis of data from the National Child 
Development Study (NCDS) – a longitudinal study of a national cohort of 
more than 17,000 children born in the same week in March 1958 – shifts 
attention from the aftermath of divorce to the conditions prevailing within 
families prior to divorce.  In 1965, when the children were aged seven, 
the mothers of 14,746 children (85 per cent of the original cohort) were 
re-interviewed in order to assess the children’s behavioural adjustment at 
home.  Teachers provided information about the children’s behaviour at 
school through a standardised questionnaire, and health visitors reported 
on the families’ difficulties and their use of social welfare services. 
Information from physical examinations and the results of reading and 
mathematical tests were also collected.  Except for the physical 
examinations, this process was repeated when the children were aged 11. 
 
In order to evaluate the relative contributions of pre- and post-separation 
circumstances to children's adjustment at age 11, the researchers identify 
those children whose parents were in an intact first marriage when the 
children were seven and then divided them at age 11 into those whose 
parents had divorced or separated and those who parents had remained 
together. 
 
They find that children whose parents had divorced or separated between 
age seven and age 11 demonstrated more behaviour problems at 11 as 
rated by parents and teachers, and scored lower than other children on 
mathematics and reading tests, even after controlling for social class and 
race.  On average, the magnitude of the differences was modest, although 
significantly different from zero.  However, when information about the 
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children’s health, achievement and behaviour prior to divorce was 
introduced into the analysis, the apparent effect of the divorce or 
separation for boys fell by about half to levels that were no longer 
significantly different from zero for both behavioural and educational 
outcomes.  For girls, the decline was smaller and the effect upon 
mathematics and reading scores remained significantly different from 
zero.  On the basis of these findings, strengthened by evidence from a 
comparable US longitudinal study, the research team concluded that much 
of the effect of divorce on children could be predicted by conditions that 
existed long before the divorce or separation occurred, and that these 
pre-divorce effects were stronger for boys than for girls.  They further 
conclude that as much attention should be paid to the processes that 
occur in troubled, intact families as to the trauma that children suffer after 
their parents’ divorce or separation. 
 
Again using NCDS data but approaching the issue from a different angle, 
Flouri and Buchanan (2004) investigate the influence of early father 
involvement on children’s later educational achievement, independently of 
early mother involvement and other influences.  In all, 7,259 cohort 
members provided data on mother involvement at age seven, father 
involvement at age seven and school-leaving qualifications by age 20.  Of 
these, 3,303 were used in the final analysis.  Models were constructed to 
estimate the influence of various early predictors of educational attainment.  
The authors find that 52 per cent of educational attainment by age 20 could 
be explained by a combination of control variables (including gender, birth 
weight, and parental education), structural variables (structure of parental 
family, number of siblings and number of family moves) and ‘internal’ 
variables (general ability, mental health, and academic motivation).  When 
early father involvement was introduced into the model, the amount of 
variance in attainment explained increased by only four per cent but the 
change was statistically significant.  Similarly, when early mother 
involvement was separately introduced into the model, the amount of 
variance in attainment explained increased by five per cent and again the 
change was statistically significant. 
 
The authors find that while mothers’ early involvement was important for 
children’s educational outcomes, early father involvement at age seven 
independently and significantly predicted children’s educational 
achievement by age 20, that this effect was equally strong for girls as for 
boys, and that it was not diminished for children growing up in non-intact 
families.  The implication is that the early disruption of the father-child 
bond following family dissolution, and where the father does not remain 
involved, will have a negative impact upon the child’s subsequent level of 
educational attainment and that this persists into adulthood. 
 
More recent findings from a study based upon a selection of young adults 
from successive waves of the British Household Panel Survey 1991-1995, 
(Ermisch and Francesconi, 2000) conclude that living in a single parent 
family was associated with disadvantageous outcomes for most young 
people.  Two samples of young people were used for the analysis:  an 
`individual’ sample of 764 individuals and a `sibling’ sample of 411 
individuals who could be matched to at least one sibling over the same 
79 
 
period.  Information about siblings allowed the researchers to control for 
unobserved effects that would be shared by children belonging to the 
same family. 
 
With regard to educational attainment, they found that the probability of 
obtaining an A level (UK pre university examination usually taken at age 
17/18) or higher qualification was significantly reduced by 13.7 per cent 
for the individual sample and by 14.6 per cent for the sibling sample when 
the young person had spent time with a single mother during childhood.  
Moreover, they found that family disruption in early childhood up to the 
age of six years (or being born outside a live-in partnership) had the most 
pronounced impact on later educational achievement.  As a possible 
explanation for this latter finding, the authors proposed that family 
disruption was likely to have a particularly powerful impact upon the 
child’s cognitive, cultural and social development at this early stage. 
 
A study by Winkelmann (2005) incorporated the perspective of young 
people themselves by including subjective measures of well-being in the 
analysis of outcomes for 640 children from intact and non-intact families 
in Germany.  The study used data from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel, an annual household survey which has been supplemented since 
2000 by a youth questionnaire.  While children from non-intact families 
were significantly more likely to place themselves at the lower end of a 
subjective scale of well-being (that is, with score of less than five on a one 
to 10 scale), this family structure effect became insignificance when 
controls for income and other aspects of material well-being were 
introduced.  Specifically in relation to educational outcomes, while children 
from non-intact families were 20 per cent less likely than those from two-
parent families to attend a Gymnasium (the most demanding tier of 
secondary education), parental education – particularly the mother’s 
education – was a stronger determinant of a child’s educational pathway.  
Winkelmann (2005) argued against a simple causal link between non-
intact family structures, subjective well-being and educational attainment, 
drawing attention to structural inequalities within the German educational 
system (such as reduced access to schools in rural areas) which can 
influence educational outcomes independently of the ability and 
motivation of the child. 
 
Voegeli and Willenbacher (1993) focus on single mothers in the former 
Federal Republic of Germany.  Given that the German census and 
household data used for this study related to the early 1960s, the detailed 
findings have limited contemporary relevance.  It is perhaps sufficient to 
note that the children of single mothers who were employed did better in 
terms of their take-up of secondary education than those with mothers 
who were unemployed or dependent on maintenance.  Single children 
from single parent families were as likely as children from two-parent 
families to enrol for secondary education, and indeed more likely in the 
case of girls; however, levels of enrolment fell when the single parent 
family contained two or more children.  The authors conclude that this 
reflected inadequate support (in terms of child care, job security and 
flexible conditions) for single parents wishing to combine work with 
bringing up more than one child.  In other words, the extra pressures on 
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the resources and time of single parents represented by additional 
children required compensatory social and employment provision.  
 
In the Netherlands, research by Dronkers (1994) considered the effect of 
different forms of single parenthood (including reconstituted families with 
step-parents) on the educational performance of a national cohort of more 
than 15,500 children entering secondary school in 1989 using a national 
dataset for educational attainment.  He finds that children living with 
single parents had lower levels of educational achievement than children 
living with their natural parents, and that this effect remained after 
controlling for background variables.  Moreover, the negative outcomes 
for children of single mother families increased in the 1980’s compared to 
the outcomes for children in all single parent families in the 1970s. 
 
Borgers et al. (1996) report data from a 1990 survey by the Dutch 
Institute for Budget Research of more than 11,000 pupils from all levels of 
primary and secondary schools.  More than 10,000 children were living 
with both natural parents.  The remainder were divided into various family 
types:  mother-headed families where the father had died and father-
headed families where the mother had died; mother-headed families 
caused by divorce and father-headed families caused by divorce; step 
families caused by divorce and stepfamilies caused by the death of one of 
the original parents.  Instead of using educational attainment as the 
principal outcome measure, the authors used 11 different indicators from 
the survey analysis to give a more global measure of pupils’ well-being.  
These include two education-related indicators:  pupils’ self-assessment of 
their educational success and school truancy.  Controls for various 
demographic variables relating to both parents and children were used. 
 
Significant positive effects were found in relation to seven of the indicators 
for mother-headed families caused by divorce, including those relating to 
truancy and self-reported educational success.  Three significant effects 
were identified for mother-headed families caused by death, one of which 
included school truancy. The education-related indicators were 
insignificant for stepfamilies caused by either divorce or  death.  School 
truancy was significant for father-headed families caused by death.  The 
authors noted that the size of the significant effects related to family form 
was always small, usually less than one per cent, whereas the control 
variables explained between two per cent and 19 per cent of variations in 
well-being.  However, when the sample was re-weighted so that the 
numbers of children in intact families was equal to those in non-intact 
families, stronger effects were observed in relation to non-intact family 
types. 
 
The authors conclude that living in single parent families or stepfamilies 
caused by death had fewer negative consequences for children than living 
in single parent families caused by divorce.  This was notwithstanding the 
absence of effects for father-headed families following divorce, which the 
authors explained in terms of the positive selection of the relatively small 
number of fathers who take on the principal caring role.  In general, the 
results of this study give support to the weak social position of the mother 
as the most likely explanation for the negative effects of living in a single 
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parent family.  At the same time, these negative effects were not 
neutralised if the mother had a high educational level, and not diminished 
if she had a low educational level. 
 
The analysis of family type and its effect on children’s well-being was 
taken forward by Dronkers (1999) through introducing parental conflict 
into models.  He uses data from almost 10,000 questionnaires completed 
by young people aged 14 years and over who took part in a national 
survey in the Netherlands in 1994.  On the basis of earlier research, the 
author constructs a number of hypotheses about the presence or absence 
of parental conflict in different family structures on nine indicators of 
children’s well-being, including school failure and truancy.  Although this 
study did not independently measure the young people’s educational 
achievement and the indicators were based on self-reported information, 
the findings suggest that the severity of conflict between parents had an 
important impact upon children’s well-being.  So where serious parental 
conflict was not a factor in either family type, children in single parent 
families who had significant contact with the separated parent after 
divorce had lower well-being scores than those in two-parent families.  
Where serious conflict had been present, however, children from single 
parent families scored better than children from two-parent families.  
Dronkers (1999) also finds that the persistence of parental conflict after 
divorce was linked to negative outcomes for children over both the short 
and longer term.  
 
The suggestion that the presence of parental conflict is a powerful 
explanatory factor irrespective of family structure receives support from a 
three-year UK longitudinal study of 230 children aged 11-13 drawn 
exclusively from two-parent families (Harold et al., 2007).  Parental 
conflict was linked to a subsequent lowering of children’s educational 
attainment and, interestingly, the mechanism through which this operated 
was the children’s attribution of self-blame for their parents’ difficulties 
rather than negative parenting arising out of marital conflict. 
 
It is important to reiterate that the research evidence discussed in this 
section has been drawn from  western European and Nordic countries, and 
that there are obvious dangers in generalising key findings to other parts 
of Europe. 
 
 
4.3  Child Outcomes:  Cross-country studies 
 
A key methodological problem for comparative studies is to identify a 
measure of educational achievement that is consistent across countries.  
The Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), a 
comparative survey of attainment using a standardised mathematics and 
science test for children aged nine, 13 and in their last year of secondary 
school from 50 countries in 1995, provides researchers with a useful 
vehicle. 
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TIMSS provides the educational performance data for an investigation by 
Pong et al. (2003) of the difference in mathematics and science 
achievement between younger children (third and fourth graders – or 
around nine years old) living with a single parent and those living with 
two-parents in 11 industrialised nations, including seven European 
countries (featuring England, Scotland (both UK) and the Netherlands 
from our case study countries).  They find that single parenthood was 
significantly and negatively associated with lower mathematics and 
science achievement.  With only two exceptions (Austria and Iceland), an 
achievement gap between children in single parent families and in two-
parent families was found in every country as well as in the 11 countries 
combined. 
 
The authors estimate the size of effect of single parenthood in countries 
by constructing two models:  the first incorporating dummy family 
structure variables and control variables for age, gender, immigration 
status and grade level; the second incorporating family resource variables 
for which the number of books, the number of possessions and household 
size were taken as proxy measures.  Among the European countries 
included, the effect size22 for achievement in mathematics under the first 
model was greatest for Norway (.24) and England (.23) and weakest for 
Austria (.03) and Iceland (.01) while for science achievement, the effect 
size was greatest for England (.22) and Scotland (.21) and, once again, 
weakest for Austria (.04) and Iceland (.01).  Under the second model, the 
effect size of single parenthood was smaller overall and weakest for 
Iceland, Ireland and Austria.  A significant negative effect was nonetheless 
sustained for all countries other than for Austria and Iceland; and for 
Ireland in relation to mathematical achievement and Norway in relation to 
science achievement. 
 
These findings are interpreted by the authors in relation to the family 
policies adopted by each of the countries studied.  In terms of Hantrais’ 
typology, the EU countries included in the study (Austria, the Netherlands, 
England and Scotland) all fell into the partially defamilialised category and 
the findings may not therefore apply to other European family policy 
environments. 
 
The analysis took into account several policies that support family income 
and parental time inputs, including the existence of a family or child 
allowance, universal child benefits to single parents, benefits in tax and 
social security to single parents, family transfer per child, social 
expenditure per gross domestic product and parental leave policies.  All 
family policy variables except for maternity leave duration were found to 
be significant and positive for both mathematical and science 
achievement.  The strongest effects were found in relation to family and 
child allowances, leading the authors to suggest that the absence of an 
achievement gap for either science or mathematics for Austria reflected 
the relatively generous level of universal allowances in that country.  In 
brief, it was found that countries (such as Austria) with the most generous 
                                            
22 The effect size is the actual coefficient as a proportion of the standard deviation 
of the test score being analysed. 
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family welfare policies show smaller or no achievement gaps by family 
structure.  In conclusion, they argue that the apparently detrimental 
effects of growing up with a single parent could be partially offset by 
supportive family policies, particularly economic assistance to single 
parent households. 
 
Woessmann (2004) also used TIMSS performance data, plus background 
questionnaires completed by participants, to estimate the effect of 
parental education and other measures of family background on children’s 
test scores in the US and 15 European countries, including Denmark, 
England and Scotland (both UK), France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden.  The impact of family background on children’s 
performance was strong in all countries.  In relation to family structure, it 
was found that in no country did children living with both parents perform 
significantly worse than those living with one parent, and that they 
performed statistically significantly better in the US and eight Western 
European school systems.  Only in Norway was the difference in test-score 
points (18.7) stronger than in the US (15.5), and the next largest effects 
were in Ireland (14.4), Greece (13.9) and Germany (9.4).  The other 
countries with statistically significant effects for this measure were 
Switzerland (8.3), France (7.8), Scotland (7.2) and Sweden (5.2). 
 
The TIMSS was once again the principal data source for a comparative 
study (Schiller et al. 2002 ) of almost 220,000 middle school students 
(modal age 13 years) from 34 countries, including Germany, France, 
Netherlands, Scotland, Denmark and Sweden, with an average of nearly 
6,500 students per country.  The analysis explored variations in the 
relationship between mathematical achievement and two aspects of the 
adolescents’ social background:  parents’ education and family structure.  
It also considers whether these variations were associated with different 
levels of economic development between countries, as measured by Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).  The results show that both aspects of social 
background exercised a significant effect upon the students’ performance.  
For each additional level of education their parents obtained, the children 
scored an average of 7.3 percentage points higher on the test (about 28.8 
per cent of a year’s gain), while those living with both parents scored an 
average of 5.7 percentage points more than those living in non-traditional 
families. 
 
When these variations were related to GDP, parents’ higher educational 
attainment had a consistently positive effect on children’s mathematics 
test scores, however, the positive effect of living within an intact family 
varied between countries, and was significantly higher in countries with 
the strongest economies.  The authors suggest that greater economic 
development tends to marginalise families in society, increasing the 
influence of intangible social resources in educational stratification.  They 
argue that the greater relative advantage of living with two-parents in the 
countries with greater GDP shows the increased importance of parents’ 
strategic investments of time and attention in supporting children’s 
academic success and that additional pressures on the time and energies 
of single and remarried parents may cause these resources to be 
particularly lacking in non-traditional families.  They also point out that 
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industrialised societies tend to have more geographically mobile families 
and smaller families, thus reducing the availability of social supports and 
other intangible resources through extended family or community 
networks.  
 
The primary focus of a study of 14 European countries by Hampden-
Thompson and Pong (2005) was to consider the possible effect of national 
family policy environments in mediating the impact of family structure on 
academic achievement.23  TIMSS was used to provide academic 
performance data for almost 70,000 children of around nine years old.  
The stated advantages of surveying this younger age group were that 
they were still at school in most parts of the world and also that the 
curriculum for this level tended to be less differentiated. 
 
Their study relates the findings on family structure and mathematics and 
science achievement to differences in family policy environments.  The 
authors used Esping-Andersen’s (1990) classification of welfare regimes to 
underpin their analysis.  This classification identifies three distinctive 
welfare regimes according to the ways in which welfare production is 
allocated between the state, markets and households:  
 
• a social democratic regime, characteristic of Scandinavian/Nordic 
countries, with generous safety nets, a strong commitment to the 
principles of universalism and egalitarianism, and a central role for the 
state in policy-making;   
• a liberal regime, whose guiding principles are based on the free market 
economy and where social benefits tend to be low, means-tested and 
carry a social stigma (typified by the UK); and 
•  a conservative regime – falling somewhere between the previous two 
– in which the actions of the state are directed towards supporting 
traditional institutions like the family, and where strong family ties 
rather than state intervention are seen as the first line of support for 
individuals’ welfare.  Under this latter regime, the state tends to 
intervene only when family support has failed. 
 
For the purposes of their study, the authors sub-divided the conservative 
regime into continental conservative and Southern Mediterranean.  They 
argued that while both sub-types were heavily influenced by Roman 
Catholicism, they were differentiated by the more developed social safety 
nets in continental conservative regimes, compared to an extreme 
reliance on the family, church and charitable institutions and meagre 
family benefits in Southern Mediterranean conservative regimes.  
Accordingly, the countries in the study were grouped by regime as 
follows: 
                                            
23 Among our selected case study countries for this review, Great Britain, 
Scotland (separately), the Netherlands, Greece and the Czech Republic were 
included in this study.  The remaining countries were:  Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Norway, Portugal and Slovenia.  
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Liberal 
 
Social 
Democratic 
 
Continental 
Conservative
 
Southern 
Mediterranean 
Conservative 
 
Great Britain 
Ireland 
Scotland 
 
Iceland 
Netherlands 
Norway 
 
Austria 
Czech 
Republic 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Slovenia 
 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Portugal 
 
 
There are similarities between these regime categories and Hantrais’ 
(2004:200) typology of family policy environments:  the liberal regime 
broadly corresponds to the partially defamilialised group; the social 
democratic regime to the defamilialised; the continental conservative to 
the refamilialised and the southern Mediterranean to the familialised.  
However, there are some notable differences with regard to specific 
countries in that Hantrais places Austria and the Netherlands in the 
partially defamilialised group.   
 
The study was informed by the hypothesis that family policy environments 
moderate the relationship between single parenthood and children’s 
educational achievement by changing the resources - both money and 
time - available within these families.  It was anticipated that children of 
single parents in liberal regimes would fare less well than those living 
within both social democratic regimes and the two types of conservative 
regime.  The hypothesis was underpinned by a recognition of the high 
level of state support to single parent families in social democratic 
regimes and the social support available to these families through non-
state institutions and networks in conservative regimes.  Both were 
considered to provide single parent families with better social capital than 
liberal regimes which tend to rely on market solutions to the problem of 
providing family support. 
 
The study finds that living within a single parent family had a negative 
effect upon children’s academic achievement and that this effect remained 
largely the same after controlling for family resources and other variables.  
However, the effect varied significantly between countries.  For science 
scores, the negative effect of living within a single parent family was 
larger in Great Britain than any other country while, for mathematics, the 
largest effects were found in Great Britain/Scotland, Ireland, Norway and 
the Netherlands.  In general, negative effects were smallest in the 
Mediterranean conservative countries (including Greece) and the 
continental conservative countries (including the Czech Republic). 
 
Moreover, the performance gap between children from single parent and 
two-parent families was significantly larger in countries with liberal 
regimes than in those with the other three types of regime.  The gap 
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between liberal and conservative regime countries was not affected by the 
introduction of additional student-level variables (family resources and 
control variables such as age, gender and location).  These additional 
variables did, however, affect the achievement gap by family structure 
between liberal and social democratic regimes.  When they were excluded 
no difference was found between the two types but once they were 
introduced into the analysis, the achievement gap became significantly 
larger in the former. 
 
The authors conclude that neo-liberal family policies had a negative effect 
upon the academic performance of children from single parent families.  
These policies were said to be relatively weak in terms of the financial 
supports provided and ineffective in moving single parents out of poverty.  
They were also relatively unsuccessful in resolving work-family conflicts 
because over-reliance on expensive market solutions for childcare and 
restricted provision for parental leave. 
 
Perhaps the most surprising finding was that both the continental 
conservative countries and the Southern Mediterranean conservative 
countries demonstrated smaller achievement gaps by family type than the 
social democratic countries, despite having weaker family policies.  The 
authors are unclear about the reasons for this.  However, they speculate 
that the cultural and political emphasis upon the family unit within 
countries with either type of conservative regime has enabled families – 
and, in southern Mediterranean conservative countries, informal 
community institutions - to provide the caring support that single parent 
families need, both financially and in resolving the work/family conflict.  
This chimes with the finding by Chambaz (2001), noted in Chapter 2, that 
a large proportion of single parent families in Southern European countries 
were included in other households.  Yet Hampden-Thompson and Pong 
(2005) suggest that the family policies and financial safety nets in 
countries with social democratic regimes have promoted defamilialisation 
within households while simultaneously increasing the resources available 
to single parent families through state support and access to the 
workplace.  A likely consequence is that inputs of time into childrearing by 
single parents are reduced.  An important question left unanswered by 
this analysis is the extent to which the greater integration of families into 
extended households and community institutions in countries with 
conservative regimes is a consequence of forced dependence resulting 
from inadequate social safety nets and is therefore indicative of high 
levels of concealed poverty. 
 
Bradshaw et al. (2007) consider child well-being at the European level.  
They analyse data already available for the (then) EU25, including both 
time series data and comparative surveys of children and young people, 
and compare the performance of the member states in relation to eight 
`clusters’.  One of these clusters covers education, with educational 
attainment as a key domain.  Measures of educational achievement were 
derived from data on reading, mathematics and scientific literacy from the 
OECD PISA 2003 survey.  From our case studies, Malta did not appear in 
this ranking because it is not part of PISA.  The index scores ranged from 
+3.0 to -2.0 with Finland (more than 2.0) outperforming all other 
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countries by a considerable margin, followed from our case studies by the 
Netherlands (more than 1.0), UK,24 Sweden, Czech Republic, France and 
Germany (between 0 and 1.0).  Case study countries with negative scores 
were, in descending rank, Poland, Denmark and Spain (between 0 and -
1.0) and Greece (between -1.0 and -2.0).  Greece was the lowest ranking 
of the 20 countries for which data were available. 
 
Reviewing these findings against the Hantrais typology, there appears to 
be less clustering by family policy type.  Finland, a defamilialised country 
is the clear leader but other countries achieving positive scores are a 
mixture of all four types:  defamilialised (Sweden), partially defamilialised 
(UK, Germany and Netherlands), familialised (France) and refamilialised 
(Czech Republic).  At the negative end of the scale, two familialised 
countries (Spain and Greece) have the lowest scores, but defamilialised 
Denmark and refamilialised Poland also feature.  
 
Another ‘cluster’ focused on family cluster.25  When the two domains of 
interest here are superimposed, it is clear that there is no simple 
correspondence between scores for family structure and for children’s 
educational attainment.  Thus Greece, with the second highest score for 
intact family structure, has the lowest score for educational attainment.  
In contrast, the UK does relatively well in terms of educational attainment, 
while having the most fragmented families.  This does not undermine the 
findings of other comparative studies that, within countries, children from 
non-intact families are likely to be disadvantaged educationally. 
 
A recent meta-analysis of international economic, social and educational 
data by Esping-Andersen (2008) finds that countries vary enormously in 
the polarisation of the educational achievements of adolescents.  
Reviewing International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) data 
from the OECD and PISA mathematical data for seven European countries 
(all case study countries) plus the US, he finds that Finland (a 
defamilialised country) was the least polarised European country in terms 
of the skill dispersion of 15 year old students, while also demonstrating 
the highest levels of overall attainment.  The mean performance score of 
students in Finland from the 2000 PISA study was 547, with just seven 
per cent falling under the PISA minimum, which indicates a degree of 
cognitive dysfunction.  The proportion of young adults aged 20-24 with no 
more than compulsory education was eight per cent.  At the other end of 
the scale, Spain (a familialised country) was the most polarised, 
demonstrating the lowest mean PISA test scores (487) and the largest 
proportion of students under the PISA minimum (19 per cent) plus the 
highest proportion of young adults with no more than compulsory 
education (31 per cent).  In between were the Netherlands, Germany and 
the UK (partially defamilialised) and Sweden and Denmark 
(defamilialised).  The mean PISA score for Netherlands students was 
actually higher than that of their peers in Finland (552) but the 
proportions failing to reach the PISA minimum (10 per cent) and of young 
                                            
24 Although the UK data was considered to be unreliable because of low response 
rates. 
25 Bradshaw et al. (2007) findings on family structure are presented in Chapter 2. 
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adults with no more than compulsory education (22 per cent) were higher, 
indicating a greater degree of polarisation.  The mean PISA scores and the 
percentages failing to reach the PISA minimum in the remaining countries 
were Germany (527 and 21 per cent), Denmark (521 and 15 per cent), 
Sweden (518 and 10 per cent) and the UK (511 and 13 per cent 
 
The author identifies a number of structural trends that served to increase 
polarisation in the skill profile of young adults, including growing income 
inequality which makes parents’ capacity to invest in their children’s 
education more unequal.  Demographic changes – particularly greater 
family instability due to increasing single parenthood and immigration – 
were seen to be another driver of unequal educational outcomes.  
Although poverty was strongly associated with poor educational outcomes 
and was particularly prevalent in single mother families, single mother 
poverty rates also varied considerably; for example, they were high in the 
US (almost 50 per cent) and much lower in Nordic countries (10-13 per 
cent).  Indeed, the link between growing up in single parent families and 
low educational attainment was highlighted by the OECD PISA surveys 
(2000, 2003) which: 
 
‘Show that children growing up in lone parent households perform 
relatively lower than children from other families.  This is mostly 
true in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden 
while in a number of countries their performance is not significantly 
different from pupils growing up in other families.’  
EC (2008: 58) 
 
Nonetheless, Esping-Andersen (2008) identifies welfare redistribution 
strategies as having an important effect in reducing poverty among all 
families with children, with particularly powerful impacts in Sweden 
(reducing poverty by 13 per cent) and France (a reduction of 20 per cent).  
 
Although these comparative studies show a high level of agreement 
regarding the negative association between non-intact family structures 
and children’s educational achievement, the studies are few in number 
and are perhaps over-reliant upon a rather narrow measure of educational 
achievement, namely children’s performance in standardised 
mathematical and science tests. 
 
 
4.4  Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has considered single-country and comparative studies which 
address the nature of the relationship between family structure and 
educational achievement.  The single country studies are drawn only from 
defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries, and caution must 
therefore be exercised in generalising their findings to societies with very 
different policy environments.  The comparative cross-national studies 
included in this review introduce evidence from a broader sweep of 
countries but are generally reliant on quite a limited measure of 
educational achievement. 
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Although the findings of some studies provide counterexamples, the 
general thrust of the evidence reviewed here supports a negative 
association between non-intact family structures and children’s 
educational achievement.  Recent studies on child poverty and the 
dynamics of single parenthood (EC, 2007; 2008) indicate that there is a 
noticeable correlation between growing up in a single parent family and 
the socio-economic, labour and educational prospects of children.  
Educational outcomes are of particular concern as they are now 
recognised as crucial to the future life-prospects of children and young 
people.  As the EC 2008 report on child poverty observed: 
 
‘Young people who leave school too early and with only lower 
secondary education are at a disadvantage on the labour market.  
Their personal and social development is in danger of being 
curtailed and they are at greater risk of poverty and social 
exclusion that other young people who continue their education 
and training.’ 
EC (2008: 57) 
 
Interpreting this association, however, is a challenging and contentious 
task.  This partly reflects the methodological difficulties of separating the 
effects of family structure from other powerful influences (such as low 
income, poor housing tenure and low parental education) that tend to be 
felt disproportionately by single parent families.  Many studies have 
employed sophisticated statistical designs in order to tease out different 
effects but there are acknowledged difficulties in measuring background 
factors, such as parental mental health, upon outcomes for children. 
 
Typically, the more complex the analysis, in terms of the multiplicity of 
variables introduced, the smaller the effect of family structure on 
educational achievement.  In some studies this effect disappears 
altogether, although, in others, significant effects remain.  Does family 
breakdown per se exercises an independent effect upon the achievements 
of children?  Perhaps the most policy-relevant message from this review is 
that children from non-intact families are more likely than those living 
with both their parents to be exposed to risks which represent barriers to 
achievement.  These risks may occur within the heart of the family -for 
example, when adults’ parenting skills are affected by stress and anxiety - 
and in the family’s socio-economic environment - for example, when low 
income and poor access to employment opportunities restrict choices and 
resources.  
  
The review has offered some insights into the extent to which outcomes 
for children in different countries are mediated by specific family policy 
environments, which offer varying degrees of support and protection to 
non-intact families.  There is a reasonably convincing body of evidence 
that redistributive welfare strategies, generous childcare support and 
equal access to the labour market that are characteristic of defamilialised 
countries produce better educational outcomes for children than the mix 
of private and social welfare solutions promoted in partially defamilialised 
societies.  The detailed situation in the familialised countries of Southern 
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Europe and the refamilialised countries of Central Europe remains poorly 
delineated, however; and there is clearly a need for focused research to 
redress this imbalance.  While there are some indications that family and 
community networks in the familialised countries provide a degree of 
protection from the social and economic disadvantages single parent 
families might otherwise face, it is likely that in many cases reliance on 
family and social networks increases financial hardship in already poor 
families and creates a more restrictive environment in which the choices 
available to single parents are influenced by conservative social norms.  
While the achievement gap between children from intact and non-intact 
families in these societies has been found to be relatively small, there is 
also evidence – at least for the Southern European countries - that the 
overall level of educational achievement is low and that there is greater 
divergence between the highest and lowest achieving children, 
irrespective of family structure, than in the defamilialised and partially 
defamilialised countries of Western and Northern Europe.  
 
There also seems to be a lack of European research on educational 
outcomes for children when families are reconstituted through the re-
marriage or re-partnering of parents.  Findings from the US literature 
have indicated that outcomes for step-children are similar to those for 
children from single parent families (Mclanahan and Sandefur, 1994) and, 
moreover, that children in stable `blended’ families containing both step-
children and half-siblings born into the new partnership have substantially 
lower levels of achievement than those living with both their birth parents 
(Ginther and Pollack, 2004).  Given the increasingly complex family 
structures in many European countries, this would appear to be an 
important area for further enquiry. 
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5 Health and Well-being Outcomes 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
Exploring and interpreting the associations between family breakdown and 
health outcomes for children in European Union (EU) countries is a 
complex task, not least because of the extraordinarily wide range of 
conditions, behaviours and events that may be construed as outcomes.  
Moreover, an individual’s health and well-being may be scrutinised at 
many different phases of life, from infancy through to mature adulthood.  
In order to accommodate both the range and the depth of the subject 
matter, this literature review is broadly structured according to life stages.  
Evidence relating to each stage is then considered.  
 
Ideally this chapter would review evidence from all the family policy 
environments denoted by our typology, however, in practice the research 
evidence is skewed towards the Nordic countries and the UK where large-
scale prospective studies and representative datasets have provided a rich 
source of material.  Some comparative, cross-national studies have also 
been identified covering a broader range of countries.  Accordingly, many 
of the observations and findings from the studies discussed below may be 
specific to defamilialised and partially-defamilialised countries and may 
not necessarily apply to societies with familialised and refamilialised family 
policy environments.   
 
A shortcoming common to many of the studies discussed below is that 
they do not distinguish between the routes into single parenthood.  So 
while they may, for instance, compare one parent families with two-
parent families and report a significant effect by family type, they rarely 
say whether the effect holds for single parent families created by family 
breakdown and/or those arising from non-marital births or the death of a 
partner.  As a consequence, even when an adverse health outcome for 
children of single mothers is found, it does not necessarily follow that the 
health outcome can simply be attributed to family breakdown. 
 
 
5.2  Pre-term births and death in infancy 
 
The relationship between socio-demographic factors and adverse 
outcomes in infancy, notably pre-term birth, perinatal mortality and 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, is the focus of the studies reviewed in 
this section.    
 
A comparative study by Zeitlin et al. (2002) investigates the impact of 
marital status on pre-term birth in European countries where extra-
marital births were more or less common.  Citing earlier research findings 
that the marital status of the mother had been identified as a risk factor 
for pre-term birth, the authors consider whether society’s acceptance of 
extra-marital child bearing might mediate the association between being 
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unmarried and birth outcome.  The study draws on data from the 
European Programme of Population Risks and Pregnancy Outcomes 
(EUROPOP), a collaborative European initiative carried out between 1994 
and 1997 to study the risk factors for pre-term birth, using a case-control 
design.  The sample included data from the Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Scotland, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.  Cases 
included all singleton live pre-term and still-births delivered in 
participating maternity hospitals during the study period, with controls 
randomly selected from singleton births.  Information about the mother, 
her pregnancy and the newborn child was collected using the same 
questionnaire in all countries and was supplemented with details from her 
medical records.  The total sample comprised 5,456 cases and 8,234 
controls.  
 
The countries are divided into two groups according to the proportion of 
births to married mothers in the control population, validated with 
information from EUROSTAT.  This proportion varied in the sample from 
96.8 per cent in Greece to 58.4 per cent in Sweden.  Percentages for 
other countries in our case study group were:  Czech Republic, 85.5 per 
cent; Finland, 65.8 per cent; France, 66.4 per cent; Germany, 74.8 per 
cent; Netherlands 68.7 per cent; Poland, 88.7 per cent; Scotland, 62.5 
per cent; and Spain, 90.3 per cent.  Eighty per cent of births to married 
mothers is selected as the threshold between low and high values.  Thus 
the familialised countries from our case study group (Greece and Spain) 
and the refamilialised countries (Czech Republic and Poland) were above 
the threshold, while the defamilialised countries (Finland, France and 
Sweden) and partially defamilialised (Scotland, Netherlands and Germany) 
fell below it.  
 
In the overall sample, there was a significantly elevated risk of a pre-term 
birth associated both with cohabitation (an odds ratio of 1.2) and single 
motherhood (an odds ratio of 1.3).  The risk was particularly marked in 
those (familialised and refamilialised) countries where births to unmarried 
mothers were less common.26  In contrast, in (defamilialised and partially 
defamilialised) countries where non-marital births were more common, 
the risk to both cohabiting and single mothers was insignificant.  These 
results are unchanged in analyses which exclude countries close to the 
threshold.  
 
For moderate pre-term births (that is, 33-36 weeks’ gestation), the data 
support the hypothesis that the association between pre-term birth is 
mediated by marital patterns within the general population.  Elevated 
risks for both single and cohabiting women in this sub-group are confined 
to countries where extra-marital births were less common.  However, the 
risk of pre-term birth before 33 weeks was greater for single and 
cohabiting mothers in both groups of countries.  The authors argue for 
further research to understand the financial and emotional stressors 
associated with being an unmarried mother in different societies, with 
                                            
26  An odds ratio of 1.69 for cohabitating women and of 1.61 for single women. 
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attention to community-level factors, such as health care and social 
support programmes.   
 
Forssas et al. (1999) investigate the maternal risk factors associated with 
perinatal deaths in Finland (a defamilialised country).  This involves an 
analysis of all data from the Medical Birth Register on all newborns 
(199,291) in Finland between 1991 and 1993.  From the total number of 
births, there were 1,461 perinatal deaths.  The purpose of the study was 
to identify maternal risk factors and to establish how much of the excess 
mortality could be explained by low birth weight.  Eight maternal 
characteristics were considered:  age, previous births, socio-economic 
status, marital status (married, cohabiting or single), smoking habit, 
earlier stillbirth, insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus and IVF pregnancy.  
The results show that previous stillbirth, higher maternal age and 
maternal diabetes were associated with greatly increased perinatal 
mortality risks.  The risk was also increased for women with lower socio-
economic status, those who smoked, single mothers and those giving 
birth for the first time.  While infants’ low birthweight explained 100 per 
cent of the excess perinatal mortality associated with IVF and smoking 
during pregnancy, it bore a variable relationship to other maternal 
characteristics.  For single mothers, low birthweight explained only 50 per 
cent of excess mortality, leading the authors to conclude that perinatal 
mortality for this group must be mediated by other factors, although they 
did not speculate what those factors might be. 
 
Following a sharp increase in Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) in 
the Nordic countries in the 1980’s, a joint Nordic SIDS study was initiated.  
While subsequent advice about sleeping positions dramatically decreased 
the incidence of infant death, particularly in Norway, concern remained 
about social factors that were known to be associated with the syndrome 
but which were poorly understood.  Daltveit et al. (1998) conducted a 
study to explore these factors by means of a case control study in 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark.  Parents of 244 SIDS infants and 869 
control infants, matched on gender, age at death and place at birth, 
completed a questionnaire.  The socio-demographic variables used in the 
analysis include maternal age, birth order, marital status, parental 
educational level, parental employment status and housing conditions.  In 
addition, two modifiable risk factors – sleeping and maternal smoking – 
were included.  Univariate analysis shows single motherhood to be 
associated with an increased risk of SIDS, as were high birth order, young 
maternal age, low parental education and high parental unemployment.  
The risk was also high if the parent had no contact with family or friends.  
However, in a multivariate analysis where maternal smoking was also 
included, only paternal unemployment, young maternal age and birth 
order remained significantly associated with SIDS.  Although housing 
conditions were not associated with SIDS, the risk was higher if the 
parents had lived in their present home for a relatively short time. 
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5.3 Morbidity, injury and death in childhood 
and adolescence  
 
A Swedish study by Ringbäck-Weitoft et al. (2003) investigates 
differences in mortality, severe morbidity and injury among children from 
one parent families compared to those living with both parents.  They 
analyse overall and cause-specific mortality from 1991-1998 and risk of 
hospital admission during the same period for almost a million children, of 
whom 65,085 were children of single parents and 921,257 lived with two-
parents.  Using the unique national registration number allocated to all 
Swedish citizens, the researchers are able to link data from the 1990 
census and a number of other national data sources.  The children were 
aged between six and 18 years at the beginning of the follow-up in 1991, 
and by the end of the follow-up in 1998, the youngest child was 14 years 
old and the oldest 26 years.  Thus the outcomes encompass mainly 
childhood and adolescence but shade into young adulthood. 
 
The researchers found marked differences in the socio-economic 
circumstances of the two groups:  single parents generally had a lower 
employment status, were considerably more likely to be reliant on social 
benefits and to rent rather than own their homes; and were at a 
substantially higher risk of admission to hospital for psychiatric illness or 
addiction to alcohol.  
 
The findings of this study show an increased risk of psychiatric disease, 
suicide or suicide attempt, injury and addiction in children in single-parent 
households compared with those in two-parent households.  Boys in 
single-parent families had higher risks than girls of both psychiatric and 
drug-related illnesses, and they also had a raised risk of all-cause 
mortality.  Much of the raised risk for children from single parent families 
could be accounted for by socio-economic circumstances, the main 
explanation for increased risk being lack of household resources as 
indicated by receipt of social benefits and housing situation.  However, 
significant risks remained unaccounted for even when the model was fully 
adjusted for a range of socio-economic and demographic circumstances.  
Specifically, children in single-parent households had increased risks 
compared with those in two-parent households of psychiatric illness in 
childhood, suicide attempt, and both alcohol and drug-related illnesses.  
The authors noted that although the socio-economic situation of single 
parents in Sweden was relatively favourable, social policies did not 
recognise the special situation of the single parent as the only bread-
winner and carer and that this may have resulted in insufficient support 
for single parents in meeting the challenge of combining family life and 
working life. 
 
Commenting on this study, Whitehead and Holland (2003), suggest that 
the findings left major questions unanswered about the causal pathways 
that lead to higher risks for single parents and their children.  They also 
questioned whether causal pathways would be the same in all countries.  
In comparison to single parents in Britain, they noted that single parents 
in Sweden are afforded a high level of protection from poverty and 
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unemployment by the generous universal social welfare system.  This in 
turn was likely to shield them from the stress, anxiety and social isolation 
which might otherwise adversely affect the parental role.  They conclude 
that the health inequalities between children from single parent and two-
parent families in Sweden remained largely unexplained.  However, they 
highlight that the meaning of what is measured will differ in important 
ways between societies.  For example, while receipt of welfare benefits 
may be taken as a marker of poverty, it is likely to have very different 
connotations in a country such as Sweden (a defamilialised country) with 
strong social safety nets, compared to countries with less comprehensive 
social supports.  Similarly, housing tenure as an indicator of socio-
economic status may not be a consistent indicator between countries. 
 
Within the different social and political context of the UK – a partially 
defamilialised country - B, Cooper et al. (1998) also considers the social 
patterning of health inequalities among children.  Noting the conflicting 
results from earlier research, which had examined associations between 
health outcomes and traditional measures of social class, the authors 
predict that in the aftermath of societal changes in Britain in the 1980s, 
measures of material and social disadvantage would be more accurate 
indicators of health inequalities than social class.  The study uses data 
from three years of the British General Household Survey (GHS) from 
1992/93 to 1994/95, providing a sample of over 16,500 children aged 0-
16 years.  Morbidity was measured the presence of a limiting longstanding 
illness as identified by the person assuming most responsibility for the 
child.  The findings demonstrate that family structure, employment status 
and receipt of benefit are more closely associated with health differentials 
than parental social class.  However, the outcomes for children with single 
parents were mediated by the economic and employment status of the 
parents.  Thus the health status of children of working single parents was 
not significantly different from that of children of intact families where 
both parents worked.  At the same time, non-employment among single 
parents was associated with higher levels of limiting longstanding illness 
and, where basic social benefits were received, significantly higher levels 
of chronic illness in their children compared to children from two-parent 
families without any benefit entitlement.  Given that the health of children 
in two-parent families was also adversely affected by parental income or 
unemployment, the general conclusion reached by the authors is that it 
was not family structure per se that resulted in health inequalities for 
children but poor economic status. 
 
While acknowledging the weight of evidence in the literature for an 
association between single parent households and a range of adverse 
health, educational and behavioural outcomes for children, Spencer 
(2005) hypothesises that the increased risk could be explained by 
material disadvantage.  Using data from the third wave (2001) of the 
Families and Children Study, a British panel survey, he is able to extract 
outcome information for 15,636 children aged 0-18 years belonging to 
8,541 households.  The selected health outcomes are parent-reported 
health (fair/poor versus good/very good) and longstanding illness or 
disability.  Single parenthood at the time of the survey is the principal 
explanatory variable of interest, and single parenthood for at least a year 
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the secondary explanatory variable.  The analysis also controls for a 
variety of variables:  household demographics, measures of household 
material disadvantage, socio-economic circumstances and household 
tenure.  The results show that both boys and girls in single parent 
households had increased risk of all adverse outcomes (that is, health, 
behavioural and educational) when controlling for the age of the child 
alone and for age plus household demographics (age of the main carer, 
number of dependent children and the child’s rank in the household).  
However, the increased risk is eliminated for all outcomes except parent-
reported health of girls following the addition of housing tenure, 
household hardship index and an interaction term for hardship and single 
parenthood.  There is some evidence that a combination of single 
parenthood and material hardship generated more risk of adverse 
outcomes than either of these variables alone.  Similar results were 
obtained when the effect of single parenthood for at least one year was 
entered into the model:  this was associated with increased risks to both 
boys and girls that, once again, were eliminated when measures of 
material disadvantage were added.  The findings broadly confirm the 
author’s hypothesis that the negative outcomes, including health 
outcomes, for children from single parent families can be explained by the 
material disadvantages commonly experienced by these families.  
 
Another UK study, by Fleming and Charlton (1998), sought to identify 
differences in morbidity in children presenting to general practitioners 
from households with one adult compared to households with two adults.  
Data collected from a national study of morbidity in general practice are 
used.  The study involved general practitioners and practice nurses from 
60 practices entering their assessment of problems presenting in each 
face-to-face encounter during the year ending August 1992.  The total 
study population of nearly half a million was representative of the national 
census population.  It included 93,356 children from birth to 15 years, of 
whom 10,983 (11.8 per cent) were living in households with more than 
one adult.  While rates of consulting for any illness were slightly higher in 
one-adult rather than two-adult households, rates of consulting for 
accidents were considerably higher:  for boys under one year they were 
50 per cent higher and for girls 35 per cent higher.  Young children (four 
years and younger) were less likely to present for immunisation than 
those from two-adult households, and they were a third more likely than 
children from two-adult households to be visited at home (this might be 
explained by the lack of a car – see chapter 2).  The authors conclude that 
single-adult households are an appropriate indicator of deprivation, and 
argue that children from these households require specific targeting by 
general practitioners and other primary care professionals for accident 
prevention and immunisation uptake. 
 
A Report Card issued by the Unicef Innocenti Centre (2001) shows that 
there is also considerable variation in the prevalence of injury between 
countries, which is equally poorly understood.  The report provides a 
league table of child deaths by injury in the 26 richest OECD countries.  It 
shows dramatic variations between countries in child death rates per 
100,000 children over a twelve month period, ranging from 5.2 for 
Sweden to 25.6 for Korea.  The rates per 100,000 children for other 
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countries within our case study group were:  UK, 6.1; Netherlands, 6.6; 
Greece, 7.8; Denmark and Spain, 8.1; Finland, 8.2; Germany, 8.3; 
France, 9.1; and the Czech Republic, 12.0.  The authors note that 
whatever the proximate cause of death or injury, the risk to children was 
strongly associated with social and demographic factors, including 
poverty, single parenthood, low maternal education and parental alcohol 
or drug abuse.  They also acknowledge, however, that the detailed data 
needed to disaggregate these factors and estimate their relative influence 
are lacking for most countries and that this was a generally 
underdeveloped area of research.  More refined and accurate data about 
the socio-economic circumstances associated with child injury and death 
would, in their view, assist the formulation of preventative strategies 
directed towards families and communities where the risks are known to 
be higher. 
 
The UK provides a detailed investigation of the relationship between 
family structure and child injury.  A review of available data on the 
accident risks to children of single parents was undertaken by Roberts and 
Bless (1995).  While highlighting the substantially higher rates of injury to 
children of single parents – estimated at twice the rate for children of two-
parent families in the UK – the authors argue that this increased risk could 
be explained by poverty, poor housing and social isolation.  They point out 
the consistently strong association in epidemiological research between 
child injury and poverty, and maintain that the low level of social security 
benefits and limited access to paid employment for most single parents 
placed them below the poverty threshold.  Their low incomes in turn 
exposed them to unsatisfactory housing in dangerous environments, both 
of which pose injury risks to children.  They note, for example, that 
residential fires were the second leading cause of death to children in the 
UK and that the risks were greatest in older houses, rented 
accommodation, mobile homes and homes without telephones or smoke 
detectors.  Finally, the authors identify social support as an important 
factor in the prevention of child injury, both through providing parents 
with resources and knowledge and in protecting them against depression.  
The social isolation faced by many single mothers is seen to multiply the 
disadvantages of poverty and poor housing and further increase the risk 
of accidents and injuries to children.  The principal remedy proposed by 
the authors is affordable day care which would simultaneously provide a 
safe environment for children and ease access into paid work for mothers, 
enabling them to improve their incomes and their housing.  Upgrading the 
housing stock and providing social support for single mothers are also 
identified as critical strategies for safeguarding children. 
 
Another group of studies has examined associations between family 
structure and specific disease patterns in children.  An example is a study 
by Hägglöf et al. (1991) which considers whether psychosocial stress 
presented a risk factor for Type 1 diabetes in children.  This study forms 
part of the Swedish childhood diabetes study - a national case referent 
study.  All recent onset child patients aged 0-14 years over one year were 
invited to participate.  Two referent subjects matched for age, sex and 
geographical distribution were selected for each patient using the official 
Swedish population register.  In all, 338 patients and 528 referent 
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subjects took part.  Family characteristics such as the marital status of 
parents, parental age, number of siblings and proportion of immigrants 
were similar for both the diabetic patients and the children in the referent 
group.  Questionnaires were distributed to the families of the diabetes 
patients and the families of the referent subjects approximately four 
weeks after the diagnosis of Type 1 diabetes, with the purpose of 
recording significant life events over the year prior to diagnosis.  An 
inventory of 45 possible life events was incorporated into the 
questionnaire.  These included parental divorce and separation, the 
remarriage of a parent and the death of a parent or a close member of the 
family.  Three different methods were used to analyse the life events 
qualitatively.  First, a life change values index already established for this 
questionnaire provided a rating of the severity of the life events.  Second, 
each family evaluated how upsetting a life event had been to the child on 
a self-esteem scale.  Third, losses within the family are analysed 
separately since these had been indicated in previous research as being 
associated in both adults and children with the onset of diabetes.  All 
analyses are performed separately for children aged 0-4 years, 5-9 years 
and 10-14 years.  
 
The results show no difference in the number of life events between the 
families of the diabetic children and the referent families, with a mean of 
1.9 events per family.  Neither are there any significant differences when 
the results are analysed by age group.  In the group as a whole, the 
number of severe life events as rated by the families themselves tended 
to be higher for the diabetic children but the difference is not statistically 
significant.  However, the impact of life events relating to losses within the 
family differed according to age group.  The chances that such events 
comprise a risk factor for Type 1 diabetes are significantly higher among 
children aged 5-9 years and remain significant when standardised for 
possibly confounding factors such as age, sex, maternal education and 
whether Type 1 diabetes was present among first degree relatives.  The 
authors suggest that this age group might be especially vulnerable to 
stressful life events due to the discrepancy between cognitive skills and 
emotional development; alternatively, they speculate that the occurrence 
of significant events, such as parental divorce, might be more frequent in 
this age group.     
 
The relationship between single parenthood and outcomes for children 
with cystic fibrosis, a severe and life-threatening long-term illness, is the 
focus of a study conducted by a hospital research team in Northern 
Ireland (part of the UK) (Macpherson et al., 1998).  Seventy-five children 
aged between eight months and six years are identified from the patient 
register of a regional cystic fibrosis centre, of which 20 are from single 
parent families and 55 from two-parent families.  An interview schedule 
was devised for the mothers in order to probe family circumstances, 
including number of siblings, financial and employment situation, receipt 
of benefits, smoking and housing.  All participating mothers were also 
asked to complete the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), which is 
widely used to detect psychiatric disorders.  In addition, the child’s age 
and genetic history was recorded from the patient register, and the 
pattern of hospital admissions over the previous year was recorded, along 
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with the most recent Schwachman score (a clinical score widely used to 
assess the status of patients with cystic fibrosis).    
 
Analysis of the outcomes for children show that those younger than six 
years with single mothers and teenage mothers had markedly increased 
morbidity.  This was reflected in higher rates of hospital admissions, more 
days in hospital per year and a significantly lower mean Schwachman 
score than for children from older two-parent families.  The authors 
suggest that these results could be indicative of lower compliance with 
prophylactic and preventative regimes, which in turn were likely to reflect 
a lack of support for single and teenage mothers in managing the 
increased burden of care.  They conclude that young cystic fibrosis 
children with single or teenage mothers have significantly worse clinical 
progress than those from intact families and that this population required 
extra clinical vigilance and social support. 
 
 
5.4  Behavioural and emotional problems in 
childhood 
 
While the studies discussed in the previous section are mainly concerned 
with physical health outcomes, a large body of research has been devoted 
to identifying the factors associated with behavioural and emotional 
problems in childhood. 
 
A study undertaken by Harland et al (2002) in the Netherlands, a partially 
defamilialised country, sought to determine whether children’s 
demographic characteristics (sex, age, ethnicity and degree of 
urbanisation), family characteristics (family structure, employment status 
of the parent(s), educational level, and number of siblings living in the 
family at the time of the study), and stressful life events were associated 
with an increased risk of behavioural and/or emotional problems.  With 
regard to life events, it focused on parental divorce or separation and 
unemployment, because these were observed frequently and had been 
found in previous research to have significant consequences.  A particular 
concern of the study is to assess whether the impact of divorce and 
separation changed over time, and special attention is paid to risks to 
children who had recently experienced parental separation/divorce or 
unemployment compared to those with longstanding experience of this 
problem. 
 
The Child Behaviour Checklist (CBCL), a well-established and validated 
instrument for identifying problems in children’s behaviour from the 
parents’ viewpoint, was completed by a national sample of 4,480 parents 
of school-aged children (4-15 years) who were also interviewed about 
their demographic and family characteristics and about the child’s recent 
life events.  Child health care professionals provided additional 
background information.  The data were collected in a standardised way 
during routine health assessments.  Results show that family 
characteristics and recent life events were more strongly associated with 
children’s risks of behavioural and emotional problems as measured by 
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the CBCL than other demographic characteristics.  Overall, the likelihood 
of having a clinical CBCL problem tended to be higher for children 
experiencing divorce or separation than it was for those encountering 
unemployment.  Moreover, children tend to recover over time - although 
not completely - from the damaging emotional effects of divorce.  On the 
whole, the observed effects are moderate.  The authors do not propose a 
causal link between life events and emotional problems but rather seek to 
identify high risk groups of children.  They feel that the results do not 
justify screening for children who had experienced stressful life events but 
nonetheless indicate that child health professionals should be alert if a 
child’s history contained such events. 
 
McMunn et al. (2001) sought to unravel the complex relationship between 
family structure, child and adolescent well-being, socio-economic status 
and parental mental health.  They use data from the Health Survey for 
England, a large, annual nationally representative survey.  The 1997 
edition of the survey focused on the health of young people and was the 
first to use the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ), an 
instrument for screening children for psychological morbidity.  Sampling 
yielded 5,705 children aged 4-15 years whose parents completed the 
SDQ.  Key questions for the study are whether children from two-parent 
and single parent families differ in terms of their emotional and 
behavioural symptoms, and, if so, whether this relationship persists once 
socio-economic circumstances and parental mental health are taken into 
account.   
 
Compared to children from two-parent families, children of never-married 
single mothers were three times more likely to have a high SDQ score, 
indicating psychiatric disorders.  Those with previously married single 
mothers or from reconstituted families were twice as likely to have a high 
score.  Children in single father families were not significantly more likely 
to have a high SDQ score.  Girls were less likely than boys, and 13-15 
year olds were less likely than four to six year olds to have a high score.  
When various indicators of socio-economic status were taken into account 
(receipt of benefits, social class of head of household and housing tenure), 
the effect of single mother households (both never married and previously 
married) on child psychological status disappeared.  However, children of 
reconstituted families were 60 per cent more likely to have a high SDQ 
score even when socio-economic status was taken into account.  
 
Information about maternal factors and mother’s education, working 
status and psychological well-being was available only for a sub sample of 
1,426 children.  While these maternal factors, along with family structure 
and socio-economic status, were all associated with high SDQ scores for 
children, they were also strongly associated with one another so that, for 
example, mothers with no educational qualifications were the most likely 
to be single parents while the opposite was true for those with degrees or 
higher education.  The authors conclude that it was not single motherhood 
per se that was detrimental to children’s psychological well-being but 
rather the poverty and low maternal educational attainment that are 
characteristic of many single mothers.  However, these factors were 
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unable to explain the enhanced psychological risk for children from 
reconstituted families.   
 
Wadsby and Svedin (1993) undertook a two-year follow-up study of 
Swedish children whose parents had recently divorced.  The base 
population for the study was drawn from all Swedish couples with children 
under 18 years who applied for and completed a divorce at a single 
district court over a twelve month period ending in June 1988.  One 
hundred and thirteen children aged 3-18 years from 78 families were 
included in the original study group, and 300 children from intact families 
were used as a reference group for mental health assessment.  An 
assessment of the children was made within eight weeks after parents' 
formal application for divorce.  This examined the presence of behavioural 
disturbances and symptoms of poor mental health among children of 
divorced parents as compared with children from intact homes, examined 
age and gender differences, and studied the children's reactions to the 
information about their parents' divorce.  A semi-structured behaviour and 
symptom interview was undertaken with the parents, supplemented with 
open questions and information about any contacts with the Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatric Service before and at the time of divorce.  This 
early assessment had shown that behavioural problems and symptoms of 
poor mental health were not more common among the children of 
divorced parents than among the children from intact families, and there 
were no age or sex differences.  The purpose of the follow-up study was 
to re-examine the children’s mental health, with the specific aim of 
determining whether their symptom scores had changed.  
 
Ninety-seven of the original children were re-examined:  44 boys and 53 
girls.  A reference group was once again used, comprising 232 children 
from intact families randomly selected from the general population.  The 
interview used as part of the original assessment was repeated and was 
supplemented by parent and teacher questionnaires designed to 
discriminate between children who showed disorder and those who did 
not.  Subsequent contacts with the child psychiatric service were also 
noted.  Boys of divorced families were found to have a significantly higher 
symptom score at the follow up.  
 
Differences related to age were seen only between the children who were 
younger than five years at the time of the original study and subsequently 
were between five and seven years of age at the follow-up.  These 
children were significantly more symptom- loaded at the follow-up, with 
the boys once again accounting for the increased score.  In spite of the 
increased total score, there was no significant increase in the percentage 
of children with behavioural issues at the follow-up (16 per cent) 
compared with the original study (13 per cent) and no more than for 
children from intact homes (16 per cent).  Of the 27 per cent of children 
who demonstrated a higher symptom score at the follow-up, psychiatric 
contact for one or both parents and parental alcohol abuse appeared to be 
contributory factors, while the experience of a particularly traumatic 
divorce was associated with a symptom score outside the range of normal 
behaviour displayed by 16 per cent of children. 
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Franz et al. (2003) note the lack of methodologically sound studies of 
health and social outcomes for single mothers and their children in 
Germany.  They also observe a lack of targeted support programmes for 
this group and designed a large epidemiological study in order to improve 
information and facilitate the development and planning of specific 
interventions.  A school eligibility test carried out for the entire cohort of 
children aged 5-7 years in Dusseldorf during 1999 allowed the screening 
of all accompanying adults, from whom a study group of 531 single 
mothers (who were either living alone or with a new partner but 
unmarried) and a control group of 278 married mothers were drawn.  The 
authors analyse outcomes for the mothers themselves and for their 
children.  Child outcomes are measured in terms of levels of problem 
behaviour as measured by the CBCL, which was completed by the 
mothers.  This has nine sub-scales which were aggregated to give a total 
score for behavioural problems.  The authors find that children’s problem 
behaviour is elevated among the single mother group compared to the 
control group.  However, significantly higher means for CBCL subscales 
(thought disorder, social problems, delinquent behaviour, other problems, 
mixed problems, externalizing) and CBCL total score were found only in 
boys of single mothers.  
 
Within the distribution of CBCL total scores for boys a larger subgroup of 
higher troubled children among single mothers is observed.  Younger 
single mothers considered their sons to show more difficult behaviour than 
older single mothers.  Girls of single mothers also show higher CBCL mean 
values but do not differ significantly from those belonging to two-parent 
families.  Children of full-time employed single mothers show a CBCL 
mean total score of 23.27 compared to a CBCL total of 12.82 for children 
of full-time employed mothers of the control group.  The study also finds 
an elevated prevalence of psychological distress among single mothers 
compared to the control group and a highly significant correlation between 
the level of distress of the single mother and the children’s CBCL total 
score.  The authors argue for preventative interventions and community 
support structures for single parent families to be targeted at the points of 
highest need, along with increased financial benefits.  In order to use 
existing resources efficiently, they feel that priority should be given to 
young single mothers who have an insufficient income or low educational 
or professional grades, as well as those who do not have additional 
personal support for their child.  
 
 
5.5  Adjustment in adolescence and young 
adulthood 
 
Some studies discussed above include findings on health outcomes 
through childhood and into adolescence and young adulthood.  The 
studies described in this Section focus more closely on these latter 
developmental stages and consider whether outcomes for young people in 
terms of psychological functioning and life transitions differ according to 
parental family structures.  
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Chase-Lansdale et al. (1995) use the NCDS to explore the psychological 
functioning of young adults from divorced families.  As noted in Chapter 3, 
the NCDS is a survey of all children born in the UK during a single week in 
March 1958.  The study uses data gathered at birth and subsequently at 
ages seven, 11, 16 and 23 years.  The 17,414 individuals in the original 
cohort were reduced by sample attrition to 12,537 at age 23.  The authors 
select a longitudinal sub-sample for this investigation of 10,353 
individuals whose parents had remained married until age seven and had 
subsequently divorced.  Three specific questions were posed:   
 
(1) Does divorce during childhood have long-term consequences on adult 
mental health, and are there gender differences?  
(2) Do subsequent life events or developmental capacities counteract 
negative effects of divorce?  
(3) When child and family characteristics prior to divorce are taken into 
account, is the relationship between the divorce itself and adult mental 
health weakened?   
 
Mental health outcomes were measured by means of the Malaise 
Inventory, an instrument designed to sample a broad range of adult 
emotional disorders. 
 
The results indicate that divorce had negative long-term consequences for 
both young men and women’s emotional and psychological adjustment at 
age 23, which were associated with a moderate percentage increase in the 
average score of the Malaise Inventory.  In relative terms, divorce was 
associated with a substantial 39 per cent increase in the risk of 
psychopathology.  While describing an effect of this magnitude as 
`important and worrisome’, the authors also pointed out that this was a 
relative effect and that, in absolute terms, it remained the case that 82 
per cent of young women and 94 per cent of young men whose parents 
had divorced fell below the clinical threshold, suggesting that in the vast 
majority of cases there is substantial recovery following divorce. 
 
The timing of divorce was also considered (that is, between ages seven 
and 11, or between ages 11-16) and there were indications that later 
divorce was more harmful to children’s subsequent adjustment.  The 
authors offer two main interpretations for this finding.  The first is that 
divorce during adolescence may be particularly disturbing.  This is a time 
of major developmental transformations and life choices involving the 
renegotiation of autonomy and connectedness with the family, the 
development of a sex-role identity, intimate relationships with others and, 
in the UK, required an early career choice and decisions on whether to 
leave school at age 16.  The second is that the closer proximity of the 
divorce to young adulthood created a greater likelihood of continuity 
between adverse reactions in the aftermath of divorce and maladjustment 
in the early adult years. 
 
Moreover, children with fewer emotional problems at age seven were 
more adversely affected by divorce, as measured by magnitude of change 
in Malaise Inventory Scores, even though they ultimately demonstrated a 
lower level of mental health problems in adulthood.  The authors 
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speculate that divorce may have been experienced as more of a shock by 
the well-adjusted children and that the emotional problems of the poorly 
adjusted children may have reflected dysfunction in their families which 
was ameliorated through divorce.  The study was also able to investigate 
the question of whether long-term negative outcomes for children 
following divorce reflected prior problems in the child or family rather than 
the divorce itself.  It finds that the long-term negative effects on adult 
mental health at age 23 were linked to the divorce since they were not 
reduced when problematic child and family factors at age seven (that is, 
before the divorce) were taken into account. 
 
Similar questions about long-term outcomes for young people were 
addressed by a study undertaken in the Netherlands, another partially 
defamilialised country.  Spruijt and de Goede (1996) compare a series of 
outcomes indicative of health and well-being for adolescents and young 
adults from four family types:  stable intact families, conflict intact 
families, single parent families and stepfamilies.  Data are used from the 
Utrecht Study of Adolescent Development, a longitudinal study with a 
national panel design.  The sample comprised 3,393 young people aged 
between 12 and 24 years.  The young people and one of their parents 
were interviewed.  Children from single parent families and stepfamilies 
had, on average, experienced their parents’ divorce or separation ten 
years before the data were gathered, while the formation of new 
stepfamilies had taken place on average eight years before, leading the 
authors to observe that outcomes could be seen as long-term.  Family 
income and the sex, age and educational level of the young person were 
controlled for in the analysis. 
 
The authors hypothesise that the young people’s general physical and 
psychological well-being and their feelings of well-being in a relationship 
would be negatively related to the amount of structural change they had 
experienced within their parental family.  Standardised scales are used to 
measure physical and mental health and psychological distress.  In 
addition, the young people were asked whether they had considered 
suicide during the previous 12 months.  In order to ascertain their feelings 
of well-being in a relationship, they were questioned about significant 
events and decisions in their emotional lives.  
 
Findings relating to physical health show that young people from intact 
families are the ‘most healthy’, followed by those from stepfamilies, 
conflict families and, finally, single parent families.  Those from single 
parent families also score lowest on the measures of psychological well-
being, and those from intact families once again scored highest.  
However, those from stepfamilies scored higher on these measures than 
young people from single parent families and conflictual families.  When 
asked about their own emotional relationships, young people from single 
parent families and stepfamilies had more experience of emotional upsets 
and the breaking up relationships, although the difference was significant 
only for those from single parent families.  After controlling for family 
income, sex and educational level, these reported relationships between 
family structure and outcomes remain significant.  While children from 
single parent families show the lowest levels of well-being in all respects 
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and those from intact families the highest, children from stepfamilies 
occupy an intermediate position, thus refuting the hypothesis that those 
who had experienced most structural change within their families would 
experience the lowest levels of well-being.  
 
A small study in Sweden (Samuelsson, 1995) compared the social 
networks of children aged 9-16 years from single parent families who 
were patients at a child and adolescent psychiatric clinic with a control 
group of children of single parents who had not attended the clinic.  Both 
parent and child were asked to complete several standardised self-report 
questionnaires.  The children’s questionnaires measured the strength of 
their social interactions, their sense of being valued and esteemed by 
others and the extent to which they felt lonely and lacked companionship.  
They also drew network maps to indicate the people important to them in 
each area of their lives.  The parents completed a screening instrument 
for behavioural disturbances in children, the same social interaction 
schedule and their own network maps.  
 
A key finding with regard to the differences between the patient group 
and the control group was that the former experienced greater feelings of 
loneliness, were more dissatisfied with their networks, had fewer friends 
at school, and were less close to the parent with access rights, to school 
friends and to female relatives.  They also reported more conflict between 
people in their networks.  The author estimate that 20 per cent of 
behavioural disturbances in the clinical group could be explained by the 
children’s social networks.   
 
 
5.6  Vulnerability in adulthood 
 
As the subjects of prospective birth cohort studies in Finland and the UK 
have matured into adulthood, researchers have taken the opportunity to 
explore associations between childhood factors, including family 
breakdown, and long-term outcomes in adulthood.  While the prospective 
studies in these two countries have dominated this area of research, 
research based upon retrospective reporting of childhood experiences in 
Sweden and the UK have also been undertaken.  
 
Rodgers (1994, cited by Wadsworth and Kuh, 1997) examines adult 
mental health using the Present State Examination (PSE) at age 36 years 
and the Psychiatric Symptom Frequency Scale (PSF) at 43 years.  This 
shows that experience of parental divorce or separation between 0-15 
years was a risk for a high score of psychiatric symptoms at age 43 
among those women who were themselves single, divorced or remarried.  
No effect for men was observed.  It was concluded that vulnerability in 
later life as experienced by single mothers, those married more than once 
or those never married by age 43 years added significantly to the 
childhood experience of divorce and separation to increase the risk of 
psychiatric problems in later life.   
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In a later study Rodgers (1996) retrospectively collected information 
about the quality of parent-child relationships using a standardised 
instrument (the Parker Parental Bonding Instrument, PBI) to assess the 
quality of parent-child relationships.  While the validity of the responses 
could not be checked directly, those who had experienced parental 
separation or divorce in childhood showed significantly lower maternal and 
paternal care scores and significantly higher paternal control scores in 
comparison to others.  PBI scores show a low but significant correlations 
with adult affective symptoms assessed using the PSE at 36 years and the 
PSF at 43 years.  Indeed, combined care and control scores show an 
effect on symptoms that was as great or greater than other factors of 
known importance, such as parental separation or divorce, leading to the 
conclusion that `interpersonal competence’ (the ability to interactive 
effectively with others) was important in the continuity between childhood 
relationships with parents and adult mental health.  
 
The second post-war British birth cohort study, the NCDS, has been used 
to examine associations between childhood patterns and a range of long-
term outcomes.  For example, Kiernan (1996) uses data from the study 
up to age 33 to examine whether outcomes in adulthood for children from 
single parent families differ according to whether or not the mother had 
worked during the child’s teenage years.  By this stage, attrition had 
reduced the original study population from 17,414 at birth to just under 
11,500 at age 33.  The outcomes examined covered the children’s own 
partnership and parenting experiences in adulthood, including the timing 
and context of first birth and partnership breakdown.   
 
The major differences in family formation experiences in adulthood were 
between women from intact families and those from single parent families 
(with higher rates of teenage motherhood, early cohabitation, partnership 
dissolution and single parenthood for the latter, although the author does 
not report the extent to which these are statistically significant).  There 
were some observable differences between outcomes for women from 
single parent families where the mother was employed and those with 
non-working single mothers, with higher proportions of the latter having a 
teenage pregnancy or a child outside marriage.  However, only with 
respect to the risk of teenage pregnancy were these differences 
statistically significant.  One conclusion from the study was that having a 
working single mother reduced the likelihood of teenage pregnancy, which 
the author suggests may reflect the higher aspirations of girls who have 
an economically active mother as a role model.  While men and women 
from disrupted families were more likely to have experienced partnership 
dissolution than those from intact families, this propensity did not differ 
according to whether or not the mother was employed.  Also, women from 
the two sub-groups of single parent families (mother employed and not 
employed) had a similar propensity to become single parents themselves.    
 
Hope et al. (1998) also uses data from the NCDS up to age 33 in order to 
investigate the association between parental separation and alcohol 
consumption and problem drinking in adulthood.  The study was based on 
a sample of just under 10,000 subjects, with similar numbers of males 
and females.  Analyses were conducted for those who experienced 
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parental divorce in childhood (up to age 16), those who experienced 
parental death in childhood and those whose parents divorced at a later 
time (between the ages of 17 and 33).  At ages 23 and 33, respondents 
estimated their weekly consumption of alcoholic beverages, and this was 
quantified in terms of units of alcohol.  The age 33 questionnaire included 
the four-item CAGE measure, designed to identify problem drinkers, which 
had been used in a number of clinical settings.27  At age 23, the 
relationship between alcohol consumption and parental divorce was weak 
and inconsistent but stronger effects emerged at age 33 when higher 
levels of alcohol consumption, heavy drinking and problem drinking (with 
odds ratios between 1.29 and 1.90) were found for those who had 
experienced parental divorce in childhood, but not for those who had 
experienced parental death or later divorce.  These findings were not 
substantially changed when socio-economic circumstances or marital 
status at age 33 were taken into account.  The authors suggest that the 
emergence of risk between the ages of 23 and 33 suggested a latency 
effect with regard to parental separation, although occurring later than for 
other outcomes, such as anxiety, depression and under-achievement.    
 
In the different context of defamilialised Finland, Sauvola et al. (2001) 
used data from the Northern Finland 1966 Birth Cohort Project, which is 
linked to the national death register, to study the relationship between 
family background and offspring mortality.  As reported earlier, the 
original birth cohort comprised more than 12,000 individuals, representing 
96 per cent of children born in Finland during 1966.  This study is based 
upon the 11,017 individuals from the cohort who were alive and living in 
Finland at age 16 years.  Information about death and causes of death 
among individuals in this sample between ages 16 and 28 was collected in 
a follow up study.  The analysis compared mortality outcomes for children 
from two-parent and single parent families.  Given that mental illness is a 
well-known risk factor for premature death, the analysis took into account 
validated psychiatric diagnoses for the young people.  Controls for social 
class bias are also used.   
 
Of the sample, 117 individuals died during the follow-up period, with the 
mortality rate for males three times that of females.  The vast majority of 
deaths (79 per cent) were from unnatural causes:  suicides, accidents and 
homicides.  After adjusting for confounding variables, it was found that 
the risk of deaths for males from single parent families was significantly 
greater than for those from two-parent families.  The adjusted mortality 
ratio varied from an odds ratio of 1.4 to 2.5 depending on the cause of 
death.  Of all the deceased males, 32 per cent came from a single parent 
background, compared to 18 per cent who were alive.  This difference was 
statistically significant.  The highest risk increase associated with coming 
from a single parent background was in the level of suicides:  40 per cent 
of males who committed suicide were from a single parent background 
and this increased risk (an odds ratio of 2.5) remained significant after 
adjusting for validated psychiatric diagnosis.  No significantly higher risk 
of mortality was observed for females from a single parent family.  The 
                                            
27 CAGE is an acronym for:  Cutting down, Annoyance by criticism, Guilty feeling, 
and Eye-openers. 
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authors argue for further research to explore the specific social, 
psychological and biological factors which influence risk of mortality 
among males from single parent families, and also to determine whether 
there is a link between mortality and timing of parental separation.  They 
also urge mental health professionals to take more account of the need 
for preventative mental health care for children of single parent families, 
particularly boys. 
 
Mäkikyrö et al. (1998) hypothesise, on the basis of reports in the 
literature, that children of single parents would be at increased risk of 
developing a psychiatric disorder in adulthood.  Their own investigation 
seeks to analyse the association between family type and subsequent 
hospital-treated mental disorders among persons aged 16-28 years.  This 
study once again used data from the North Finland Birth Cohort Project.  
All cohort members were identified who appeared in the Finnish Hospital 
Discharge Register until the end of 1994 for any psychiatric disorder and 
for psychotic disorders before or after the age of 16.  If an individual had 
more than one hospitalisation, the most severe diagnosis over the period 
was selected.  One-parent families were deemed to be of four types:  
where the mother was unmarried at the child’s birth and remained so until 
s/he was 14 years old; where the mother was unmarried at the child’s 
birth but subsequently married before the child was 14 years old; the 
mother, father or both had died before the child was 14 years old; and the 
parents were married when the child was born but divorced before the 
child was 14 years old.  Several confounding variables were considered in 
the analysis:  place of residence, social class, maternal age, maternal 
parity at the time of birth and the number of children in the family in 
1980.   
 
The incidence of treated psychiatric disorder in the whole cohort up to age 
28 was 4.7 per cent for males and 2.3 per cent for females.  The rates 
being 4.1 per cent and two per cent for males and females respectively in 
two-parent families and 7.2 per cent and 3.6 per cent in single parent 
families. The difference between the single and two-parent families is 
significant for both males and females.  However, the incidence of 
schizophrenia, schizophrenia spectrum disorders and other psychoses, 
anxiety and other non-psychotic disorders, and female alcoholism do not 
vary significantly between the family types.  The main differences are in a 
higher proportion of males with personality disorder and alcoholism from 
single parent families and of individuals of both sexes with depressive 
disorders.  The findings indicate that there is an association between some 
single parent family types and specific disorders.  Thus, parental divorce 
was associated with personality disorders, alcoholism and (more weakly) 
anxiety disorder, while parental death was associated with depression.  
While noting that the absolute risk to children of single parents in Finland 
remains small, with 94.6 per cent having no hospital-treated psychiatric 
disorder, the authors note that the three-to-five fold relative increase in 
risk is nonetheless remarkable in psychiatric research.  They are not able 
to draw conclusions about causal links from the data but speculate that 
adverse events associated with single parenthood (such as parental 
conflict, bereavement, loss of material and psychological support) might 
play a role.  
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More recently, a psychiatric field study was undertaken as part of the 31-
year follow-up survey for the North Finland Birth Cohort Project 
(Kantorjävi et al., 2008).  From nearly 1,600 individuals, those with a 
personality disorder were identified by means of standardised screening 
and interviewing methods.  All hospital treatment episodes for study 
members between 1982-1997 (ages 16-31 years) are also identified from 
the Finnish Hospital Discharge Register, and patient records for public 
outpatient care over the same period are analysed.  One hundred and ten 
members of the cohort had at least one personality disorder.  Family 
background information for the cohort members had been gathered at 
birth and at age 14. The variables used in this study included gender, 
social class and parental mental illness.   
 
The main findings of the study are that a single-parent family type at birth 
and being an only child are both significantly associated with personality 
disorders in adulthood.  Being born into a single parent family predicted 
any personality disorder, and cluster B personality disorders (antisocial, 
borderline, histrionic, narcissistic) in adulthood.  Also, single parenthood 
throughout childhood was associated especially with cluster B personality 
disorders.  Being an only child position was a risk for any personality 
disorder, particularly cluster A personality disorders (paranoid, schizoid, 
schizotypal). These associations remained significant after adjusting for 
parental social class and parental psychiatric disorder.  The authors 
speculate that living in single parent families presents many problems 
which could influence a child’s psychic development, such as moves to a 
new house or school, loss of friends and changes in patterns of contact.  
They recommend further studies to explore the psychosocial aspects of 
family environment that may promote vulnerability to personality 
disorders in adulthood.  They also believe that their findings had 
implications for clinical practice by highlighting that the assessment of 
family structure is an important part of psychiatric history taking.    
 
Using a different methodology, Lundberg (1993) seeks to explore the 
relationship between indicators of social and economic problems in 
childhood and illness and mortality in adulthood among a representative 
sample of 4216 Swedish citizens born between 1906 and 1951.  They 
were interviewed in 1968 about their childhood living conditions and re-
interviewed 13 years later in 1981.  A follow-up of mortality for 1981-
1984 was also included.  The panel data about these individuals were 
drawn from the Swedish Level of Living Surveys.  Four different illness 
variables were included:  all physical illnesses, aches and pains in back 
and joints, circulatory illness and mental illness.  Four indicators of 
adverse childhood conditions were introduced, two relating to economic 
circumstances (economic hardship and a large family defined as four or 
more children) and two reflecting social conditions (broken family and 
conflict in the family).  The study found that adverse conditions in 
childhood, between birth and age 16, had a negative effect on health in 
adulthood and that this remained after controlling for age, sex, and class 
or origin.  Indicators of social problems emerged as more powerful 
predictors of adult health than economic conditions.  Coming from a 
broken family and experiencing family conflict were important, but the 
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latter had a stronger effect.  These results held true when controlling for 
mental illness in 1968.  Two possible explanations for the findings are 
considered.  The first is the ‘biological imprint hypothesis’ which suggests 
that the organism is changed by factors in childhood, such as poor 
nutrition, which have an impact on subsequent health.  The second is the 
‘unhealthy life career hypothesis’ which sees childhood and adult ill-health 
as connected by a chain of unhealthy living conditions which may lead to 
illness or premature death in adulthood.  The author believes that the 
results of the study support of the latter hypothesis. 
 
The significance of family conflict in childhood is also highlighted by Gahler 
(1998), who analyses data relating to a sample of 4,831 adults aged 18-
75 years from the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey, with the purpose 
of determining the long-term impact of parental divorce or separation on 
individuals’ long-term psychological well-being.  The dependent variable is 
self-reported psychological well-being using six different indicators:  
general tiredness, insomnia, nervous trouble, depression, mental illness 
and over-exertion.  The main independent variable is family type in 
childhood (divided into intact families and families dissolved by divorce or 
separation).  A second family variable relating to reported family conflict 
during childhood is also used.  Nine other variables were controlled for, 
including economic hardship, parental social class, parental education and 
size of family.  Although a preliminary analysis shows an increased risk of 
low psychological well-being among children of divorced or separated 
families, this is not statistically significant and the effect disappears when 
controls for socio-economic situation during childhood are introduced, 
leading the author to conclude that parental divorce or separation per se 
do not have negative long-term effects upon the individual’s psychological 
well-being.  This result applies to both males and females.  The decisive 
factor in long-term well-being is experience of family conflict during 
childhood.  However, this effect was greatest for children from intact 
families, who reported the lowest level of psychological well-being when 
conflict had been present, followed by those from divorced or separated  
families who had also experienced conflict.  
 
 
5.7  Conclusions 
 
This Chapter discusses findings on the association between family 
structure and health outcomes for children at several life stages between 
infancy and adulthood.  Most of the evidence is from the UK and the 
Nordic countries, although studies based on data from France, 
Netherlands and Germany have also been discussed.  A small number of 
comparative studies has shed light on relative outcomes in familialised 
and refamilialised countries in Central and Southern Europe although 
these countries are under-represented in studies in the English language. 
 
Each study requires careful reading as the findings are generally subtle, 
complex and influenced by the research design.  For single parenthood in 
particular, the association with material deprivation, poor housing and low 
levels of parental educational achievement is very strong.  In many of the 
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studies reviewed here, a clear relationship between single parenthood and 
negative health outcomes for children is revealed in a preliminary 
analysis, only to diminish or disappear when other factors are introduced.  
There are also examples, however, of health disadvantages accruing to 
children from non-intact families even after a range of demographic and 
socio-economic variables have been taken into account.  Even so these 
negative associations are often for sub-groups, such as for younger 
children (aged under six), teenagers, and boys, and the effects can be 
long term.  The causal pathways that link family structure to health 
outcomes have yet to be precisely delineated.  It is also important to 
recognise that any negative effects of family breakdown are relative 
rather than absolute and that the considerable majority of children will be 
unaffected.   
 
The complexity of the relationship between the variables also makes it 
difficult to identify policy recommendations.  Nonetheless, policy analysts 
have proposed a range of measures including: 
 
• Provision of affordable child/day care in order provide a safe 
environment for children and help parents into paid work, which in turn 
may enable them to improve their earnings and hence their children’s 
health and well-being. 
 
• A related proposal upgrading the housing stock is seen as a route to 
improving children’s health. 
 
• Providing social support for single mothers, in particular for agencies to 
be sensitive to (sub-) groups that are most likely to be at risk of poor 
health outcomes as a consequence of family breakdown.   
 
• Increased financial welfare benefits (particularly in countries where 
benefits are low)..  
 
Underpinning a number of these proposals is the recognition that simply 
promoting employment for single parents is not on its own an adequate 
policy response.   
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6  Housing Outcomes 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between family breakdown and 
housing across the twelve EU Member States within the context of 
housing policies and current housing trends.  The first part of the chapter 
discusses definitional and research issues.  The second part develops the 
findings of the first section by examining the impact housing changes due 
to family breakdown can have on children.  This includes the impact 
family breakdown can have both on the living arrangements and housing 
standards of children, on their future attitudes to housing and – in the 
case of marital breakdown - on their relationship with resident and non-
resident parents.  The final section looks at how housing issues arising 
from family breakdown fit into the different family policy typologies 
outlined by Hantrais (2004) (see Chapter 2) and what improvements (if 
any) could potentially be made.  
 
First, however, it is necessary to look at the relationship between family 
and housing generally.  The purpose of this is to demonstrate the 
influence family and familial situations can have not only on the housing 
circumstances of children but also on the future housing careers and 
approaches of young people.   
 
It is important to note the nature of contemporary notions of ‘family 
breakdown’.  In Europe today children are more likely to lose a parent 
through the breakdown of the parental relationship than by death, and 
geographical moves are often a consequence of this as families re-form 
and relocate (Hawthorne et al., 2003).  For this reason, this chapter will 
focus on marital dissolution or relationship breakdown as indicative of 
family breakdown rather than loss of a family member through death or 
other means.  
 
 
6.2  Housing and the EU 
 
Housing is now recognised as one of the key dimensions of stratification 
in modern day Europe (Kendig, 1990; Dewilde, 2008) and as having a 
significant influence on individual health, well-being and life-chances.  
There is a long-standing recognition that good housing is necessary for 
social cohesion (Maclennan et al., 1996) and that poor housing situations 
can impinge on the health and education of children (see Chapters 5 and 
6).  Though specific housing needs have been included in EU initiatives - 
for example, the provision of social housing under the European Liaison 
Committee for Social Housing – housing policies remain within the remit 
of national governments and so there is no over-arching EU housing 
policy.  However, recent publications such as the European Charter on 
Housing adopted by the Urban-Housing Intergroup on 26 April 2006 
(Hutchinson report) and the European Parliament Resolution on housing 
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and regional policy on 10 May 2007 have underlined the negative social 
effects of poor housing and called for the EU to adopt a European 
Declaration on housing (European Parliament, 2007) to address the 
housing needs and problems of all EU citizens.  
 
Prior to EU expansion in 2004, Maclennan et al (1996) identified four 
common housing-related strands across the EU15 (Maclennan et al, 
1996): 
 
• The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK are characterised by a large 
degree of state intervention.  These countries have the largest social 
rented sectors in the EU and their governments spend more than three 
per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on housing policies. 
• In Austria, Denmark, France and Germany there has been less market 
displacement and large private rental sectors have been retained. 
Public expenditure on housing policy typically lies in the range of one 
to two per cent of GDP. 
• Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg form a disparate 
group, but all have large owner occupier sectors and relatively small 
social rented sectors.  Government expenditure on housing is usually  
around one per cent of GDP. 
• Portugal, Spain and Greece have particularly large owner occupied 
sectors, minimal social rented sectors and (until recently) declining low 
quality private rental sectors.  Government expenditure on housing 
policy is less than one per cent of GDP. 
 
More recent analyses such as the Housing Statistics in the European 
Union 2005/06 report (see Federcasa, 2006) outline the diversity of 
housing policy approaches across current EU Member States.  On the 
whole, EU Member States’ housing initiatives are concerned with five key 
goals: 
 
• the provision of affordable housing for people and families, particularly 
young and vulnerable people; 
• maintaining a flexible, balanced range of tenure options which can 
meet their populations’ housing needs; 
• increasing the available good quality housing stock; 
• ensuring that people and families have a choice regarding their living 
arrangements; and 
• the promotion of owner-occupation or ‘stable’ tenancy arrangements. 
 
Housing problems associated with family breakdown are an area of 
concern for policy makers as family breakdown is believed to worsen the 
housing situations and living conditions of families and children (Dewilde, 
2008; Feijten, 2005).  As Murphy (1990: 41) comments, ‘in the housing 
game of snakes and ladders, marital or family breakdown is a snake.’  
Family breakdown can make long-term tenures such as owner-occupation 
financially unsustainable and restrict the housing options of children and 
their parents.  On the other hand, growing up in poorer housing or having 
difficulty financially sustaining a particular housing tenure is of course not 
only and not always a consequence of family breakdown.  Market forces, 
limitations in tenure availability and social attitudes may also play a 
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significant role.  For example, moving into poorer housing after family 
breakdown, and the associated problems this causes for children’s well-
being, is linked to imbalances in the quality of the housing stock when 
one form of housing consumption has been favoured at the ‘expense’ of 
other types of tenure  (Dewilde, 2008:809; and see Gurney, 1999).   
 
Notwithstanding this, family breakdown does have an affect on families’ 
housing options if only because it leads to an increase in the number of 
households as individuals leave the family home and this can limit the 
availability of appropriate housing if the number of dwellings does not 
increase at the same rate.  This can in turn restrict the housing options 
for recently divided families as it limits the number of affordable, good 
quality homes available to them.  
 
 
6.3  Family and housing  
 
Konig (1976), Segalen (1981) and Forrest and Murie (1995) emphasise 
the importance of family networks in contemporary society.  Rossi (1955) 
argues that household events are linked to housing events (see Smits and 
Mulder, 2008) and increasingly analysts have taken a form of ‘whole 
family approach’ to the study of housing.  Not only does the family bear 
the responsibility for obtaining housing for its members (Hill, 1971, cited 
in Morris and Winter, 1978) but recent country-specific investigations into 
the dynamics of family life suggest that housing often provides the main 
part of a family’s resource wealth.  For example, Bonvalet’s evaluation of 
family wealth in France estimates that around 53 per cent of the average 
French family’s resource and economic wealth lay in housing capital 
(Bonvalet, 1995; and see Forrest and Murie, 1995).  This is also true for 
other EU Member States, such as the UK, where home ownership, at least 
until recent events in the finance markets, was increasingly seen as a 
form of wealth accumulation (Forrest and Murie, 1995) and Greece where 
housing is the main source of ‘resource wealth’ for the ‘income poor’ 
(Forrest and Murie, 1995).  Recent studies of housing in the UK also 
demonstrate how the relationship between young people and their 
families can play a substantial role in their housing career pathways 
(Green et al., 2008).  
 
Housing is considered to encompass a bundle of characteristics that are 
integral to family well-being (Bratt, 2002).  These include safety, stability, 
access to necessary resources and decent living conditions.  For instance, 
Bratt (2002) views social success, health and well-being of families as 
facilitated by decent living conditions.  Poor housing can contribute to 
problems such as social exclusion and is closely associated with 
limitations in the economic and educational prospects of children and 
young people. This is discussed further below.  
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6.4  Research on housing outcomes  
 
Given the complexities of the European housing market, a number of 
issues arise regarding existing definitions and level of disaggregation 
employed by analysts.  
 
Measuring households and measuring families are two very different 
processes and statistical analyses reflect this.  For example, although 
analyses of two-home situations based on the Enquête sur les resources 
et les conditions de vie – the French edition of the EU Survey on Income 
and Living conditions (see, for example, Eurostat, 2007) – suggest that 
data regarding multi-residence may be indicative of children of separated 
parents sharing their time between both parents’ homes, this evidence 
may be subject to omissions (Toulemon, 2008).  Toulemon’s study 
highlights that although multi-residence is linked to specific family 
situations – and changes therein – some of these situations are 
temporary or ambiguous.  Fundamentally, this could imply that while two-
home situations could be indicative of family breakdown or separation, 
they could equally be indicative of situations such as where young people 
(for example, university students) are registered both as having ‘left the 
nest’ and as living in the parental home, or what has been called Living 
Apart Together (LAT) where some couples live in different houses but are 
still together (Billari et al., 2007; Levin, 2004).  In addition, using 
measurements of households as indicative of family dynamics (that is, 
whether separated or together) is imprecise post-family breakdown as 
couples occasionally continue to reside in the same house after the 
relationship has ended either for financial reasons or to be nearer their 
children (Gram-Hanssen and Bech-Danielsen, 2008) - or the marital home 
may still be used as a primary address during the transition to different 
accommodation (Feijten, 2005).  
 
Moreover, housing policy does not discuss ‘families’ but ‘households’. 
Although housing policy does mention the needs of certain types of family 
nuclei, for example, single parent families are dealt with in housing 
commentaries and analyses, as it stands, official Member States’ policies 
focus on meeting the housing needs of households, regardless of their 
specific characteristics.  
 
The complexity of housing pathways and the impact that problems, such 
as disparities within housing provision or restricted tenure options, can 
have on the housing situations of parents and children after family 
breakdown are important.  Furthermore, some housing theorists argue 
that there is a close link between features of a housing system and 
societal characteristics (Somerville, 2005).  For example, Lauster (2005) 
locates the decline in ‘family household formation’ in Sweden and the 
relative rise in non family or single-person households in the changing 
social attitudes of young people entering the housing market,.  While 
Dewilde (2008) sees growing up in poorer quality housing as a 
consequence of family breakdown.  However, identifying a drop in 
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housing quality as implicit in the process of family breakdown fails to pay 
sufficient attention to the wide range of supplementary factors that may 
also influence the relationship between family breakdown and housing 
situations.  As Somerville (2000; 2005) argues: 
 
‘[S]uch relationships are inevitable historically and geographically 
specific, and are mediated by many important economic, social and 
cultural variables, such as housing form (e.g. houses or flats), 
housing affordability (relative costs of renting and buying), housing 
location (e.g. inner city or suburbs), and cultural bias (e.g. towards 
owner-occupation).  The relationship itself may even be accidental 
rather than causal.’ 
Somerville (2005: 88). 
 
 
 
6.5 Family breakdown, children and housing 
and living arrangements 
 
Separating may entail new housing needs and relocation.  Separating may 
mean that some have to find new housing that meets the needs of the 
new situation and that others will stay in the matrimonial home (Gram-
Hassen and Bech-Danielsen, 2008: 507).  From a housing perspective, 
family breakdown influences children and families in three main ways – 
economically, practically and emotionally. 
 
6.5.1  Economic effects 
One of the main economic effects of family breakdown is a loss in income 
entering the home which can significantly alter the standard of living 
post-family breakdown.  Housing costs are a significant issue for 
European households and are one of the primary financial burdens for 
families in many EU countries, particularly Southern EU Member States.  
Changes in household income due to family breakdown could exacerbate 
this problem.  In Spain and Greece for example, housing is cited as a 
financial burden by 83.6 and 67.1 per cent of households respectively 
(Eurostat, 2008).  Housing costs are also a major concern in countries 
where owner-occupation is the preferred tenure.  For instance, in Ireland, 
where an estimated 82 per cent of households are owner-occupiers 
(Housing Statistics in EU, 2004), only 38.2 per cent of households say 
that housing costs are not a financial burden (Eurostat, 2008) compared 
with 48.4 per cent who regard housing as a financial burden and 13.4 per 
cent who regard it as a heavy financial burden (ibid).  Tables 6.1 to 6.3 
show that households’ perception of housing costs as a financial burden 
increased during the late-1990s.  These data are only available between 
1994 and 2001 and therefore do not include more recent accession states 
such as Malta and the Czech Republic of our case study countries.  
Despite this, they give a good indication of how European households 
view housing costs.  Considered in the light of Hantrais’ typology, the 
figures also indicate that countries in the defamilialised category are 
significantly less likely to perceive housing costs as a financial burden.  
For example while 64.1 per cent of Denmark’s households (defamilialised) 
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do not perceive housing costs as a financial burden, only 16.5 per cent of 
Spanish households (familialised) feel the same way. 
 
6.5.2  Practical effects 
Although also dependent on a range of factors such as availability and 
affordability, family breakdown can restrict the housing choices or 
pathways of both children and families.  This could influence the future 
housing careers of young people, their attitudes to housing and the age at 
which children leave home (Iacovou, 2001).  Analyses of tenure choices 
indicate that family breakdown can play an important role in the 
movement of families between tenures (Feijten, 2005), in particular it is 
one of the primary causes of moves from owner-occupation into the public 
and private rented sectors (Murphy, 1990; Bonvalet and Lelievre, 1991, 
1997; Helderman, 2007; Dewilde, 2008).  Helderman’s (2007:244) study 
of the Netherlands found that moves for union dissolution reasons lead 
considerably more often to moves to rented homes than moves for other 
motives.  This is due to a combination of reduced income, diminished 
household size and, in some cases, the need to move quickly due to 
domestic violence or intense household conflict. 
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Table 6.1: Share of households with no financial burden due to housing costs (percentage) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 
Denmark 
 
68.2 69.9 68.2 67.7 67.6 67.6 63.6 64.1 
Finland 
 
   -    - 47.7 49.2 53.9 53.3 54.2 55.7 
France 
 
50.8 52.1 50.3 54 51.4 51.8 54.3 57.5 
Netherlands 
 
68.6 69.2 68.7 70.9 74.1 76.3 77 76.2 
Germany 
 
42.5 42.3 42.8 40.2 41.8 41.9 41.6 41 
Ireland 
 
27.7 27 26.6 28.6 33.4 34.7 36.9 38.2 
UK 
 
90.4 91.6 92.9 92.8 93.5 94.4 93.7 95.1 
Spain 
 
13.6 14.3 14.5 15.1 14 16.4 18.5 16.5 
Greece 
 
36.1 44.7 45 45.7 35.5 40.5 41.1 34 
Source:  Eurostat    
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Table 6.2 Share of households with financial burden due to housing costs (percentage) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 
Denmark 24 23.9 24.6 26.3 26.1 26 29 28.5 
 
Finland     -   - 35.7 35.1 33 35.8 35.4 33 
 
France 30.7 30.1 31.1 28.5 30.8 29.9 29.4 27.9 
 
Netherlands 26.5 25.6 26 24.2 22.7 20.1 19.9 20.7 
 
Germany 43.3 42.1 42.2 44.7 43 43.5 42.7 44.7 
 
Ireland 47.4 51.5 51.4 53.5 51.4 49.1 49 48.4 
 
UK    - 41.4 40   -   -   -   -   - 
 
Spain 48.5 49.3 52.8 53.4 56.6 57.1 56.4 57.4 
 
Greece 32.9 30.7 31.8 34.2 41.8 39.3 41.8 47.7 
 
Source:  Eurostat 
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Table 6.3: Share of households with heavy financial burden due to housing costs (percentage) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 
Denmark 7.8 6.3 7.3 6 6.3 6.4 7.4 7.4 
 
Finland   -   - 16.6 15.8 13.1 10.9 10.4 11.3 
 
France 18.5 17.8 18.6 17.5 17.7 18.3 16.3 14.6 
 
Netherlands 4.9 5.1 5.4 5 3.2 3.6 3 3.1 
 
Germany 14.2 15.6 15 15.1 15.3 14.6 15.7 14.2 
 
Ireland 24.8 21.4 22 17.9 15.2 16.2 14.1 13.4 
 
UK 9.6 8.4 7.1 7.2 6.5 5.6 6.3 4.9 
 
Spain 37.9 36.4 32.7 31.5 29.4 26.5 25.1 26.2 
 
Greece 31 24.6 23.2 20.2 22.8 20.1 17 18.4 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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The financial strain of housing costs is most likely to become 
unmanageable post-family breakdown for the less well-off.  Research 
suggests that the housing options of low-income individuals after marital 
dissolution or family breakdown are much more limited than the options 
of middle- or high-income individuals.  People with low incomes are 
significantly more likely to ‘sofa-surf’ with relatives and friends or return 
to the parental home (Dewilde, 2008; Sullivan, 1986) (a situation also 
known as ‘hidden homelessness’).  Shortfalls in household income after 
family breakdown may force families in to poor quality or inappropriate 
housing.  Currently, ‘poor quality’ is defined by the EC (2007) as a 
dwelling for one or more persons which lacks basic amenities such as 
toilets, baths/showers and central heating - though it is questionable 
whether this definition is sufficient for families with children.  In addition 
to standard housing requirements, children and young people have 
specific resource requirements such as access to schools and day care 
facilities and safe areas to play.  Without access to these resources, not 
only the educational prospects but the life prospects of children could be 
severely restricted often leaving them social excluded and isolated (see 
Chapters 3 and 4).  
 
As the European Parliament Directorate General for Research noted in 
1996, housing policy needs to work in tandem with policies targeting 
health and education (Maclennan et al., 1996) and research suggests 
that both stepfamilies and single parent families tend to live in areas with 
fewer community resources, including schools with higher drop-out rates 
(Rodger and Pryor, 1998; Wade and Smart, 2002; Weithoft, Hjern and 
Rosen, 2004).  
 
Although it is important not to treat the consequences of growing up in a 
single parent family as synonymous with the consequences of family 
breakdown findings such as these help to underline the important role 
family characteristics and living arrangements can play in the 
development and long-term prospects of children. 
 
Access to appropriate short-term supported housing after family 
breakdown is important to separated families.  Research suggests that in 
the immediate aftermath of family breakdown, many parents and children 
return to the parental home or stay with relatives or friends (Dewilde, 
2008), sometimes for considerable periods of time.  Without proper 
immediate and long-term support, this can push families with acute 
resource problems after family breakdown into a cycle of unstable, 
temporary housing situations.  Previous research has found that, 
particularly among women, family breakdown is closely connected with 
homelessness and marital breakdown is a key stage on the ‘Homelessness 
Journeys’ framework produced by Reeve et al. (2006) for the UK charity 
CRISIS.  Based on empirical evidence, this framework illustrates how 
homelessness or ‘hidden homelessness’ among mothers and their children 
was often prolonged by lack of immediate, ‘emergency’ housing options 
after the family unit had broken down.  Overall, a significant consequence 
of family breakdown for children is an increased likelihood of growing up 
in families with lower incomes and poorer housing or of entering into a 
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cycle of homelessness or ‘hidden homelessness’, especially in families 
headed by single mothers (Rodgers and Pryor, 1998; Reeve et al., 2006). 
 
These UK findings are similar to the results of studies into the affect of 
marital dissolution in the Netherlands where one of the most likely 
destinations for people who had to move out of the marital home due to 
family breakdown was staying with family or friends (Feijten, 2005; 
Gram-Hanssen and Bech-Danielsen, 2008).  Family breakdown can often 
force people to change their housing situation immediately, 
notwithstanding the costs or benefits of their housing choice.  One study 
of previously cohabitating separated couples in Denmark (Gram-Hanssen 
and Bech-Danielsen, 2008) found that there was a tendency to move into 
a series of temporary, poorer quality housing situations in the aftermath 
of family breakdown due to the interface of a decline in resources and the 
immediate need for new accommodation with market forces, national 
housing policies and trends. The authors suggest that one way of 
preventing parents and children from entering into this cycle of poor living 
arrangements could be to increase expenditure on social or public 
housing, particularly short-term supported housing.  
 
Coupled with alterations to living standards and resources, family 
breakdown could exert an influence over the long-term housing attitudes 
of children and families.  As has been already noted, the circumstances 
within the parental home can shape children and young people’s views on 
housing career moves, such as the decision to leave the parental home 
(De Jong Gierveld et al, 1991; Goldscheider and DaVanzo, 1989; 
Goldscheider and Goldscheider, 1998; Murphy and Wang, 1998; Billari 
and Liefbroder, 2007), and preference of housing tenure.  The effects of 
changes in family living situations - now most commonly caused by family 
breakdown through marital dissolution or parental separation – can have 
negative consequences for some children well beyond the time of change, 
with these sometimes persisting into adulthood (Hawthorne et al., 2003).  
Research shows (Kiernan, 1992; Cherlin et al., 1995) that young people 
who have experienced family breakdown tend to leave the parental home 
earlier than other young people.  For example, Kiernan (1992) uses the 
UK National Child Development Study data up to age 23 to compare 
patterns of leaving home, partnership formation and childbearing in early 
adulthood.  The results show that young women who had experienced the 
breakdown of their parents’ marriage and who were living with a single 
parent or step-parent at age 16 are significantly more likely to have left 
home by age 18 than their peers from intact families.  This association is 
not altered by the introduction of background controls (social class at 
birth and non-verbal ability score at age 11).  They were also more likely 
to have left because of family friction, although this effect was reduced by 
background controls, remaining significant only for women from 
stepfamilies and for the very small number who had lived with a widowed 
single father.  Other key findings in relation to young women were that 
they were more likely to have formed a partnership in their teens, to have 
had a child before the age of 20 and/or to have had an extra-marital 
birth.  For example, the odds of cohabitation in the teenage years were 
three times as high for this group as for girls from intact families.  These 
associations are not altered by the introduction of background controls.  
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In contrast, those who were living in a one-parent family following the 
death of a parent differed little from their peers from two-parent families. 
 
Some differences were observed in the transitional behaviour of young 
men.  For example, while those who had lived in stepfamilies were more 
likely to have left home by age 18 than those from intact families, sons of 
single mothers did not show this propensity and were indeed no more 
likely to have left home at this age than those living with both natural 
parents.  Family friction was an important factor leading to early home 
leaving for boys from stepfamilies and single father families, with odds of 
between three and six times higher than those from intact families.  The 
relationship between family disruption in childhood and adolescence and 
their own experiences of partnership and family formation were weaker 
for men but still important.  As for women, there was no significant 
association between having lost a parent through death and youthful 
partnership formation.  However, there was a strong association for those 
who had experienced the breakdown of their parents’ marriage, with an 
increased risk for young men from stepfamilies of forming partnerships in 
their teens and becoming fathers before the age of 20. 
 
Cherlin et al. (1995) also uses NCDS data up to age 23 to explore 
demographic outcomes for young adults in the UK, comparing individuals 
who had experienced parental divorce with those who had grown up with 
two parents.  The authors are particularly concerned to determine 
whether different outcomes were directly related to divorce or whether 
they reflected problems that had arisen in the family prior to divorce, 
and/or characteristics of the child or family.  The prospective design of the 
NCDS enabled them to control for pre-disruption characteristics and to 
examine in some detail the magnitude of the effect of divorce.  They also 
examine the long-term effects of a child's degree of emotional problems at 
age seven on his or her demographic outcomes in young adulthood and 
briefly discussed two extensions of these analyses:  cohabitation and non-
marital childbearing considered as joint outcomes, and the effects of the 
timing of the parental divorce.  The survey design provided a great deal of 
information about the children at age seven, enabling the authors to 
assemble a range of emotional, cognitive and socio-economic indicators.  
Two indicators of marital disruption were used:  whether the child had 
experienced parental divorce/separation between the ages of seven and 
16 years (175 boys and 208 girls in the age seven subsample experienced 
these events and were interviewed at age 23); and, second, whether a 
parent died during this period (182 boys and 185 girls were included).  
 
The findings show that parental divorce did not make a young person 
significantly less likely to marry by age 23 or to have a child by that age; 
in other words, it did not appear to undermine individuals’ desire to enter 
into long-term commitments.  At the same time, however, parental 
divorce did seem more likely to stimulate a pattern of behaviour 
characterised by early home leaving due to conflict with parents and step-
parents.  For both women and men, the odds of leaving home because of 
friction versus not leaving home were five times greater for those whose 
parents divorced.  In comparison, a parental divorce increased, by about 
half, the odds of leaving home for other reasons (such as getting married 
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or taking a job) versus not leaving home.  Leaving home because of 
friction was in turn associated with earlier sexual activity outside 
marriage, leading in this cohort to a greater likelihood of premarital birth 
and cohabitation by age 23.  Parental death, in contrast, had a 
substantially weaker effect on leaving home because of familial friction, 
on premarital cohabitation, and on premarital birth.   
 
The authors also find that the introduction of pre-disruption characteristics 
into the analysis (behaviour problems, achievement levels, and family 
difficulties that were already present at age seven) does not significantly 
weaken the long-term effects of divorce on demographic behaviour at age 
23.  This finding conflicted with the results of an earlier study based on 
the same cohort between the ages of seven and 11 which had indicated a 
reduction in adverse effects over that interval (Cherlin et al. 1991), 
leading the authors of this later investigation to speculate that divorce 
may have different consequences during middle childhood and early 
adolescence than during young adulthood.  
 
6.5.3  Emotional effects 
Housing arrangements following family breakdown can impact on 
children’s emotional relationship with their parents.  This includes the 
emotional effects of changes in living arrangements and alterations in the 
relationship between parents and children, specifically with regard to 
issues of custody, access and the departure of one or both parents from 
the family home.  In their review of UK interventions and policies 
supporting children of divorcing parents, Hawthorne et al. (2003) found 
that the change in housing situations and the movement out of the family 
home could have a negative effect on children’s well-being and their 
interactions with their parents.  
 
Managing alterations in living arrangements is important for deflecting 
some of the emotional problems that family breakdown can cause for 
children.  One of the key findings of Hawthorne et al.’s (2003) study is 
that there was a noticeable link between the amount that everyday family 
life changed after family breakdown and the intensity of the negative 
emotional effects of family breakdown for children.  In saying this, the 
report also went to some lengths to stress that changes in living 
arrangements did not always damage the emotional well-being of the 
child.  Overall the research finds that, while changes in living 
arrangements after family breakdown may not be a direct cause of 
childhood trauma, without taking the views and emotional needs of 
children into account, these changes could have harmful repercussions for 
childhood well-being.  Investigations into children’s perspectives of family 
breakdown due to marital dissolution indicate that the event can cause 
distress, sadness, anger and self-blame among some young people (Dunn 
et al, 2001; Mitchell, 1985; Pritchard, 1998; Hawthorne et al., 2003), 
feelings which can be compounded by the loss of day-to-day contact with 
non-resident parents.  In a cohort of children in the UK who had 
experienced parental separation and family breakdown, those children 
who retained good contact with both parents felt they had coped well, in 
comparison with those who did not (Walczak and Burns, 1984).  The UK-
based Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children also found that 
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children either expressed positive or no negative feelings towards ‘dual 
citizenship’ or spending equal amounts of time with both parents 
(Hawthorne et al., 2003).  
 
However, research has also highlighted that this relationship was equally 
influenced by the amount or level of conflict between parents (either 
before or after family breakdown) and the effects of changes in the level 
of contact, particularly between fathers and children.  Again, the effect of 
changing housing situations, parental contact and children’s well-being is 
a complex one.  While fathers’ involvement is linked to positive outcomes 
the actual amounts of time spent with each parent seem not to be so 
important as the quality of the relationship (Amato and Gilbreth, 1999; 
Hawthorne et al., 2003).  This could suggest that divided living 
arrangements between parents may not always be an accurate indicator 
of ‘positive’ parent-child relations.  In other words, in terms of children’s 
emotional well-being after marital dissolution or family breakdown, 
changes in living arrangements or contact do not necessarily have a 
negative effect if the changeover is properly managed and mediated.  
 
Similar conclusions were reached by a study of the well-being of children 
in Dutch secondary schools (Dronkers, 1999).  An empirical study 
comparing the well-being of Dutch youth with a sample of over 9,000 
secondary school pupils28 found that conflict between parents had a 
significantly greater impact on children’s well-being than residential 
contact with parents.  In fact, the research suggests that the well-being of 
pupils living in single-mother families is higher than that of pupils living in 
two-parent families with a high level of parental conflict (Dronkers, 1999: 
195).  Like the Hawthorne et al. (2003) study, Dronkers’ analysis 
underlines that although contact with the departed parent (usually the 
father) was important for children’s well-being, the amount of contact had 
less of an impact than the degree of conflict between parents.  
 
This report suggests that a potential way of preventing some of the more 
extreme negative emotional effects of a change in living circumstances 
would be to involve children and young people in the process of 
negotiating new living arrangements.  In saying this, the study stresses 
that, as yet, no evidence has been found that suggests allowing children 
the final say on their post-family breakdown living arrangements is more 
beneficial to their emotional well-being than allowing them make some 
input.  However, overall the findings of this study appear to indicate that, 
in order to off-set some of the more serious emotional damage enforced 
changes in children’s living arrangements due to marital or family 
breakdown can cause, the transition needs to be properly managed and 
mediated.  To this end, it is important that parental conflict is kept to a 
minimum and that the views of children involved are taken into 
consideration.  
 
                                            
28 This sample excluded children under 14 as the researchers ‘were not sure 
pupils of that young age would underestimate the degree of parental conflict 
(there are indications that these pupils underestimate parental conflicts)’ 
(Dronkers, 1999: 200) 
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The impact of changes in the living arrangements of parents – that is, 
from residential to non-residential – have on children also needs to be 
taken into account when negotiating the living arrangements and housing 
situations of children post-family breakdown.  Loss of contact or decline in 
the quality of contact with non-residential parents can have significant 
effect on children’s emotional reactions to family breakdown or union 
dissolution.  Evidence from Hawthorne et al.’s study (2003) implies that 
children who experience marital breakdown often demonstrate a sense of 
‘losing a parent’ and this can magnify the emotional stress union 
dissolution places on them.  In spite of this, the study also went to some 
lengths to highlight that parental residency in the family home was not as 
important as the quality of the contact time between parents and children 
– residential or non-residential.  Again, this suggests that managing the 
transition from one set of living arrangements to another during family 
breakdown effectively is essential to mitigate the more extreme negative 
consequences for children.  
 
 
6.6  Family breakdown, housing and family 
policy 
 
This section examines the types of housing issues present within the EU 
Member States selected for this evaluation and identifies potential policy 
changes to alleviate some of the housing problems faced by children after 
family breakdown.  
 
As the 1996 report (Maclennan et al., 1996) notes, Member States’ 
approaches to housing policy differ sharply.  For example, while Hungary 
lists support for young families with children to buy their own homes, the 
Netherlands provides no housing aid to families (Norris and Shiels, 2004).  
These differences are also reflected in Member States’ attitudes to 
housing provision and stock.  While some EU Member States such as 
Greece, Spain and Malta are explicit in their support for homeownership 
over other tenures, others such as Finland state the aim of housing policy 
is to: 
 
‘Ensure a socially and regionally balanced and stable housing 
market, to eliminate homelessness, to improve the quality of 
housing, to ensure that housing is available at reasonable cost and 
to make it easier for people and families to find housing that 
corresponds to their current housing needs.’  
(cited in Federcasa, 2006: 98) 
 
The Finnish government’s approach mirrors that of countries such as 
Ireland whose housing policy statement outlines that: 
 
‘The aim is to enable all households to have available an affordable 
dwelling of good quality suited to their needs, in a good 
environment and, as far as possible, at the tenure of their choice.’ 
Federcasa (2006: 98) 
 
127 
 
 
Housing policies have a considerable impact on the lives of children and 
families who have experienced family breakdown.  Having a needs-based 
system and a universal housing quality standard could prevent some of 
the more extreme consequences of family breakdown for the living 
conditions and housing prospects of parents and children.  As French 
housing policy states: 
 
Housing policy [in France] is predicted on the assumption, in order 
for each person to be housed according to his/her wishes, action 
must be taken on each link in the housing chain.’ 
Federcasa (2006: 98) 
 
 
Table 6.4 Occupied dwelling stock by tenure (percentage), 2003 
 
Hantrais’ 
Typology 
Countries Owner-
occupation
Rented Other 
(including 
co-
operatives)
 
Defamilialised Denmark 53 40 7 
 Finland 63 34 3 
 Sweden 46 39 15 
 France 56 38 6 
     
Partially  Netherlands 55 45 0 
defamilialised Germany 45 55 0 
 Ireland 82 18 n/a 
 UK 
 
69 31 0 
Familialised Spain 82 11 7 
 Malta 70 26 4 
 
Refamilialised Czech 
Republic* 
 
47 29 24 
Source:  Housing Statistics in the EU, 2004 
Notes:  * 2000 data – 2003 figures not available 
 
One way of ensuring that this aim is achieved, and that already 
disadvantaged parents and children who experience family breakdown do 
not fall into a similar cycle of poor living arrangements, could be to 
increase public expenditure on social or public housing, particularly short-
term supported housing (Reeve et al., 2006; Gram-Hanssen and Bech-
Danielsen, 2008).  
 
In this important respect Member States’ policies appear to follow similar 
lines to Hantrais’ model with countries in the defamilialised and partially 
defamilialised categories having higher rates of public expenditure on 
social housing provision than countries in the familialised and 
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refamilialised categories.  For example, in France and Finland 
(defamilialised) where there are explicit, institutionalised and government 
funded family policies, over four per cent of state budget expenditure is 
directed towards subsidising social housing whereas in countries such as 
Greece and Malta (familialised) where family policy is less developed and 
coordinated, total public expenditure on subsidising social housing 
amounts to less than 0.02 per cent.  The exceptions are the Czech 
Republic and Spain but this could partly be due to the high proportion of 
the population who view housing costs as burdensome (Table 6.5 and 
Figures 6.1 to 6.4).   
 
As Figures 6.1 to 6.4 demonstrate, public housing subsidies as a 
percentage of total public expenditure, state budget expenditure and GDP 
vary widely across the selected twelve Member States ranging from zero 
per cent of both state budget expenditure and GDP in Malta to 4.45 per 
cent of state budget expenditure and 1.63 per cent of GDP in France 
(Federcasa, 2006).  The level, or low level, of public expenditure on social 
housing is particularly an issue in countries where housing costs are a 
specific concern for their populations.  This includes Spain, where less 
than one per cent of GDP is spent on social housing (Federcasa, 2006) 
despite 26.4 per cent of the population viewing housing costs as a heavy 
financial burden (Eurostat, 2007).  In the light of both the European 
Parliament’s 1996 suggestions for improvements in EU Member States’ 
housing policies and the need for affordable housing post-family 
breakdown, these figures could imply that future EU policy initiatives need 
to focus on increasing social housing investment.  
 
There is a close relationship between the housing policy in the twelve 
selected countries and their housing tenure.  Indeed many housing 
policies explicitly refer to the importance of ensuring the availability of a 
tenure-balanced, good quality housing stock.  As was noted earlier in this 
chapter, some of the housing problems experienced by children and 
parents post-family breakdown relate to the stress of moving from one 
tenure to another.  A country which promotes one type of tenure – for 
example owner-occupation - at the expense of others (Gurney, 1999) 
could limit the housing options of these families and push them in to 
much poorer living conditions.  An effective way of preventing this would 
be to maintain a balanced, flexible stock of good quality housing.  An 
example of this is the housing policy of Sweden: 
 
‘The objective of housing policy is to give everyone the opportunity 
to live in good housing at reasonable cost and in stimulating a 
secure environment within sustainable frameworks. The housing 
environment and built environment must help ensure equal and 
dignified living conditions and must, in particular, promote good 
conditions for children and young people. Planning, construction 
and management must be based on ecologically, economically and 
socially sustainable development.’  
Federcasa (2006: 99) 
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Table 6.5: Public housing subsidies expenditure (percentage) 
 
Hantrais 
category 
Country Total public 
expenditure 
 
State budget 
expenditure 
GDP 
Defamilialised Denmark 1.90 3.40 1.00 
 Finland 2.10 4.30 1.00 
 Sweden 1.18 2.20 0.64 
 France 
 
n/a 4.45 1.63 
Partially  Netherlands n/a 3.00 0.60 
defamilialised Germany 0.59 2.41 0.28 
 Ireland 0.20 0.22 0.10 
 UK 
 
n/a n/a n/a 
Familialised Greece 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 Spain n/a 2.83 0.81 
 Malta 
 
0.01 0.00 0.00 
Refamilialised Czech Republic 
 
1.90 2.80 0.90 
Source:  Housing Statistics in the EU 2004/05, Federcasa, 2006; Ministries Responsible for Housing  
Notes:  Data from 2003 is used for Denmark; data are not available for the UK; and only total public expenditure data are presented for 
Germany. 
 
130 
 
Figure 6.1: Public housing subsidies expenditure - Defamilialised 
countries (percentage)  
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Source:  Housing Statistics in the EU 2004/05, Federcasa, 2006; Ministries Responsible 
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Figure 6.2: Public housing subsidies expenditure - Partially 
defamilialised countries (percentage)  
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Figure 6.3: Public housing subsidies expenditure - Familialised 
countries (percentage)  
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Figure 6.4: Public housing subsidies expenditure - Refamilialised 
countries (percentage)  
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6.7  Conclusions 
 
The issues covered in this chapter suggest that family breakdown and 
dissolution can have substantial, long-lasting repercussions for the housing 
situations and living arrangements of children and young people.  A drop in 
household income, market pressures and the lack of affordable housing can 
push post-breakdown households into poor quality or inappropriate housing. 
Without proper mediation, these changes in living arrangements can compound 
the emotional stress family breakdown can have on children and young people.  
Overall, in order to mitigate the damaging effect of family breakdown on the 
housing situations of children, it is important that EU Member States ensure that 
their housing policies are able to provide support for these families at every 
stage of their transition in living arrangements.  In particular, Member State’s 
policies needs to address the housing needs of these families both in terms of 
welfare resources and services, and affordable, good-quality tenure choices.  
 
In addition, this review suggests that there is scope for countries to better align 
their family and housing policies as greater progress in tackling poor child 
outcomes is likely to be achieved if housing policy is more closely integrated 
with family policy.   
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7  Conclusions 
 
 
7.1 Demographic change 
 
This study has discussed literature published in the English language on the 
impact of family breakdown on outcomes for children’s poverty and social 
exclusion, education, health and housing.  Hantrais’ (2004) typology of family 
policy provides a conceptual framework for the review.  
 
Chapter 2 shows that the European Union (EU) has undergone substantial 
changes in regards to family structure, formation and dissolution and fertility 
rates.  The chapter highlights the well documented decline in marriage in most 
EU countries, with the EU15 experiencing a fall in the average number of 
marriages per 1,000 population by nearly 34 per cent between 1960 and 2000 
(Hantrais, 2004:51).  In the defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries 
cohabitation has replaced marriage as the marker of first partnership (Kiernan, 
1999).  As a result the proportion of births outside marriage across Europe has 
been rising steeply since 1980 (Hantrais, 2004:56).  Total divorce rates either 
increased or remained the same across Europe with nearly one divorce for every 
marriage in 2005 and 2006.  More divorce leads to more repartnering which in 
turn can lead to more complex family living arrangements. 
   
These changes have been taking place alongside other profound social changes 
across EU Member States which include changes to the gender balance of work 
and the decline of the male breadwinner model, increasingly ‘flexible’ labour 
markets, ageing populations consequent upon improved healthcare and living 
standards, and declining fertility in many countries.  These demographic trends 
are in turn causing further social and economic changes, for example, longer life 
expectancy and population ageing may provoke changes in attitudes towards 
multigenerational living, and destabilise the contract between generations. All 
these changes impact on the well-being of children. 
 
 
7.1.1  Impact of demographic change on outcomes for 
children 
Chapter 3 shows that households with children are generally at greater risk of 
poverty than the population as a whole.  In 2000, it was estimated that 12 per 
cent of children in the EU25 were living below the poverty line and had been for 
at least two of the three preceding years, compared to nine per cent of the 
overall EU25 population.  Only four of the case study countries had child poverty 
rates lower than those of the total population:  defamilialised Denmark, Finland 
and France; and partially defamilialised Germany.  Denmark and Finland also 
had the lowest rates of persistent poverty for children.  All of the defamilialised 
and partially defamilialised countries had low child poverty risks, with 15 per 
cent or less of its child population living below the poverty line.  The only 
exception was the UK (partially defamilialised) which had one of the highest at-
risk-of-poverty rates for children, with 24 per cent of children living below the 
poverty threshold; and the highest rate of persistent poverty for children at 19 
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per cent.  Alongside the UK, the highest rates were among the familialised and 
refamilialised countries, with roughly a quarter of all children at-risk-of-poverty 
in Poland and Spain. 
 
Chapters 3 – 6 show that children in single parent families and in stepfamilies 
tend to shave poorer outcomes with higher poverty rates, poorer health and 
housing and educational outcomes than those growing up with both biological 
parents.  The vulnerability to poverty of single parent households is 
demonstrated by at-risk-of-poverty rates for 2006.  Thirty-two per cent of single 
parent households in the EU25 were living below the poverty threshold 
compared to 17 per cent of all households with dependent children.  The lowest 
poverty risks were among the defamilialised countries which all had poverty 
rates at or below the EU25 average.  The partially defamilialised countries were 
also at or below the average, with the exception of the UK which had 41 per cent 
of single parent households living below the poverty line.  The only other country 
to have such a high poverty risk was the Czech Republic, which also had a rate 
of 41 per cent.  The familialised and refamilialised countries generally had rates 
above the average with the exception of Poland, which was at the average, and 
Greece, which was just below the average (30 per cent). 
    
The study shows that increased risks of poverty among children in single parent 
families is reinforced by disadvantage at school and poorer health and housing 
outcomes. Chapter 4 shows that, while findings are sensitive to methodology 
(see section 7.1.2 below) children from non-intact families are more likely than 
those living with both their parents to be exposed to risks which represent 
barriers to educational achievement.  These risks are associated with restricted 
access to resources and opportunities caused by low income and poor access to 
employment which may be compounded by stress and anxiety or by working 
arrangements that fail to take account of the additional need for flexibility when 
supporting and raising children alone.  Educational outcomes are of particular 
concern as they are crucial to the future life-prospects of children and young 
people.  
  
Chapter 5 shows a relationship between single parenthood and negative health 
outcomes for children although, once again, these findings are sensitive to 
methodology. Nevertheless, there is evidence of health disadvantages for 
children from non-intact families, although any negative effects of family 
breakdown on children’s health are relative rather than absolute and that a large 
majority of children will be unaffected. 
 
Chapter 6 suggests that family breakdown can have substantial, long-lasting 
adverse repercussions for the housing situations and living arrangements of 
children of single parent families.  A fall in household income, market pressures 
and the lack of affordable housing can push post-breakdown households into 
poor quality or inappropriate housing.  Without effective mediation, these 
changes in living arrangements can compound the emotional stress family 
breakdown can have on children and young people.   
 
The demographic indicators highlighted in Chapter 2 demonstrate, on the one 
hand, the diversity in patterns of family structure, formation and dissolution in 
the different EU member countries, and on the other that family forms are 
changing across the whole of Europe; family breakdown is increasing across the 
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EU with the largest increases in divorce being reported in the refamilialised and 
familialised countries:  Poland, Slovakia and Spain reported increases of 200 per 
cent and Cyprus 100 per cent.  Thus while divorce rates were still small in these 
countries, the prevalence of divorce was increasing rapidly.  As divorce becomes 
more common in the familialised and refamilialised countries more (re-) 
marriages involve divorced persons, with a consequent increase in stepfamilies 
(Hantrais, 2004:61).  At the same time, the distribution of households with three 
or more adults and dependent children decreased between 1996 and 2006, 
marking a general decrease in household size across the EU.  While these trends 
are more advanced in the defamilialised and partially defamilialised countries the 
evidence suggests that the familialised countries are on a similar course, and 
while this trend has reversed in the refamilialised countries as the social 
mechanisms of the Communist era have ben dismantled and replaced by market 
oriented approaches this may be the result of specific and perhaps relatively 
short term historical factors. 
 
These variations highlight the importance of the need for a flexible policy 
response to protect the interests of children in new family forms.  The outcome 
measures reported in chapters 3 – 6 suggest that the policies in place in the 
defamilialised countries are already well- adjusted to meeting the needs of these 
‘new’ family forms and highlight the importance, if reduction of child poverty and 
equal opportunities for children from all types of families is the aim of policy 
makers, of putting in place in countries across the EU a policy framework that 
provides single parents with a ‘work life’ balance, decent family income, and 
support services delivered by professionals and agencies sensitive to the risk of 
poorer outcomes for children due to family breakdown. 
 
7.1.2  Research issues and gaps 
 
The review of the literature on education and health highlights that the findings 
are sensitive to the methodology employed.  For example, the more complex the 
analysis of data, in terms of the multiplicity of variables introduced, the smaller 
the effect of family structure on educational achievement.  In some studies this 
effect disappears altogether, although, in others, significant effects remain.  This 
raises important questions about causation and whether family breakdown per 
se exercises an independent effect upon the achievements of children?  
Similarly, while a relationship between single parenthood and negative health 
outcomes for children may be revealed in a preliminary analysis, it may diminish 
or even disappear when other factors are introduced.   
 
There are gaps in the evidence base, at least for publications in English.  For 
example, there is a lack of European research on educational outcomes for 
children when families are reconstituted through the re-marriage or re-
partnering of the parents.  Findings from the US literature have indicated that 
outcomes for step-children are similar to those for children from single parent 
families (Mclanahan and Sandefur, 1994) and, moreover, that children in stable 
`blended’ families containing both step-children and half-siblings born into the 
new partnership have substantially lower levels of achievement than those living 
with both their birth parents (Ginther and Pollack, 2004).  Given the increasingly 
complex family structures in many European countries, this would appear to be 
an important area for further enquiry. 
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Overall, further research into different experiences of single parenthood is 
needed for a more complete understanding of the effects of family breakdown. 
 
 
7.2  Explanatory frameworks  
 
While the general thrust of the literature – both specific country and comparative 
– is that family breakdown is associated with poorer outcomes for children, there 
is debate about the nature of this link.  Aspects of this debate have been 
touched upon in previous chapters.  Some researchers have argued that the link 
has been overstated and that background features of family life, which often go 
unmeasured, may exercise a greater influence on children’s outcomes than 
family structure per se.  Others believe that there are specific risk factors 
associated with growing up within a non-intact family which exercise a real effect 
upon outcomes.  There is a third type of explanatory framework – perhaps 
better described as a different level of explanation - which considers the extent 
to which differing family policy environments across countries mediate the link 
between family structure and outcomes for children.  This links to a broader 
social policy question about the impact of family policy in equalising 
opportunities for children, both within and between EU member countries. 
 
From a public policy perspective these ‘theoretical’ concerns are paramount.  For 
instance, if family breakdown leads to children moving into poor quality 
accommodation, this in turn may adversely affect their health outcomes.  The 
challenge for the policymaker is whether they should intervene to tackle family 
breakdown, poor quality housing or both.  It may however, be that the 
appropriate role of public policy is to meet the needs of families arising from 
social changes that are taking place not only across Europe but in many other 
parts of the world too, rather than seek to hold back change, which may result in 
policies that fail to match the needs of, and provide opportunities for, children in 
‘new’ family forms. 
 
7.2.1  The effect of family structure may be illusory 
Determining how family structure affects the well-being of children, including 
their educational achievement, is fraught with difficulty because of the 
complexity of variables that might combine to produce the examined effect.  It 
has been noted above that the apparent effects of family structure have in 
several studies been substantially reduced or have even disappeared when 
variables such as parental education and number of siblings have been 
introduced (Ringback et al., 2004).  While research designs may try to maximise 
the number of family characteristics that are controlled for in order to isolate the 
effects of family structure, some may remain inaccessible to scrutiny.  Sandefur 
and Wells (1999), for example, noted that issues such as conflict, alcoholism and 
mental health are difficult to measure and that most studies fail to control for 
their effects.  Their response in their own investigation of family structure and 
educational achievement was to control for family background effects by 
including data from pairs of siblings.  The results revealed smaller effects of 
family structure than if the unmeasured background effects had not been taken 
into account, but the effects were nonetheless found to be statistically 
significant. 
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Ermisch (2003) is concerned that the frequently reported association between 
family structure and children’s achievements might be spurious because of the 
presence of some unmeasured, `true’ causal factor in the backgrounds of 
children growing up in single parent families.  He notes, for example, previous 
research findings which highlighted the importance of genetic factors in divorce, 
suggesting that one half of the variance in latent divorce risk may be attributed 
to parents’ genetic inheritance, mediated by inherited personality characteristics.  
If families are not randomly allocated into different family types but instead are 
differentiated by embedded but often unmeasured characteristics, then the 
validity of comparisons of outcomes for children is undermined.  In order to help 
overcome this problem, Ermisch (2003) also advocated the introduction of 
sibling comparisons, on the assumption that estimates that related differences in 
achievements between siblings to differences in their family structure experience 
would measure the causal impact of childhood family structure on educational 
achievement levels. 
 
The argument that there are embedded differences between different family 
types would appear to draw support from the frequently-reported finding that 
the children of widowed parents do not demonstrate the same negative 
outcomes in terms of educational achievement as children from other single 
parent family structures despite apparently similar pressures on resources and 
time.  Evidence from the US to this effect (Biblarz and Gottainer, 2000) has been 
mirrored in various European studies, including those by Jonsson and Gahler 
(1997), Riala et. al. (2003) and Ringback et al. (2004), suggesting that better 
outcomes for this group may apply in very different social and cultural contexts. 
   
7.2.2  Risk factors within non-intact families 
Another body of opinion proposes that family structure has a real effect on 
children’s outcomes independently of significant background variables, such 
as parental conflict or mental health conditions.  Those who take this view do 
not necessarily believe that single parent families are intrinsically different 
from intact families, rather, that the former are exposed to more risk factors 
that may compromise the well-being of their children.  The literature includes 
references to the following heightened risk factors for children of single parent 
families; 
 
• Reduced economic circumstances.  A sharp decline in the income available to 
single parent families following separation has been identified as a risk factor.  
For example, Ermisch (2003) suggested that expenditure on children is 
typically lower after dissolution and that this will involve a reduced investment 
in the children’s human capital, subsequently reflected in lower educational 
achievement.  Ringback et al. (2004), as noted above, attributed negative 
educational outcomes to a lack of household resources, as indicated by social 
assistance payments and housing situation. 
 
• Downward social mobility.  Adverse changes in social status following the 
transition from two-parent to one-parent family structures have been identified 
as a risk factor.  For example, Jonsson and Gahler (1997) found that 
downward social mobility among single parent families was a more important 
causal factor in relation to children’s educational outcomes than absolute 
economic deprivation 
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Parental time constraints.  It has been suggested that stress, reduced 
circumstances and pressure to work have limited the time that single parents 
are able to devote to their children’s development, with adverse consequences 
for their outcomes.   
 
• Reduced access to the labour market for single mothers.  Several studies - for 
example, Esping-Andersen (2008), Voegeli and Willenbacher (1993) – have 
found that access to employment for single mothers improved the life chances 
of their children.  Where access is restricted through discrimination or lack of 
flexibility, or where the mother is poorly qualified, children’s outcomes may be 
reduced.  The demands of employment will, however, increase the pressures 
on parental time, indicating a need for employment practices that recognise 
the need for single parents in particular to be able to harmonise their working 
hours with their children’s nursery and school routines and allow mothers time 
with their children. 
 
• Continuing parental conflict.  The harmful effect of parental conflict leading up 
to divorce, with short and long-term consequences for children’s educational 
and health outcomes has been documented in several studies – for example, 
Pitketty (2003) and Dronkers (1999).  Where parental conflict persists post-
divorce, it seems likely that this effect will be heightened (see Dronkers, 
1999). 
 
Individual studies have emphasised different risks and there appears to be little 
consensus about which are the most critical.  In any case, it is likely that single 
parent families will vary in their exposure to risk, with some benefiting from 
protective factors, such as maternal education and higher household incomes 
(Riala et al., 2003), while others are affected by an adverse combination of 
circumstances.  This highlights the challenge inherent in family policy of 
developing a programme of support which responds flexibly and effectively to the 
particular vulnerabilities of single parent families.  In terms of service delivery, it 
implies a need for more personalised services, tailored to the needs of individual 
parents. 
 
7.2.3  The role of family policy 
Whatever the precise nature of the association between growing up in a non-
intact family and poorer outcomes, the fact that such an association has been 
repeatedly demonstrated has significant implications for public policy, raising 
questions about how the family might best be supported in order to promote 
children’s development.  In the context of the European Union, there is an 
important issue about the extent to which children’s well-being is converging 
across the Member States.  Micklewright and Stewart (1999) argued that 
convergence has too often been measured by a handful of macro-economic 
indicators and that information about quality of life has been neglected.  They 
pleaded for better and more consistent monitoring of child welfare across Europe 
so that disparities between levels of well-being of children in different countries 
might become more visible and be seen as a priority for political action.  
 
In this context, national family policy may be considered an important 
intervening variable and several studies have focused on the extent to which it 
explains observed differences between countries in the levels of well-being and 
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success achieved by children from non-intact families.  Hantrais (2004) notes 
that family policies differ substantially from country to country, creating a 
variety of legal statuses and social settings for children from one-parent families.  
The efficiency and effectiveness of these policies are particularly difficult to 
assess, since outcomes may be intended or unintended, wanted or unwanted, 
direct or indirect, short or long term.  Nonetheless, these policies generate rights 
to public and private transfer payments, and give access to the labour market, 
the educational system, childcare and other supports for parenthood.  Countries 
have developed varying policies that suite their economic, legal, and social 
contexts.   
 
Voegeli and Willenbacher (1993) introduced the notion of the `social placement’ 
of children – created by the conditions of children’s personal development and 
their protection from deficits arising from their upbringing – and argue that while 
this is closely bound up with resources within the family and the mother’s 
aspirations for her child, it is also decisively linked to the `welfare mix’ - the 
blend of market, state and household resources and the possibilities for 
independent action that these contain.  They hypothesised that if single mothers 
were enabled effectively to combine childrearing with labour market 
participation, this would exert a positive influence upon the social placement of 
their children.  Conversely, they anticipated that downward mobility for the 
children of single parents would occur where deficits in the social and cultural 
infrastructure partially excluded single parents from the resources necessary for 
the effective social placement of their children. 
 
They also argue that family policy should include forms of social security 
payments which encourage the integration of single mothers into the labour 
market, an infrastructure which helps mothers to combine work and childcare, 
properly enforced child support payments, and equal access to the educational 
system for all children.  This broadly conforms to the defamilialised family policy 
environments characteristic of Denmark, Finland, France and Sweden among our 
case study countries.  
 
A related idea is that policy should be ‘child-centred’.  How this notion is 
translated into national policies would vary across the typology.  Nevertheless, it 
provides a benchmark to assess not only family policy but also social security 
and labour market policies.  Countries could be encouraged, as part of their 
policymaking process, to formally assess the ‘child centeredness’ of social and 
economic policies.  
 
7.3  Paid work is not sufficient by itself 
 
It is difficult to understand changing family forms and structure without 
examining changes in the relationship between changing family life and paid 
work.  Chapter 3 shows that the prevalence of joblessness among single parent 
families is a highly gendered phenomenon.  Single parents are predominantly 
female, with single mothers representing nine out of 10 single parents in the EU 
(see Table 1.7).  Not only do mothers struggle to balance work and care 
responsibilities, but the wages they can command in the labour market are on 
average lower than those of men (EC, 2006: 11).  Therefore, single mothers are 
most likely to face difficulties in finding jobs that are satisfactory enough for 
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them to give up welfare benefits, in countries where such benefits are available 
(Brodolini, 2007: 31).  A further consideration is the extent to which employers 
will accommodate workers with children.  Single fathers also face some of these 
issues.  Although single fathers have higher employment rates than single 
mothers, they tend to have lower employment rates than other men (EC, 
2006:11).  
 
As an OECD (2007:4) working paper observes:  
 
‘The fact that all countries with very low child poverty rates … combine 
low levels of family joblessness and effective redistribution policies 
supports the view that successful anti-poverty strategies should seek a 
balanced approach combining improved benefits where necessary and 
improved incentives to work.’   
 
While targeting support towards children and families (particularly single parent 
families) is a necessary feature of a poverty reduction scheme, it is not 
sufficient.  What is required is an overall policy approach which addresses 
underlying inequalities (Frazer and Marlier, 2007:63).   
 
Gender equality is at the heart of child centred policies.  Women are 
discriminated to a greater or lesser extent in almost all aspects of their lives 
across the EU member countries with lower average wages and salaries and 
career opportunities restricted by inappropriate working arrangements.  The 
findings from this review suggest that those countries that have policies to 
support greater gender equality also provide better outcomes for children, 
including children from single parent families.  However, even in some of the 
defamilialised countries outcomes for children from single parent families, 
although better than in the other groupings, are not as good as for children in 
those countries overall which suggested that there is room in these countries for 
further measures to improve the opportunities and outcomes for children who 
live in single parent families.  
 
The review has offered some insights into the extent to which outcomes for 
children in different countries are mediated by specific family policy 
environments, which offer varying degrees of support and protection to different 
types of families.  The complexity of the relationship between the variables 
makes it difficult to identify policy recommendations.  Nonetheless, analysts 
have proposed a range of measures including: 
 
• Provision of affordable child/day care in order provide a safe environment for 
children and help parents into paid work, which in turn would enable them to 
improve their earnings and hence their children’s health and well-being. 
 
• A related proposal is that EU Member States ensure that their housing 
policies are able to provide support for these families experiencing family 
breakdown at every stage of their transition in living arrangements.  In 
particular, Member State’s policies needs to address the housing needs of 
these families both in terms of welfare resources and services, and 
affordable, good-quality tenure choices.   In some instances it may entail 
upgrading the housing stock (not least as a route to improving children’s 
health).  
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• Providing appropriate social support for single mothers, in particular for 
frontline staff and professionals in relevant agencies to be sensitive to (sub-) 
groups that are most likely to be at risk of poor outcomes as a consequence 
of family breakdown.   
 
• Increased financial welfare benefits, in particular in those countries that 
provide inadequate benefits and educational opportunities especially for 
young single mothers with poor educational attainment.  There is a 
reasonably convincing body of evidence that the redistributive welfare 
strategies, generous childcare support and equal access to the labour market 
produce better outcomes for children.  While there are some indications that 
family and community networks in familialised and refamilialised countries 
provide a degree of protection from economic stress it is equally possible that 
they put additional financial pressure on to already poor families and create 
an environment in which the choices available to single parents are dictated 
by conservative social norms.   
 
Underpinning a number of these proposals is the recognition that simply 
promoting employment for single parents is not on its own an adequate policy 
response.  Welfare to work policies that are not supported by policies to 
guarantee job security, ‘family friendly’ working arrangements and decent wages 
on which to raise children and opportunities for skill enhancement and career 
development run the risk of coercing women in to poorly paid work that is 
damaging to both their own and their children’s welfare. 
 
Findings from the review suggest that the defamilialised approach on balance 
provides best outcomes for children in general including children who have been 
affected by family breakdown.  Although, to be effective policy can not be 
‘parachuted in’ but must take account of both opportunities and constraints 
within national policy environments there are nevertheless opportunities within 
the EU for policy learning for countries to improve the outcomes for children 
affected by family breakdown. 
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Annex A  Chapter 2 Tables 
 
 
Eurostat Notes: 
 
: Not available 
b Break in series 
e Estimated value 
i See explanatory text 
p Provisional value 
s Eurostat estimate 
u Unreliable or uncertain data 
 
Eurostat country abbreviations:   
 
be Belgium  
bg Bulgaria  
cz Czech Republic  
dk Denmark  
de Germany  
ee Estonia  
ie Ireland  
gr Greece  
es Spain  
fr France  
it Italy  
cy Cyprus  
lv Latvia 
lt Lithuania 
lu Luxembourg  
hu Hungary 
mt Malta 
nl Netherlands 
at Austria 
pl Poland 
pt Portugal 
ro Romania 
si Slovenia 
sk Slovakia 
fi Finland 
se Sweden 
uk United Kingdom 
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Table A.1: Population, by country, on January 1, 1987, 1997 and 2007 
 
Typology
Population, 
1987
Population, 
1997
Population, 
2007
Percentage 
rate of 
change, 
1987 & 2007
Percentage 
rate of 
change, 
1997 & 2007
Defamilialised Denmark 5,124,794 5,275,121 5,444,242 6.2% 3.2%
Finland 4,925,644 5,132,320 5,276,955 7.1% 2.8%
Sweden 8,381,519 8,844,499 9,113,257 8.7% 3.0%
France : 59,726,386 63,392,140 : 6.1%
Luxembourg 369,500 416,850 476,187 28.9% 14.2%
Belgium 9,864,751 10,170,226 10,584,534 7.3% 4.1%
Partially 
Defamilialised Austria 7,572,852 7,964,966 8,298,923 9.6% 4.2%
Germany 77,780,338 82,012,162 82,314,906 5.8% 0.4%
Netherlands 14,615,125 15,567,107 16,357,992 11.9% 5.1%
Ireland 3,545,263 3,654,955 4,312,526 21.6% 18.0%
UK 56,743,897 58,239,312 60,816,701 7.2% 4.4%
Familialised Italy 56,594,487 56,876,364 59,131,287 4.5% 4.0%
Portugal 10,034,846 10,072,542 10,599,095 5.6% 5.2%
Spain 38,586,591 39,525,438 44,474,631 15.3% 12.5%
Greece 9,985,326 10,744,649 11,171,740 11.9% 4.0%
Cyprus 550,888 666,313 778,684 41.4% 16.9%
Malta 343,334 373,958 407,810 18.8% 9.1%
Refamilialised Bulgaria 8,966,462 8,340,936 7,679,290 -14.4% -7.9%
Czech Rep. 10,344,119 10,309,137 10,287,189 -0.6% -0.2%
Estonia 1,546,304 1,405,996 1,342,409 -13.2% -4.5%
Latvia 2,612,068 2,444,912 2,281,305 -12.7% -6.7%
Lithuania 3,597,439 3,588,013 3,384,879 -5.9% -5.7%
Hungary 10,621,121 10,301,247 10,066,158 -5.2% -2.3%
Poland 37,571,771 38,639,341 38,125,479 1.5% -1.3%
Romania 22,895,058 22,581,862 21,565,119 -5.8% -4.5%
Slovenia 1,985,486 1,986,989 2,010,377 1.3% 1.2%
Slovakia 5,208,708 5,378,932 5,393,637 3.6% 0.3%
EU27 466,049,471 478,630,165 495,087,452 6.2% 3.4%
Base:  Population  
Number: EU27 
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, ‘Population on 1. 
January’, demo_gind 
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Table A.2: Population, by country, as a percentage of EU27 population, 
1987, 1997 and 2007 
  
Typology (%) 1987 (%) 1997 (%) 2007
Difference in 
percentage 
share, 1987 
& 2007
Difference in 
percentage 
share, 1997 
& 2007
Defamilialised Denmark 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0
Finland 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0
Sweden 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.0 0.0
France 11.9 12.1 12.8 0.9 0.7
Luxembourg 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Belgium 2.1 2.1 2.1 0.0 0.0
Partially 
Defamilialised Austria 1.6 1.7 1.7 0.1 0.0
Germany 16.7 17.1 16.6 -0.1 -0.5
Netherlands 3.1 3.3 3.3 0.2 0.1
Ireland 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.1
UK 12.2 12.2 12.3 0.1 0.1
Familialised Italy 12.1 11.9 11.9 -0.2 0.1
Portugal 2.2 2.1 2.1 0.0 0.0
Spain 8.3 8.3 9.0 0.7 0.7
Greece 2.1 2.2 2.3 0.1 0.0
Cyprus 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
Malta 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Refamilialised Bulgaria 1.9 1.7 1.6 -0.4 -0.2
Czech Rep. 2.2 2.2 2.1 -0.1 -0.1
Estonia 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.0
Latvia 0.6 0.5 0.5 -0.1 -0.1
Lithuania 0.8 0.8 0.7 -0.1 -0.1
Hungary 2.3 2.2 2.0 -0.2 -0.1
Poland 8.1 8.1 7.7 -0.4 -0.4
Romania 4.9 4.7 4.4 -0.6 -0.4
Slovenia 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
Slovakia 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0
EU27 100 100 100  
Base:  EU27 population  
Number: EU27 
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, ‘Population as a 
Percentage of EU27 Population’, demo_gind 
145 
 
Table A.3: Total live births, by country, 1987, 1997 and 2007 
 
Typology
Live 
births, 
1987
Live 
births, 
1997
Live 
births, 
2007
Percentage 
rate of 
change, 1987 
& 2007
Percentage 
rate of 
change, 1997 
& 2007
Defamilialised Denmark 56,221 67,648 64,082 14.0% -5.3%
Finland 59,827 59,329 58,729 -1.8% -1.0%
Sweden 104,699 90,502 107,421 2.6% 18.7%
France : 758,114 816,500 : 7.7%
Luxembourg 4,238 5,503 5,477 29.2% -0.5%
Belgium 117,334 116,213 120,663 2.8% 3.8%
Partially 
Defamilialised Austria 86,503 84,045 76,250 -11.9% -9.3%
Germany 867,969 812,173 682,700 -21.3% -15.9%
Netherlands 186,667 192,443 180,882 -3.1% -6.0%
Ireland 58,433 52,775 70,623 20.9% 33.8%
UK 775,405 726,622 770,651 -0.6% 6.1%
Familialised Italy 551,539 534,461 563,236 2.1% 5.4%
Portugal 123,179 113,047 102,492 -16.8% -9.3%
Spain 426,782 369,035 488,335 14.4% 32.3%
Greece 106,401 102,038 110,048 3.4% 7.9%
Cyprus 10,337 9,275 8,529 -17.5% -8.0%
Malta 5,314 4,848 3,871 -27.2% -20.2%
Refamilialised Bulgaria 116,672 64,125 75,349 -35.4% 17.5%
Czech Rep. 130,921 90,657 114,632 -12.4% 26.4%
Estonia 25,086 12,577 15,775 -37.1% 25.4%
Latvia 42,135 18,830 23,273 -44.8% 23.6%
Lithuania 59,360 37,812 32,346 -45.5% -14.5%
Hungary 125,840 100,350 97,600 -22.4% -2.7%
Poland 607,790 412,635 387,873 -36.2% -6.0%
Romania 383,199 236,891 214,728 -44.0% -9.4%
Slovenia 25,592 18,165 19,636 -23.3% 8.1%
Slovakia 84,006 59,111 54,424 -35.2% -7.9%
EU27 5,909,277 5,117,878 5,266,125 -10.9% 2.9%  
Base:  Live Births 
Number: EU27 
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, ‘Live Births’, demo_gind 
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Table A.4: Persons aged 0-14, average population by county, 1996 and 2006 
 
Typology Country
Persons 
aged 0-14
Total 
population
Proportion of 
population 
aged 0-14
Persons 
aged 0-14
Total 
population
Proportion of 
population 
aged 0-14
Percentage 
rate of 
change, 1996 
& 2006
Percentage 
difference, 
1996 & 2006
Defamilialised Denmark 928,314 5,263,074 17.6% 1,015,017 5,437,272 18.7% 9.3% 1.0%
Finland 970,169 5,124,573 18.9% 904,043 5,266,268 17.2% -6.8% -1.8%
Sweden 1,663,395 8,840,998 18.8% 1,555,182 9,080,505 17.1% -6.5% -1.7%
Belgium 1,814,112 10,156,637 17.9% 1,796,916 10,547,958 17.0% -0.9% -0.8%
Luxembourg 76,756 414,225 18.5% 86,892 472,637 18.4% 13.2% -0.1%
France 11,648,626 59,624,342 19.5% 11,738,421 63,195,457 18.6% 0.8% -1.0%
Group Avg 19.1% Group Avg 18.2% 0.0% -0.9%
Germany 13,212,867 81,914,831 16.1% 11,545,619 82,376,451 14.0% -12.6% -2.1%
Austria 1,410,822 7,959,017 17.7% 1,303,701 8,282,424 15.7% -7.6% -2.0%
UK 11,287,462 58,166,950 19.4% 10,737,520 60,622,964 17.7% -4.9% -1.7%
Netherlands 2,854,587 15,530,498 18.4% 2,971,600 16,346,101 18.2% 4.1% -0.2%
Ireland 856,718 3,637,510 23.6% 869,767 4,261,827 20.4% 1.5% -3.1%
Group Avg 17.7% Group Avg 16.0% -7.4% -1.8%
Familialised Italy 8,284,616 56,860,281 14.6% 8,303,032 58,941,499 14.1% 0.2% -0.5%
Greece 1,817,594 10,709,173 17.0% 1,595,018 11,148,460 14.3% -12.2% -2.7%
Spain 6,371,182 39,478,186 16.1% 6,400,112 44,116,441 14.5% 0.5% -1.6%
Portugal 1,741,108 10,057,861 17.3% 1,640,935 10,584,344 15.5% -5.8% -1.8%
Cyprus 161,714 661,323 24.5% 140,469 772,549 18.2% -13.1% -6.3%
Malta 80,070 372,687 21.5% 68,983 406,408 17.0% -13.8% -4.5%
Group Avg 15.6% Group Avg 14.4% -1.7% -1.2%
Refamilialised Latvia 497,446 2,457,222 20.2% 323,506 2,287,948 14.1% -35.0% -6.1%
Lithuania 774,583 3,601,613 21.5% 549,259 3,394,082 16.2% -29.1% -5.3%
Bulgaria 1,459,437 8,362,826 17.5% 1,039,484 7,699,020 13.5% -28.8% -3.9%
Hungary 1,841,606 10,311,238 17.9% 1,541,549 10,071,370 15.3% -16.3% -2.6%
Estonia 286,631 1,415,594 20.2% 201,087 1,343,547 15.0% -29.8% -5.3%
Romania 4,504,304 22,619,004 19.9% 3,339,093 21,587,666 15.5% -25.9% -4.4%
Czech Rep. 1,867,970 10,315,241 18.1% 1,490,423 10,269,134 14.5% -20.2% -3.6%
Slovakia 1,180,093 5,373,361 22.0% 882,466 5,391,409 16.4% -25.2% -5.6%
Poland 8,562,112 38,624,370 22.2% 6,105,768 38,141,267 16.0% -28.7% -6.2%
Slovenia 354,433 1,988,628 17.8% 282,151 2,006,868 14.1% -20.4% -3.8%
Group Avg 20.3% Group Avg 15.4% -26.1% -4.9%
EU 86,508,727 479,841,263 18.0% 78,428,013 494,051,876 15.9% -9.3% -2.2%
1996 2006
Partially 
Defamilialised
 
Base:  Total Population  
Number:  EU27 
Source: Eurostat 2008, 'Average population by sex and five-year age groups', demo_ppavg 
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Table A.5: Persons living as children in parental home, 2001 
Typology
Less than 
5 years
Between 
5 and 9 
years
Between 
10 and 14 
years
Between 
15 and 19 
years
Between 
20 and 24 
years
Total persons 
living as 
children in 
parental home 
(0-24)
Total persons 
living as 
children in 
parental home 
(all ages)
Total 
population 
living in 
households
Percentage of total 
household population 
living as children in 
parental home (0-24)
Percentage of total 
household 
population living as 
children in parental 
home (all ages)
Defamilialised Denmark 335,385 344,621 303,437 243,004 85,322 1,311,769 1,311,769 5,349,212 24.5% 24.5%
Finland 288,780 322,684 313,878 292,926 109,485 1,327,753 1,437,863 5,181,115 25.6% 27.8%
Belgium 548,734 583,982 606,660 569,753 429,032 2,738,161 3,118,762 10,296,350 26.6% 30.3%
Luxembourg 26,796 26,998 25,254 22,522 16,487 118,057 134,826 439,539 26.9% 30.7%
France 3,514,141 3,631,924 3,768,456 3,506,070 1,838,918 16,259,509 17,844,369 58,513,700 27.8% 30.5%
Group Avg 27.3% 29.9%
Germany 3,842,400 3,948,100 4,641,300 4,275,300 2,443,700 19,150,800 21,008,100 82,276,900 23.3% 25.5%
Austria 405,606 463,797 466,114 450,456 285,892 2,071,865 2,424,805 8,032,926 25.8% 30.2%
UK 3,450,745 3,694,035 3,794,485 3,096,371 1,538,984 15,574,620 17,277,931 58,789,200 26.5% 29.4%
Netherlands 992,860 988,338 969,873 836,728 478,845 4,266,644 4,577,631 15,985,538 26.7% 28.6%
Ireland 250,735 251,477 275,072 285,729 202,350 1,265,363 1,470,819 3,851,905 32.9% 38.2%
Group Avg 25.1% 27.7%
Familialised Italy 2,596,799 2,660,222 2,784,313 2,890,053 2,886,230 13,817,617 18,633,027 56,995,744 24.2% 32.7%
Greece 475,609 498,471 538,284 571,956 506,587 2,590,907 3,314,411 10,628,113 24.4% 31.2%
Spain 1,862,086 1,852,876 2,042,073 2,308,526 2,555,146 10,620,707 14,072,750 40,847,371 26.0% 34.5%
Portugal 530,612 525,613 563,582 640,476 557,186 2,817,469 3,395,799 10,356,117 27.2% 32.8%
Cyprus 42,509 51,610 52,907 52,158 34,570 233,754 260,015 689,565 33.9% 37.7%
Group Avg 25.2% 33.2%
Refamilialised Latvia 59,865 99,863 141,608 130,339 85,451 517,126 672,173 2,377,383 21.8% 28.3%
Lithuania 175,682 222,395 263,351 157,532 0 818,960 818,960 3,483,972 23.5% 23.5%
Bulgaria 311,727 372,086 484,529 443,170 315,358 1,926,870 2,234,217 7,904,094 24.4% 28.3%
Hungary 481,510 569,897 599,954 548,094 484,110 2,683,565 3,212,458 10,198,315 26.3% 31.5%
Estonia 59,049 76,520 102,667 84,404 40,190 362,830 410,721 1,370,052 26.5% 30.0%
Romania 1,063,028 1,100,150 1,494,247 1,395,441 997,995 6,050,861 7,014,576 21,680,974 27.9% 32.4%
Czech Rep. 440,172 557,840 641,521 649,857 570,445 2,859,835 3,328,709 10,230,060 28.0% 32.5%
Slovakia 254,113 319,956 384,292 412,234 322,279 1,692,874 1,982,284 5,379,455 31.5% 36.8%
Poland 1,848,310 2,244,649 2,713,843 3,077,542 2,180,000 12,064,344 14,244,969 38,230,080 31.6% 37.3%
Slovenia : : : 126,719 125,283 : 695,426 1,964,036 N/A 35.4%
Group Avg 28.7% 33.7%
EU Avg 26.3% 30.8%
Partially 
Defamilialised
 
Base:  Households  
Number: 25 EU countries (Sweden and Malta data not available)  
Source: Eurostat 2008, 'Population by sex, age and type of household and household status', cens_nhtype 
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Table A.6: Percentage change in the number of private households 
(000s), 1997 and 2001 
 
Typology 1997 2001
Percentage 
rate of 
change
Defamilialised Luxembourg 159 172 8.2%
France 23728 24523 3.4%
Belgium 4147 4278 3.2%
Denmark 2407 2456 2.0%
Finland 2326 2382 2.4%
Sweden 4567 4576 0.2%
Group Avg. 2.8%
Ireland 1192 1291 8.3%
Austria 3174 3300 4.0%
Netherlands 6638 6889 3.8%
UK 24700 25564 3.5%
Germany 36787 37711 2.5%
Group Avg. 3.1%
Familialised Spain 12368 13281 7.4%
Greece 3875 3993 3.0%
Italy 21451 21967 2.4%
Portugal 3310 3391 2.4%
Group Avg. 4.0%
EU15 150829 155773 3.3%
Partially 
Defamilialised
 
Base:  Private Households  
Number: EU15  
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, 'Number of private  
households (in 000s)', ilc_hlc_hh01 
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Table A.7: Average number of persons per private household, 1993-
2003 
 
Typology 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Defamilialised Denmark : u : u : u : u : u : : : : : 2.2
Finland : : : u : u : u : u : u : : : 2.2
Sweden : : : u : u : u : : : : : :
France 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
Luxembourg 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5
Belgium 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
Group Avg. 2003 2.4
Austria : : 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
Germany 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1
Netherlands 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Ireland 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3 : : : : : :
UK 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3
Group Avg. 2003 2.3
Familialised Italy 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
Portugal 3.1 3 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8
Spain 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3 3 3 2.9
Greece 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6
Cyprus : : : : : : 3 3 3 3 3.0
Group Avg. 2003 2.8
Refamilialised Bulgaria : : : : : : : : 2.8 2.8 2.7
Czech Rep. : : : : 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5
Estonia : : : : 2 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6
Latvia : : : : : : : : 2.4 2.8 2.8
Lithuania : : : : : : : : : 3 2.9
Hungary : : : 3.4 3.4 : : 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6
Malta : : : : : : : 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0
Poland : : : : 2.5 : : : 3.1 3.1 3.1
Romania : : : : 3 3 3 2.9 3 2.9 2.8
Slovenia : : : 2.9 2.9 : : 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6
Slovakia : : : : : 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1
Group Avg. 2003 2.8
EU25 : : : : : : : 2.5 e 2.4 e 2.4 e 2.4 e
Partially 
Defamilialised
Base:  Private Household 
Number: EU25 
Source: Eurostat 2008, General and Regional Statistics, 'Average number of 
persons per private household', CDB10000 
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Table A.8: Distribution among total population:  households with 
dependent children 
 
Typology 1996 2000 2001 2006
Percentage 
Difference, 
1996 & 2006
Percentage 
Difference, 
2000 & 2006 1996 2000 2001 2006
Defamilialised Denmark : : : 48 : :
Finland 52 50 50 48 -4 -2 bi
Sweden : : : 52 : :
France 58 57 55 54 -4 -3 bi
Luxembourg 57 46 47 57 0 11
Belgium 56 56 55 51 -5 -5
Partially 
Defamilialised Austria 54 53 53 50 -4 -3
Germany 46 46 : 46 0 0
Netherlands 49 50 50 51 2 1 bi i
Ireland 69 65 68 63 -6 -2
UK 50 48 48 48 -2 0 bi
Familialised Italy 55 53 52 50 -5 -3
Portugal 64 62 61 57 -7 -5 p
Spain 64 59 57 52 -12 -7
Greece 56 54 53 49 -7 -5
Cyprus : : : 64 : :
Malta : : : 57 : : p
Refamilialised Czech Rep. : : 55 52 : : i
Estonia : 57 57 56 : -1 i i
Latvia : 57 : 58 : 1 i
Lithuania : 64 63 62 : -2 i i
Hungary : 58 60 56 : -2 i i
Poland : 70 70 62 : -8 i i
Romania : 66 66 : : : i i
Slovenia : 63 62 58 : -5 i i
Slovakia : : : 61 : :
EU25 : : 55 52 : : is s
EU15 54 52 53 50 -4 -2 s s is s
Notes
Base:  Total Population 
Number: EU25 (plus Romania) 
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, 'Distribution of population 
by household types', ilc_ov19 
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Table A.9: Households (with no other person outside the family nucleus) which have resident children less than 
25 years, 2001 
Typology
Single 
father with 
children
Proportion 
of total
Single 
mother 
with 
children
Proportion 
of total
Single 
parent with 
children
Proportion 
of total
Married 
couple
Proportion 
of total
Cohabiting 
couple
Proportion 
of total
Two adults 
with 
children
Proportion 
of total
Total # of 
households 
(with no other 
person outside 
the family 
nucleus)
Defamilialised Denmark 13,566 1.0% 92,847 6.8% 106,413 7.8% 975,336 71.4% 284,780 20.8% 1,260,116 92.2% 1,366,529
Finland 26,338 2.0% 147,986 11.2% 174,324 13.2% 901,556 68.4% 242,703 18.4% 1,144,259 86.8% 1,318,583
France 238,180 1.6% 1,515,395 10.0% 1,753,575 11.6% 13,406,747 88.4% : : 13,406,747 88.4% 15,160,322
Group Avg 1.6% 9.8% 11.4% 85.6% 3.0% 88.6%
Avg not incl. France 19.6%
Partially 
Defamilialised Netherlands 58,872 1.3% 323,470 7.3% 382,342 8.7% 3,361,352 76.2% 666,470 15.1% 4,027,822 91.3% 4,410,164
Germany 341,800 1.5% 1,868,000 8.1% 2,209,800 9.6% 18,741,500 81.1% 2,104,400 9.1% 20,845,900 90.2% 23,103,500 *
UK 318,883 2.1% 2,071,703 13.4% 2,390,586 15.4% 11,067,096 71.5% 2,019,090 13.0% 13,086,186 84.6% 15,476,772
Group Avg 1.7% 9.9% 11.6% 77.2% 11.1% 88.3%
Italy 322,185 2.1% 1,593,829 10.5% 1,916,014 12.7% 12,714,261 84.1% 488,920 3.2% 13,203,181 87.3% 15,119,195
Familialised Portugal 41,998 1.5% 268,942 9.7% 310,940 11.2% 2,307,929 82.8% 167,452 6.0% 2,475,381 88.8% 2,786,321
Greece 43,617 1.8% 238,849 9.7% 282,466 11.5% 2,105,532 85.9% 63,930 2.6% 2,169,462 88.5% 2,451,928
Spain 209,023 2.3% 938,719 10.3% 1,147,742 12.5% 7,559,180 82.6% 440,123 4.8% 7,999,303 87.5% 9,147,045
Cyprus 1,386 0.8% 10,272 6.2% 11,658 7.0% 151,276 91.5% 2,478 1.5% 153,754 93.0% 165,412
Group Avg 2.1% 10.3% 12.4% 83.7% 3.9% 87.6%
Refamilialised Bulgaria 33,141 1.9% 157,466 9.2% 190,607 11.1% 1,423,356 83.1% 99,367 5.8% 1,522,723 88.9% 1,713,330
Czech Rep. 82,651 3.0% 461,534 16.6% 544,185 19.5% 2,119,818 76.1% 120,522 4.3% 2,240,340 80.5% 2,784,525
Estonia 5,969 1.8% 71,182 21.3% 77,151 23.0% 202,171 60.4% 55,410 16.6% 257,581 77.0% 334,732
Lithuania 13,902 1.6% 142,441 16.8% 156,343 18.5% 641,608 75.8% 48,184 5.7% 689,792 81.5% 846,135
Hungary 51,278 2.0% 365,208 14.0% 416,486 15.9% 1,949,926 74.6% 247,715 9.5% 2,197,641 84.1% 2,614,127
Poland 209,105 2.2% 1,609,098 16.9% 1,818,203 19.0% 7,547,580 79.0% 182,110 1.9% 7,729,690 81.0% 9,547,893
Romania 111,305 2.0% 624,508 11.2% 735,813 13.2% 4,510,994 80.7% 344,383 6.2% 4,855,377 86.8% 5,591,190
Slovenia 11,836 2.4% 76,883 15.6% 88,719 18.0% 368,059 74.6% 36,888 7.5% 404,947 82.0% 493,666
Slovakia 20,512 2.1% 132,874 13.4% 153,386 15.4% 818,813 82.4% 21,708 2.2% 840,521 84.6% 993,907
Group Avg 2.2% 14.6% 16.8% 78.6% 4.6% 83.2%
EU 1.9% 11.0% 12.9% 80.5% 6.6% 87.1%
Avg not incl. France 7.6%
EU (minus 
Bulgaria) 1.9% 11.0% 12.9% 80.4% 6.6% 87.1%
Avg not incl. France 7.6%  
* Numbers for Germany are slightly off 
 
Base:  Households (with no other person out of family nucleus) which have children under 25 years  
Number: 20 EU countries (no data for Sweden, Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, Ireland, Malta, and Latvia)  
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, 'Family nuclei by type, number of resident children in the  
family, current economic activity of parents and presence of other persons in the household', cens_nhmb 
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Table A.10: Single parents and adults in couples with children under age 25 in private households, 2001 
Typology
Single 
father with 
children
Proportion 
of total
Single 
mother 
with 
children
Proportion of 
total
Single 
parent with 
children
Proportion 
of total
Married 
couple
Proportion 
of total
Cohabiting 
couple
Proportion 
of total
Two adults 
with 
children
Proportion 
of total
Total private 
households
Defamilialised Denmark 16,333 1.1% 104,731.0 7.3% 121,064 8.4% 1,028,370 71.4% 290,999 20.2% 1,319,369 91.6% 1,440,433
Finland 28,931 2.1% 159,432.0 11.4% 188,363 13.4% 950,887 67.8% 262,713 18.7% 1,213,600 86.6% 1,401,963
France 292,698 1.8% 1,691,901.0 10.5% 1,984,599 12.3% 14,112,183 87.7% : : 14,112,183 87.7% 16,096,782 i
Group Avg 1.8% 10.3% 12.1% 85.0% 2.9% 87.9%
Avg not incl. France 69.6% 19.5%
Partially 
Defamilialised Netherlands 61,326 1.4% 334,990.0 7.4% 396,316 8.8% 3,441,857 76.3% 673,960 14.9% 4,115,817 91.2% 4,512,133 i
Austria 51,140 2.3% 300,732.0 13.6% 351,872 15.9% 1,630,914 73.9% 223,365 10.1% 1,854,279 84.1% 2,206,151 i
Germany 373,300 1.6% 1,982,000.0 8.3% 2,355,300 9.8% 19,357,700 80.9% 2,153,300 9.0% 21,511,000 89.9% 23,915,800 iu
Ireland 23,499 2.5% 130,364.0 14.1% 153,863 16.6% 692,985 75.0% 77,616 8.4% 770,601 83.4% 924,464
UK 370,860 2.2% 2,343,719.0 14.2% 2,714,579 16.4% 11,641,000 70.4% 2,191,170 13.2% 13,832,170 83.6% 16,546,749 i
Group Avg 1.8% 10.6% 12.4% 76.4% 11.1% 87.5%
Familialised Italy 362,582 2.2% 1,738,417.0 10.8% 2,100,999 13.0% 13,519,122 83.8% 510,247 3.2% 14,029,369 87.0% 16,130,368
Portugal 49,263 1.6% 317,526.0 10.3% 366,789 11.9% 2,517,039 82.0% 185,917 6.1% 2,702,956 88.1% 3,069,745
Greece 58,692 2.0% 292,485.0 10.1% 351,177 12.1% 2,477,566 85.3% 76,123 2.6% 2,553,689 87.9% 2,904,866
Spain 322,160 2.9% 1,329,960.0 11.9% 1,652,120 14.8% 8,947,032 80.1% 563,785 5.1% 9,510,817 85.2% 11,162,937
Cyprus 1,709 0.9% 12,315.0 6.5% 14,024 7.4% 173,316 91.3% 2,573 1.4% 175,889 92.6% 189,913
Group Avg 2.4% 11.0% 13.4% 82.6% 4.0% 86.6%
Refamilialised Czech Rep. 88,579 3.0% 487,842.0 16.8% 576,421 19.8% 2,208,323 75.9% 125,269 4.3% 2,333,592 80.2% 2,910,013
Estonia 9,077 2.4% 85,500.0 22.5% 94,577 24.9% 223,792 59.0% 61,223 16.1% 285,015 75.1% 379,592
Latvia 20,817 3.3% 181,518.0 29.1% 202,335 32.4% 388,609 62.2% 33,361 5.3% 421,970 67.6% 624,305
Lithuania 18,305 1.9% 187,817.0 19.0% 206,122 20.9% 725,303 73.5% 55,253 5.6% 780,556 79.1% 986,678 i
Hungary 58,428 2.0% 413,473.0 14.4% 471,901 16.5% 2,125,152 74.1% 271,641 9.5% 2,396,793 83.5% 2,868,694
Poland 231,808 2.2% 1,798,331.0 17.2% 2,030,139 19.4% 8,230,097 78.7% 197,381 1.9% 8,427,478 80.6% 10,457,617
Romania 132,878 2.1% 723,686.0 11.4% 856,564 13.4% 5,098,869 80.1% 414,061 6.5% 5,512,930 86.6% 6,369,494
Slovenia 14,610 2.6% 89,682.0 16.1% 104,292 18.8% 409,561 73.7% 42,092 7.6% 451,653 81.2% 555,945
Slovakia 32,375 2.3% 213,983.0 15.1% 246,358 17.4% 1,137,557 80.4% 30,466 2.2% 1,168,023 82.6% 1,414,381
Group Avg 2.3% 15.7% 18.0% 77.3% 4.6% 82.0%
EU 2.1% 11.7% 13.8% 79.5% 6.6% 86.2%
Avg not incl. France 78.3% 7.6%
EU (minus 
Austria, 
Ireland, and 
Latvia) 2.0% 11.6% 13.6% 79.7% 6.6% 86.3%
Avg not incl. France 78.5% 7.6%  
Base:  Total Private Households with Resident Children Under 25 Years 
Number: 22 EU countries (no data for Sweden, Luxembourg, Belgium, Bulgaria and Malta)  
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, 'Family nuclei by type, number of resident children in the family, current 
economic activity of parents and presence of other persons in the household', cens_nhmb
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Table A.11: Distribution among total population:  single parent with 
dependent children (percentage) 
 
Typology 1996 2000 2001 2006
Percentage 
difference, 
1996 & 2006
Percentage 
difference, 
2000 & 2006 1996 2000 2001 2006
Defamilialised Denmark : : : 7
Finland 6 3 6 5 -1 2 bi
Sweden : : : 8 : :
France 4 3 5 5 1 2 bi
Luxembourg 2 2 1 4 2 2
Belgium 4 4 3 6 2 2
Partially 
Defamilialised Austria 3 3 3 4 1 1
Germany 3 2 : 6 3 4
Netherlands 3 4 4 4 1 0 bi i
Ireland 3 3 3 8 5 5
UK 4 6 7 8 4 2 bi
Familialised Italy 1 1 1 3 2 2
Portugal 2 2 2 3 1 1 p
Spain 1 1 1 2 1 1
Greece 2 1 1 2 0 1
Cyprus : : : 2 : :
Malta : : : 2 : : p
Refamilialised Czech Rep. : : 5 4 : : i
Estonia : 7 7 7 : 0 i i
Latvia : 6 : 5 : -1 i
Lithuania : 7 6 6 : -1 i i
Hungary : 5 4 5 : 0 i i
Poland : 4 4 3 : -1 i i
Romania : 3 3 : : : i i
Slovenia : 3 3 3 : 0 i i
Slovakia : : : 3 : :
EU25 : : 4 5 : : is s
EU15 3 3 4 5 2 2 s s is s
Notes
Base:  Total Population 
Number: EU25 (plus Romania) 
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, 'Distribution of 
population by household types', ilc_ov19 
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Table A.12:  Live births outside marriage, 1996 & 2006 
 
Typology Country
Live 
births 
outside 
marriage
Total live 
births 1996 (%)
Live 
births 
outside 
marriage
Total live 
births 2006 (%)
Percentage 
rate of 
change
Percentage 
difference, 
1996 & 2006
Defamilialised Denmark 31,302 67,638 46.3% 30,126 64,984 46.4% -3.8% 0.1%
Finland 21,484 60,723 35.4% 23,858 58,840 40.5% 11.1% 5.2%
Sweden 51,348 95,297 53.9% 58,749 105,913 55.5% 14.4% 1.6%
France : : 419,192 830,288 50.5% : :
Luxembourg 851 5,689 15.0% 1,589 5,514 28.8% 86.7% 13.9%
Belgium 22,185 116,442 19.1% : 121,382 : :
Austria 24,880 88,809 28.0% 28,956 77,914 37.2% 16.4% 9.1%
Germany 135,700 796,013 17.0% 201,519 672,724 30.0% 48.5% 12.9%
Netherlands 32,192 189,521 17.0% 68,575 185,057 37.1% 113.0% 20.1%
Ireland 12,797 50,655 25.3% 21,295 64,237 33.2% 66.4% 7.9%
UK 260,369 732,863 35.5% 326,792 748,563 43.7% 25.5% 8.1%
Familialised Italy 43,758 528,103 8.3% : : : :
Portugal 20,597 110,363 18.7% 33,332 105,449 31.6% 61.8% 12.9%
Spain 42,352 362,626 11.7% 137,041 482,957 28.4% 223.6% 16.7%
Greece 3,290 100,718 3.3% 5,914 112,042 5.3% 79.8% 2.0%
Cyprus 144 9,638 1.5% 489 8,731 5.6% 239.6% 4.1%
Malta 135 5,038 2.7% 866 3,885 22.3% 541.5% 19.6%
Refamilialised Bulgaria 20,284 72,188 28.1% 37,572 73,978 50.8% 85.2% 22.7%
Czech Rep. 15,288 90,446 16.9% 35,259 105,831 33.3% 130.6% 16.4%
Estonia 6,370 13,242 48.1% 8,665 14,877 58.2% 36.0% 10.1%
Latvia 6,540 19,782 33.1% 9,654 22,264 43.4% 47.6% 10.3%
Lithuania 5,589 39,066 14.3% 9,266 31,265 29.6% 65.8% 15.3%
Hungary 23,813 105,272 22.6% 35,547 99,871 35.6% 49.3% 13.0%
Poland 43,548 428,203 10.2% 70,688 374,244 18.9% 62.3% 8.7%
Romania 47,919 231,348 20.7% 63,594 219,483 29.0% 32.7% 8.3%
Slovenia 5,984 18,788 31.9% 8,943 18,932 47.2% 49.4% 15.4%
Slovakia 8,430 60,123 14.0% 14,820 53,904 27.5% 75.8% 13.5%
EU27 1,172,663 5,132,932 22.8% : :
1996 2006
Partially 
Defamilialised
Base:  Total Live Births 
Number: EU27  
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, 'Live births by marital 
status and mother's age at last birthday', demo_fagec 
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Table A13: Live births within marriage, 1996 and 2006 
 
Typology
Live 
births 
inside 
marriage
Total live 
births %
Live 
births 
inside 
warriage
Total live 
births %
Percentage 
rate of 
change
Percentage 
difference, 
1996 & 2006
Defamilialised Denmark 36,336 67,638 53.7% 34,858 64,984 53.6% -4.1% -0.1%
Finland 39,239 60,723 64.6% 34,982 58,840 59.5% -10.8% -5.2%
Sweden 43,949 95,297 46.1% 47,164 105,913 44.5% 7.3% -1.6%
France : : 411,096 830,288 49.5% : :
Luxembourg 4,838 5,689 85.0% 3,925 5,514 71.2% -18.9% -13.9%
Belgium 94,257 116,442 80.9% : 121,382 : :
Austria 63,929 88,809 72.0% 48,958 77,914 62.8% -23.4% -9.1%
Germany 660,313 796,013 83.0% 471,205 672,724 70.0% -28.6% -12.9%
Netherlands 157,329 189,521 83.0% 116,482 185,057 62.9% -26.0% -20.1%
Ireland 37,858 50,655 74.7% 42,942 64,237 66.8% 13.4% -7.9%
UK 472,494 732,863 64.5% 421,771 748,563 56.3% -10.7% -8.1%
Familialised Italy 484,345 528,103 91.7% : : : :
Portugal 89,763 110,363 81.3% 72,117 105,449 68.4% -19.7% -12.9%
Spain 320,274 362,626 88.3% 345,916 482,957 71.6% 8.0% -16.7%
Greece 97,428 100,718 96.7% 106,128 112,042 94.7% 8.9% -2.0%
Cyprus 9,494 9,638 98.5% 8,242 8,731 94.4% -13.2% -4.1%
Malta 4,903 5,038 97.3% 3,019 3,885 77.7% -38.4% -19.6%
Refamilialised Bulgaria 51,904 72,188 71.9% 36,406 73,978 49.2% -29.9% -22.7%
Czech Rep. 75,158 90,446 83.1% 70,572 105,831 66.7% -6.1% -16.4%
Estonia 6,872 13,242 51.9% 6,212 14,877 41.8% -9.6% -10.1%
Latvia 13,242 19,782 66.9% 12,610 22,264 56.6% -4.8% -10.3%
Lithuania 33,477 39,066 85.7% 21,999 31,265 70.4% -34.3% -15.3%
Hungary 81,459 105,272 77.4% 64,324 99,871 64.4% -21.0% -13.0%
Poland 384,655 428,203 89.8% 303,556 374,244 81.1% -21.1% -8.7%
Romania 183,429 231,348 79.3% 155,889 219,483 71.0% -15.0% -8.3%
Slovenia 12,804 18,788 68.1% 9,989 18,932 52.8% -22.0% -15.4%
Slovakia 51,693 60,123 86.0% 39,084 53,904 72.5% -24.4% -13.5%
EU27 3,960,266 5,132,932 77.2% : :
1996 2006
Partially 
Defamilialised
Base:  Total Live Births  
Number: EU27  
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, 'Live births by marital 
status and mother's age at last birthday', demo_fagec 
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Table A.14: Percentage of women from the entire birth cohort (1952-
1959) who had experienced a second union formation by 
age 35 when the woman already had her own pre-union 
children 
 
Typology   % 
      
Defamilialised  Finland 7.6 
  Sweden 11.4 
  Belgium 4.2 
  France 7.3 
      
Austria 7.8 
Partially 
Defamilialised 
West 
Germany 6.1 
      
Familialised Italy 1.1 
  Spain 2.4 
      
Refamilialised Latvia 16.8 
  Lithuania 7.0 
  Hungary 9.8 
  Estonia 19.5 
  
Czech 
Republic 12.6 
  Poland 2.6 
  Slovenia 5.1 
  
East 
Germany 12.1 
Adapted from:  Prskawetz et al., 2003:132. 
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Table A.15: Distribution among total population:  three or more adults 
with dependent children 
 
1996 2001 2006
Typology
Households 
with 3 or 
more adults 
with 
dependent 
children (%)
Households 
with 3 or 
more adults 
with 
dependent 
children (%)
Households 
with 3 or 
more adults 
with 
dependent 
children (%)
Percentage 
difference, 
1996 & 2006
Percentage 
difference, 
2001 & 2006 2001 2006
Defamilialised Denmark : : 2 : :
Finland 5 2 3 -2 1 bi
Sweden : : 4 : :
France 9 7 4 -5 -3 bi
Luxembourg 15 12 8 -7 -4
Belgium 9 9 7 -2 -2
Partially 
Defamilialised Austria 20 21 12 -8 -9
Germany (includin 11 : 6 -5
Netherlands 7 10 5 -2 -5 i
Ireland 24 28 17 -7 -11
United Kingdom 10 8 7 -3 -1 i
Familialised Italy 18 17 11 -7 -6
Portugal 25 27 17 -8 -10 p
Spain 27 27 14 -13 -13
Greece 17 15 10 -7 -5
Cyprus : : 16 : :
Malta : : 18 : : p
Refamilialised Czech Republic : 12 11 : -1 i
Estonia : 11 14 : 3 i
Latvia : : 21 :
Lithuania : 15 16 : 1 i
Hungary : 16 15 : -1 i
Poland : 24 25 : 1 i
Romania : 24 : : : i
Slovenia : 22 19 : -3 i
Slovakia : : 24 : :
EU25 : 15 10 : -5 is s
Notes
Base:  Total Population 
Number: EU25 (plus Romania)  
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, 'Distribution of 
population by household types', ilc_ov19 
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Table A.16: Total divorce rate 
 
Typology 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006
Rate of 
change, 
1995 & 
2005
Defamilialised Denmark 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 : 25%
Finland 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0%
Sweden : 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0%
France : : : : : : : : : : : :
Luxembourg 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 67%
Belgium : 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 : : :
Partially 
Defamilialised Austria 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 25%
Germany 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 33%
Netherlands : 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0%
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 : : : : :
UK 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 : 0.5 0.5 0.4 : 0%
Familialised Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 : : 0.1 0.1 : 0%
Portugal 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 50%
Spain 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 : 200%
Greece : 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 : : : :
Cyprus : : : : : : 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 100%
Malta : : : : : : : : : : : :
Refamilialised Bulgaria : : : : : : 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 50%
Czech Rep. : : : : : : 0.4 0.4 : 0.5 0.5 0.5 25%
Estonia : : : : : : 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 : 0.5
Latvia : : : : : : 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 33%
Lithuania : : : : : : 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 67%
Hungary : : : : : : 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 33%
Poland : : : : : : 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 200%
Romania : : : : : : 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0%
Slovenia : : : : : 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 200%
Slovakia : : : : : : : 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Base:  Mean number of divorces per marriage in a given year 
Number: EU27  
Source: Eurostat 2008, General and Regional Statistics, 'Total Divorce Rate', 
cab11152 
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Table A.17: Crude divorce rate 
 
Typology 1985 1995 2005 2006 2007
Rate of 
change, 
1985 & 
2005
Rate of 
change, 
1985 & 
1995
Rate of 
change, 
1995 & 
2005
Rate of 
change, 
2005 & 
2006
Notes 
2007 
Defamilialised Denmark 2.8 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.6 0% -11% 12% -7%
Finland 1.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 44% 50% -4% -4%
Sweden 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.3 -8% 8% -15% 0%
France : 2.1 2.5 2.2 : 19% -12%
Luxembourg 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.5 2.3 28% 0% 28% 9%
Belgium 1.9 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.9 53% 84% -17% -3% p
Partially 
Defamilialised Austria 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.4 20% 15% 4% 4% p
Germany 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.3 : 4% -9% 14% -4%
Netherlands 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.0 -13% -4% -9% -5%
Ireland : 0.0 0.8 : :
UK 2.8 2.9 2.6 : : -7% 4% -10%
Familialised Italy 0.3 0.5 0.8 : 0.8 167% 67% 60% p
Portugal 0.9 1.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 144% 33% 83% 5%
Spain 0.5 0.8 1.7 : : 240% 60% 113%
Greece 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.2 50% 25% 20% 8% p
Cyprus 0.5 1.2 2.0 2.3 2.1 300% 140% 67% 15% p
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0 : :
Refamilialised Bulgaria 1.6 1.3 1.9 1.9 2.1 19% -19% 46% 0%
Czech Rep. 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 7% 3% 3% 0%
Estonia 4.0 5.2 3.0 2.8 2.8 -25% 30% -42% -7%
Latvia 4.5 3.1 2.8 3.2 3.3 -38% -31% -10% 14%
Lithuania 3.2 2.8 3.3 3.3 3.4 3% -13% 18% 0%
Hungary 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 -11% -14% 4% 0% p
Poland 1.3 1.0 1.8 1.9 1.7 38% -23% 80% 6%
Romania 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.7 7% 14% -6% 0% p
Slovenia 1.3 0.8 1.3 1.2 1.4 0% -38% 63% -8% p
Slovakia 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.3 40% 13% 24% 14%
EU27 1.7 1.8 2.0 : : 18% 6% 11%
EU25 1.8 1.8 2.1 : : 17% 0% 17%
Number: EU27  
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, 'Divorce Indicators', 
demo_ndivind 
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Table A.18: Mean duration of marriage at divorce (years) 
 
Typology 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006
Rate of 
change, 
1995 & 
2005
Defamilialised Denmark 11.2 11.2 11.1 10.4 11.2 11.4 11.4 11.5 11.1 11.2 11.4 : 0%
Finland 11.1 11.1 11.6 11.6 12.4 12.4 12.5 12.7 12.5 12.5 12.6 12.6 1%
Sweden : 12.4 12.6 11.2 11.8 12.0 11.8 11.7 11.9 11.8 11.9 11.6 1%
France : : : : : : : : : : : :
Luxembourg 10.5 13.1 10.5 11.4 11.5 13.1 12.5 11.5 12.9 12.8 13.3 13.3 6%
Belgium : 13.1 13.3 12.6 13.6 13.9 13.3 13.1 13.0 : : :
Partially 
Defamilialised Austria 8.6 8.5 8.4 9.2 9.8 10.0 10.7 11.1 11.2 10.8 10.7 10.6 0%
Germany 9.0 9.1 9.1 10.0 10.3 11.4 11.7 12.3 12.4 12.6 12.7 12.8 9%
Netherlands 8.5 13.6 14.4 11.5 12.1 11.8 11.5 12.2 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.2 13%
Ireland : : : : : : : : : : : :
UK 12.7 12.3 13.0 12.5 11.1 11.6 11.2 : 12.9 13.1 13.3 : 19%
Familialised Italy : : 24.2 17.1 16.9 15.5 15.8 : : 16.7 16.8 : 6%
Portugal 18.0 15.2 17.4 13.9 14.3 14.2 13.5 13.3 12.8 12.7 12.7 12.9 -6%
Spain : : : : 15.4 14.8 16.1 14.7 14.6 14.8 13.9 : -14%
Greece : 14.4 11.5 14.7 12.8 12.1 11.1 12.4 : : : :
Cyprus : : : : : : 11.4 12.0 11.9 12.5 11.9 11.6 4%
Malta : : : : : : : : : : : :
Refamilialised Bulgaria : : : : : : 9.0 10.2 10.9 12.3 12.3 12.2 37%
Czech Rep. : : : : : : 10.7 11.2 : 12.0 12.3 12.1 15%
Estonia : : : : : : 10.1 9.8 10.9 10.5 : 10.6
Latvia : : : : : : 9.9 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.9 6%
Lithuania : : : : : : 11.0 11.4 11.3 11.6 11.6 11.7 5%
Hungary : : : : : : 10.8 11.0 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.9 9%
Poland : : : : : : 12.5 11.4 12.7 12.9 13.3 13.2 6%
Romania : : : : : : 9.1 9.9 11.0 10.6 11.1 11.3 22%
Slovenia : : : : : 10.4 12.2 12.6 13.6 13.4 13.6 13.7 11%
Slovakia : : : : : : : 11.8 12.7 12.8 13.0 13.3
Number: EU27  
Source: Eurostat 2008, General and Regional Statistics, 'Mean duration of marriage 
at divorce (years)', cab11280 
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Table A.19: Marriages by previous marital status and sex, 2006 
 
Typology
Single 
persons %
Widowed 
persons %
Divorced 
persons %
Total of 
the 
marital 
status
Single 
persons %
Widowed 
persons %
Divorced 
persons %
Total of 
the 
marital 
status
Defamilialised Denmark 26785 73.5% 660 1.8% 8085 22.2% 36452 26384 72.4% 708 1.9% 7697 21.1% 36452
Finland 20993 74.3% 324 1.1% 5787 20.5% 28236 21630 76.6% 428 1.5% 6178 21.9% 28236
Sweden 32836 72.1% 441 1.0% 7994 17.5% 45551 35512 78.0% 388 0.9% 9651 21.2% 45551
France 217865 79.5% 4097 1.5% 52122 19.0% 274084 221032 80.6% 4268 1.6% 48784 17.8% 274084
Luxembourg 1430 73.4% 25 1.3% 493 25.3% 1948 1474 75.7% 15 0.8% 459 23.6% 1948
Belgium : : : : : : : :
Partially 
Defamilialised Austria 27121 73.5% 515 1.4% 9287 25.2% 36923 27466 74.4% 332 0.9% 9125 24.7% 36923
Germany 274022 73.3% 7018 1.9% 92641 24.8% 373681 273222 73.1% 4330 1.2% 96129 25.7% 373681
Netherlands : : : : : : : :
Ireland : : : : : : : :
UK : : : : : : : :
Familialised Italy : : : : : : : :
Portugal 40541 84.7% 675 1.4% 6641 13.9% 47857 41799 87.3% 456 1.0% 5602 11.7% 47857
Spain 181875 89.4% 1864 0.9% 19714 9.7% 203453 184267 90.6% 1116 0.5% 18070 8.9% 203453
Greece 50272 87.0% 597 1.0% 6933 12.0% 57802 50945 88.1% 408 0.7% 6449 11.2% 57802
Cyprus 4297 81.8% 97 1.8% 819 15.6% 5252 4402 83.8% 69 1.3% 746 14.2% 5252
Malta 2329 91.8% 7 0.3% 30 1.2% 2536 2324 91.6% 11 0.4% 51 2.0% 2536
Refamilialised Bulgaria 28359 86.5% 279 0.9% 3739 11.4% 32773 28730 87.7% 313 1.0% 3633 11.1% 32773
Czech Rep. 39149 74.1% 551 1.0% 13160 24.9% 52860 39569 74.9% 637 1.2% 12654 23.9% 52860
Estonia 4843 69.6% 129 1.9% 1982 28.5% 6954 4979 71.6% 187 2.7% 1788 25.7% 6954
Latvia 10496 71.8% 326 2.2% 3794 26.0% 14616 10692 73.2% 487 3.3% 3437 23.5% 14616
Lithuania 16278 76.6% 340 1.6% 4628 21.8% 21246 16641 78.3% 502 2.4% 4103 19.3% 21246
Hungary 34684 98.9% 570 1.6% 9274 26.5% 35058 35058 78.7% 599 1.3% 8871 19.9% 44528
Poland 202442 89.5% 3932 1.7% 19807 8.8% 226181 204241 90.3% 4289 1.9% 17651 7.8% 226181
Romania 123635 84.3% 1949 1.3% 21053 14.4% 146637 124680 85.0% 2537 1.7% 19420 13.2% 146637
Slovenia 5684 89.3% 92 1.4% 592 9.3% 6368 5799 91.1% 68 1.1% 501 7.9% 6368
Slovakia 22106 85.2% 199 0.8% 3634 14.0% 25939 22694 87.5% 146 0.6% 3099 11.9% 25939
Males Females
 
Base:  Total Marriages by Sex  
Number: EU27  
Source: Eurostat 2008, Population and Social Conditions, 'Marriages by previous marital status and sex', demo_nmsta 
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Table A.20: Population, number and proportion (rate per 10,000) of 
children under three years in institutional care in 2003 
 
 
* Figures in brackets should be treated with caution – these figures have either been 
based on estimates from samples of children over the age of five years or include 
children who may be in institutional care with a parent, for less than three months, or in 
a facility with less than 11 children. 
 
Source:  Chou and Browne, 2008:  43.  Refer to original source for information on notes 
on data. 
 
163 
 
Annex B   Chapter 3 Tables 
 
 
Eurostat Notes: 
 
: Not available 
b Break in series 
e Estimated value 
i See explanatory text 
p Provisional value 
s Eurostat estimate 
u Unreliable or uncertain data 
 
Eurostat country abbreviations:   
 
be Belgium  
bg Bulgaria  
cz Czech Republic  
dk Denmark  
de Germany  
ee Estonia  
ie Ireland  
gr Greece  
es Spain  
fr France  
it Italy  
cy Cyprus  
lv Latvia 
lt Lithuania 
lu Luxembourg  
hu Hungary 
mt Malta 
nl Netherlands 
at Austria 
pl Poland 
pt Portugal 
ro Romania 
si Slovenia 
sk Slovakia 
fi Finland 
se Sweden 
uk United Kingdom 
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Table B.1: Distribution of single parents with dependent children and 
households with dependent children among total population 
and at-risk-of-poverty population, 2006  
 
LPHH HHDC
eu25 total pop. 5 52
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 9 55
dk total pop. 7 48
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 11 34
fi total pop. 5 48
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 7 33
fr total pop. 5 54
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 11 54
se total pop. 8 52
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 20 51
de total pop. 6 46
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 11 40
nl total pop. 4 51
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 13 58
uk total pop. 8 48
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 17 52
es total pop. 2 52
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 3 56
gr total pop. 2 49
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 2 54
mt total pop. 2 57
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 6 62
cz total pop. 4 52
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 16 70
pl total pop. 3 62
at-risk-of-poverty pop. 4 76
Distribution among:
 
Source: Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'Distribution of population by 
household types', ilc_ov19 
Note:  2006 data for eu25 is a Eurostat estimate; 2006 MT data is provisional 
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Table B.2: At-risk-of-poverty rate (cut-off point:  60 per cent of median equivalised income after social 
transfers), single parent households vs. households with dependent children, 1996, 2001, and 2006 
 
Typology Geo LPHH HHDC LPHH HHDC
eu25 : : 30 18 32 s 17 s : : 7% -6%
eu15 37 s 18 s 32 18 32 s 17 s -14% -6% 0% -6%
Defam. dk : : 12 i 6 i 19 8 : : 58% 33%
fi 8 5 17 bi 8 bi 18 9 125% 80% 6% 13%
fr 34 15 29 bi 15 bi 29 13 -15% -13% 0% -13%
se : : 13 i 7 i 32 12 : : 146% 71%
de 51 14 36 12 24 11 -53% -21% -33% -8%
nl 39 14 38 ip 14 ip 32 11 -18% -21% -16% -21%
uk 52 21 43 bi 21 bi 41 21 -21% 0% -5% 0%
Famil. es 32 21 42 22 38 22 19% 5% -10% 0%
gr 27 20 37 17 30 23 11% 15% -19% 35%
mt : : : : 37 p 16 p : : : :
Refam. cz : : 26 i 10 i 41 13 : : 58% 30%
pl : : 22 i 19 i 32 23 : : 45% 21%
Partially 
defam.
Rate of change
1996 & 2006 2001 & 20061996 2001 2006
LPHH HHDCLPHH HHDC LPHH HHDC
 
Source: Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'At-risk-of-poverty rate, by household type', ilc_sis1a 
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Table B.3: Percentage of households below the poverty threshold with 
heavy financial burden due to housing costs (total 
households vs. single parents with dependent children), 
1995 and 2001 
 
Typology
eu15 1995 30.5 36.2
2001 26.4 41.5
Defam. dk 1995 12.6 15.6 u
2001 11.9 10.3 u
fi 1996 25.8 31.1 u
2001 22.6 18.6 u
fr 1995 28.4 39.6
2001 25.8 37.1
de 1995 22.8 22.9
2001 19.8 46.9 u
nl 1995 14.6 29.4 u
2001 9.6 23.4 u
uk 1995 13.7 u :
2001 5.8 16.7
Famil. es 1995 56.3 57.0 u
2000 38.2 65.2 u
gr 1995 23.5 12.6 u
2001 17.1 :
Total SPDC
Partially 
defam.
 
Source: Eurostat, Income and living conditions, 'Burden of the housing costs by 
type of household and income group', ilc_ho_afforda 
 
Table B.4: Tenure status as a percentage of all households below the 
poverty threshold (total households vs. single parents with 
dependent children), 1995/1996/1997 and 2000/2001 
 
Typology
Total Total Total
eu15 1995 45.6 27.5 47.6 67.9 6.9 4.6
2001 50.1 26.6 43.3 66.7 6.5 6.7
Defam. dk 1995 35.5 6.0 u 63.6 94.0 u 0.9 0.0
2001 37.9 21.1 u 61.2 78.9 u 0.9 :
fi 1996 39.8 25.7 u 55.6 74.3 u 4.6 6.8 u
2001 42.3 9.8 u 55.8 90.2 u 1.9 :
fr 1995 42.1 16.1 51.7 80.7 6.2 3.2
2001 47.0 15.1 45.2 75.8 7.8 9.1
se 1997 37.9 37.7 u 62.0 62.3 u 0.1 :
2001 35.8 34.9 u 64.2 65.1 u : :
de 1995 23.5 5.7 69.8 92.7 6.6 1.5
2001 27.5 4.3 64.5 91.5 8.0 4.2
nl 1995 27.4 3.7 u 69.1 96.3 u 3.5 0.0
2001 39.8 7.0 u 58.0 93.0 u 2.2 :
uk 1995 48.0 30.4 48.1 69.6 3.9 1.2
2001 53.7 21.7 44.1 76.1 2.3 2.1
Famil. es 1995 74.6 53.1 u 16.6 38.3 u 8.9 8.5 u
2000 83.4 86.3 u 8.7 12.1 u 7.9 1.6 u
gr 1995 89.1 77.3 u 8.2 14.2 u 2.7 8.5 u
2001 90.6 : 5.3 : 4.0 :
Partially 
defam.
Country Owner Rent Rent free
LPHH LPHH LPHH
 
Source: Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'Tenure status of 
accommodation by type of household and income group', ilc_ho_tenstata 
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Table B.5: Percentage of households below the poverty threshold with housing problems (total households vs. 
single parents with dependent children), 1995, 1996, and 2000 
 
Typology Geo Yr Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total
eu15 1995 23.6 28.3 28.4 32.2 12.4 16.9 17.9 25.9 28.0 32.5 18.2 20.2 20.6 25.4 26.2 33.4
1996 21.2 25.3 33.3 46.6 13.0 16.6 17.7 23.1 25.6 25.1 15.2 19.7 20.4 26.6 24.7 30.6
2000 19.7 21.0 27.3 36.5 11.9 14.7 15.8 19.6 23.4 22.7 12.0 11.5 17.5 23.5 22.5 28.8
Defam. dk 1995 21.1 38.5 u 15.6 31.1 u 4.6 : 5.6 7.7 u 13.7 15.1 u 8.0 4.5 u 10.3 16.4 u 10.5 19.3 u
1996 18.9 16.3 u 18.5 37.5 u 5.2 7.8 u 6.6 10.4 u 13.5 23.9 u 8.1 16.2 u 11.2 31.3 u 9.8 23.8 u
2000 16.4 37.0 u 17.2 40.7 u 3.8 1.8 u 3.5 4.8 u 9.7 13.4 u 5.8 10.1 u 9.2 23.4 u 7.5 20.3 u
fi 1995 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
1996 15.1 20.2 u 33.7 59.4 u 6.7 4.4 u 5.2 24.7 u 10.0 9.2 u 17.0 25.8 u 19.3 45.5 u 13.6 33.9 u
2000 19.9 32.1 u 33.0 70.1 u 4.6 20.1 u 4.5 15.0 u 9.9 9.1 u 14.5 10.1 u 23.6 40.3 u 14.6 42.0 u
fr 1995 17.1 18.7 29.0 37.7 12.7 10.3 16.9 20.2 35.1 34.6 16.8 19.0 20.9 31.8 27.4 32.8
1996 15.9 18.4 26.5 39.9 13.5 21.2 17.3 18.7 31.8 32.4 14.2 22.0 22.8 34.7 25.1 32.6
2000 15.9 19.5 26.1 35.8 15.0 17.9 17.4 27.7 32.9 32.0 16.9 14.5 18.7 20.4 24.3 31.9
de 1995 20.2 40.6 u 31.2 28.7 u 8.6 23.1 u 8.6 31.2 u 18.7 36.2 u 18.7 24.9 u 10.9 8.1 u 18.3 42.4 u
1996 16.0 18.2 u 38.6 50.0 u 9.7 19.0 u 9.3 20.4 u 17.5 22.1 u 13.2 17.2 u 12.2 8.2 u 17.2 21.9 u
2000 19.8 24.4 u : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
nl 1995 18.1 19.4 u 42.9 61.5 u 6.8 6.8 u 9.2 7.5 u 31.3 38.0 u 15.3 15.7 u 29.3 40.2 u 26.3 36.3 u
1996 17.0 19.3 u 46.5 41.9 u 7.1 2.2 u 11.5 11.0 u 28.8 46.7 u 12.7 14.1 u 22.8 28.5 u 21.5 13.8 u
2000 17.1 17.5 41.4 49.8 6.3 5.3 9.8 14.8 29.2 34.8 15.2 14.8 23.7 37.0 24.7 22.7
uk 1995 25.2 30.7 24.6 25.2 11.0 12.5 19.8 26.5 35.7 42.7 17.8 18.2 37.4 42.7 29.4 30.0
1996 23.6 34.6 32.3 35.1 10.3 13.6 19.3 34.9 30.4 40.0 15.3 13.1 33.7 41.3 27.8 39.8
2000 : : 24.9 37.1 6.4 11.6 6.5 9.1 15.2 26.3 7.7 6.0 20.9 27.6 19.2 33.1
Famil. es 1995 27.0 19.4 u 29.8 32.4 u 16.2 27.9 u 0.5 : 34.9 22.4 u 16.1 28.5 u 23.4 23.7 u 27.6 35.8 u
1996 26.9 15.2 u 30.4 55.7 u 21.6 9.2 u 1.1 9.2 u 34.1 3.9 u 11.0 18.1 u 20.0 36.9 u 26.7 23.2 u
2000 17.5 30.1 u 20.6 25.9 u 12.3 30.0 u 1.0 5.8 u 22.9 31.2 u 6.2 : 13.0 30.9 u 15.8 34.2 u
gr 1995 27.5 20.9 u 11.7 11.7 u 12.2 12.9 u 56.0 47.0 u 40.5 45.3 u 10.2 26.9 u 3.9 17.8 u 32.7 24.7 u
1996 27.0 : 14.3 : 12.5 : 49.4 : 36.5 : 11.1 : 3.8 : 29.7 :
2000 20.6 : 13.4 : 9.6 : 42.9 : 33.8 : 8.9 : 4.2 : 24.3 :
Partially 
defam.
SPDC SPDC SPDC SPDCSPDC SPDC SPDC SPDC
Rot in the house or 
damp or leaky roof
Pollution caused by 
traffic or industry
Vandalism or 
crime
Households with ≥3 
housing problemsLack of space
Noise from neighbours 
or outside Darkness
Inadequate 
heating facilities
 
Source: Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'Housing problems by type of household and income group', ilc_ho_problemb 
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Table B.6: Percentage of households below the poverty threshold 
lacking basic amenities (total households vs. single parents 
with dependent children), 1995-2001 
 
Typology Geo Yr Total Total Total Total Total
eu15 1995 6.5 3.5 6.6 6.7 5 4.4 10.5 9 32.6 32.6
1996 6.5 3.5 6 3.5 4.2 1.6 9.9 6.1 30.5 26.2
1997 6.9 3.6 5.7 2 4.9 1.6 11.2 5 31.6 21.8
1998 8.4 7.9 5 1.9 3.9 1.3 31.6 23.1 29.4 23.1
1999 7.6 3.9 4.8 1.2 3.8 1 32.9 22.6 30.7 22.4
2000 6.5 4 4.5 0.7 3.4 0.8 28.8 23.1 26.8 :
2001 6.2 3.5 4.2 0.9 3.2 0.7 28.9 21.1 27 21
Defam. dk 1995 2.7 : 7.7 : 3.1 : 7.7 : 4.8 3.2 u
1996 2.7 : 6.7 3.1 u 2.7 : 6.8 3.1 u 2.3 :
1997 2 : 6.5 : 4 : 6.5 : 1.6 :
1998 2 : 5.7 : 2.8 : 6.3 : 1.6 :
1999 1.3 : 4.8 1.35 u 3.2 : 5.4 1.35 u 0.8 :
2000 1.4 : 3.2 : 2.7 : 3.7 : 0.5 :
2001 1.2 : 2.9 : 1.8 : 3.3 : 0.6 :
fi 1995 : : : : : : : : : :
1996 5.2 : 8.2 : 5 : 9.3 : 5.4 :
1997 6.3 : 8 : 5.8 : 9.7 : 3.7 :
1998 8 : 10.1 : 7 : 13.1 : 7.6 :
1999 5.1 : 5.8 : 4.8 : 8.8 : 4.9 :
2000 5 : 5.4 : 5.5 : 9.5 : 4.9 :
2001 5.2 : 5.2 : 5.5 : 9.2 : 5.2 :
fr 1995 5.9 1.1 9.5 1.2 6.8 1.3 12.4 2.5 19 7.2
1996 5.9 1.1 9.6 1.1 6.3 1.3 11.9 2.4 20.4 5.9
1997 5.6 : 9.1 : 5.8 1.4 11 1.4 19.9 9.4
1998 5.4 1.3 8.4 1.3 6 1.4 23 10 18.9 10
1999 6.4 1.2 9.3 1.2 6.5 1.3 24.2 11.8 19.8 11.8
2000 4.9 1.2 7.5 1.2 5.3 1.4 21.9 10.9 18.6 :
2001 3.7 1.3 6.1 1.3 4.7 : 20.7 6.3 17.7 6.3
de 1995 10.5 3.2 u 7.5 19.5 u 5.1 12.8 u 16.2 24.8 u 21.6 38.6 u
1996 10.5 3.2 u 6.2 8.5 u 3.2 1.9 u 14.8 11.4 u 18.9 24.9 u
1997 7.4 6.4 6.5 1.4 7.1 2.4 13.6 7.4 28.4 12.6
1998 5.8 2.5 3.1 0.6 2.8 0.6 20.9 6.7 18.6 6.5
1999 4.2 0.4 3.3 1.3 3 1.3 25.2 11.5 22.6 11.5
2000 3.7 0.39 u 3.3 0.61 u 2.6 0.61 u 18.6 10.11 u 16.2 :
2001 4.3 : 4.4 1.28 u 3.7 1.28 u 18.9 10.53 u 15.6 10.53 u
nl 1995 1.3 : 3.2 : 2.8 : 3.9 : 16.4 4.7 u
1996 1.3 : 1.7 : 1.6 : 2 : 15.4 13.3 u
1997 0.9 : 1.9 : 1.8 : 2.8 : 13.7 9.4 u
1998 0.5 : 2.5 : 2 : 16.2 5.07 u 14.4 5.07 u
1999 0.9 : 1.1 : 1.5 : 15.9 5.71 u 14.8 5.71 u
2000 : : 0.8 : 0.5 : 11.4 6.8 11.2 :
2001 0.5 : 0.5 : 0.6 : 9.8 6.35 u 9.5 6.35 u
uk 1995 : : 0.4 : 0.4 : 1 : 19.3 11.2
1996 : : 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 16.7 11.9
1997 : : 1.3 0.5 0.3 : : : 15.9 9.5
1998 : : 2.5 1.6 0.7 : 15.8 14.4 14 14.4
1999 : : 2.1 0.6 0.7 : 16.2 11.2 14 10.6
2000 : : 2.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 14.6 11.6 12.3 :
2001 : : 1.7 : 0.7 : 12.3 3.2 10.5 3.2
Famil. es 1995 5.5 1.5 u 3.7 8 u 2.7 5.2 u 8.5 8 u 86.9 88.2 u
1996 5.5 1.5 u 3.1 : 2.6 : 6.8 1.5 u 84.6 75.3 u
1997 5.5 2.2 u 3 : 1.3 2.2 u 6.1 2.2 u 78.4 93.2 u
1998 4.6 7.79 u 1.6 2.6 u 1 4.91 u 80 90.11 u 80 90.11 u
1999 4.3 1.52 u 1.4 : 1 : 84.2 76.3 u 84.2 76.3 u
2000 4 10.7 u 1.7 : 1.4 : 78.1 89.06 u 78 :
2001 2.7 : 0.9 : 0.3 : 77.2 : 77.2 :
gr 1995 : : 16 : 18.1 : : : 73.9 61.8 u
1996 : : 11.5 : 13.5 : : : 72.3 :
1997 : : 10.9 : 12.6 : : : 72.4 :
1998 81.9 : 11.1 : 13.2 : 70.7 : 69.8 :
1999 83.4 : 15.7 : 19.5 : 70.1 : 69.5 :
2000 83.4 : 15.8 : 19.1 : 69 : 68.2 :
2001 83.5 : 14 : 18.1 : 68.1 : 67.7 :
LPHH LPHH LPHH
Partially 
defam.
Central heating
Hot running water 
on the premises
Bath, shower in 
dwelling
Flush toilet in 
dwelling
Missing at least one 
of 3 basic amenities
LPHHLPHH
 
Source: Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'Lack of amenities by type of 
household and income group', ilc_ho_amenb 
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Table B.7: Percentage of households below the poverty threshold which 
cannot afford certain durables (total households vs. single 
parents with dependent children), 1995-1998 
 
Typology Geo Yr Total Total Total Total Total
eu15 1995 19.6 44.4 4.3 3.5 19.1 23.1 25.0 36.1 20.2 28.4 10.7 15.5
1996 28.4 45.5 4.2 2.6 23.3 28.4 32.8 39.8 23.2 27.4 7.4 11.5
1997 13.2 35.5 2.9 2.7 14.2 14.0 18.8 22.0 14.9 19.7 7.4 9.2
1998 10.1 24.6 2.0 1.1 10.8 11.6 14.7 16.8 11.2 14.5 5.6 7.9
Defam. dk 1995 23.2 59.3 u 3.2 : 11.9 20.8 u 12.1 32.6 u 14.9 30.2 u 6.8 7.0 u
1996 21.2 40.7 u 3.8 : 11.6 3.0 u 10.1 21.3 u 12.6 15.6 u 3.9 3.0 u
1997 22.7 51.2 u 1.8 : 7.5 6.9 u 4.8 12.3 u 8.6 20.6 u 3.3 :
1998 17.2 44.2 u 3.2 : 13.5 6.8 u 7.9 34.5 u 9.1 20.1 u 2.5 3.4 u
fi 1995 : : : : : : : : : : : :
1996 23.5 32.8 u 9.2 : 18.9 21.2 u 17.9 34.9 u 16.1 13.5 u 10.8 :
1997 24.2 42.1 u 5.6 6.1 u 22.5 14.4 u 15.9 32.1 u 18.5 22.1 u 10.9 16.4 u
1998 : : : : : : : : : : : :
fr 1995 17.7 u 35.8 u 5.8 7.5 22.0 23.4 19.7 25.5 21.2 32.6 5.7 2.1
1996 16.7 40.9 4.5 5.5 19.9 27.2 20.5 34.4 17.0 25.4 5.3 8.6
1997 15.6 45.4 3.5 8.9 17.3 15.9 20.1 25.9 16.5 28.9 4.4 3.7
1998 21.1 34.7 4.7 5.0 19.6 16.6 23.3 33.5 16.8 27.5 5.2 8.6
de 1995 15.0 40.1 u 1.2 : 11.9 14.6 u 17.9 33.4 u 15.2 20.6 u 8.8 14.6 u
1996 51.9 59.6 u 3.5 : 35.3 28.4 u 55.5 49.6 u 33.8 31.0 u 6.4 9.5 u
1997 : : : : : : : : : : : :
1998 : : : : : : : : : : : :
nl 1995 20.9 36.9 u 4.2 : 14.4 10.4 u 8.3 14.0 u 16.6 21.5 u 2.2 :
1996 21.2 40.7 u 3.2 : 11.8 8.2 u 8.8 9.1 u 18.5 17.8 u 2.2 :
1997 18.4 25.3 u 2.5 5.3 u 12.7 9.4 u 11.3 11.1 u 14.0 7.7 u 2.5 6.0 u
1998 14.6 33.8 u 0.9 : 13.7 18.9 u 11.6 15.7 u 12.6 11.4 u 2.2 8.4 u
uk 1995 26.5 43.2 3.2 2.9 13.3 17.2 24.2 42.4 11.5 18.4 12.3 20.9
1996 28.1 44.4 3.6 2.7 14.1 15.3 21.1 31.6 12.2 16.5 1.5 1.0
1997 : : : : : : : : : : : :
1998 : : : : : : : : : : : :
Famil. es 1995 29.0 64.5 u 2.7 8.7 u 31.4 34.6 u 56.2 61.9 u 48.8 57.8 u 23.3 33.9 u
1996 26.0 46.6 u 3.2 3.7 u 27.8 27.8 u 50.0 77.1 u 43.6 50.2 u 19.3 29.0 u
1997 27.9 63.0 u 1.8 : 26.8 33.2 u 49.6 63.8 u 39.3 52.5 u 16.7 16.1 u
1998 26.6 67.3 u 1.7 1.7 u 23.3 24.8 u 47.7 46.3 u 37.2 42.8 u 17.9 25.3 u
gr 1995 26.4 57.2 u 16.7 6.3 u 32.5 49.8 u 33.8 72.6 u 21.3 32.0 u 14.5 5.5 u
1996 28.8 : 12.3 : 26.1 : 35.1 : 17.3 : 13.2 :
1997 26.5 : 12.0 : 26.3 : 37.9 : 20.9 : 12.1 :
1998 23.8 : 8.2 : 23.6 : 32.5 : 21.4 : 9.9 :
LPHH LPHH
Video recorder Dishwasher Microwave
Partially 
defam.
Telephone
Total
Car Colour TV
LPHH LPHHLPHH LPHH
 
Source: Eurostat 2008, Income and living conditions, 'Durables by type of 
household and income group', ilc_ho_durablea 
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